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Stories about the oil and gas industry are made for drama; these are tales of 
unimaginable wealth, unimaginable power, and oftentimes, unimaginable deeds. But 
what should we make of an oil and gas narrative without a blood feud or villain? This is 
the story of the Norway Model, a unique system of natural resource management 
responsible for this country’s transformation since 1969 when massive oil reserves were 
discovered on the North Sea continental shelf. After centuries of foreign occupation, the 
Norwegian government has built a thriving petroleum sector to fund its social welfare 
system beyond even the highest expectations; somehow, this nation of five million people 
grew from a poor maritime society to a global leader in environmentally conscious 
energy production with the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world. 
Despite these results, this oil economy faces new challenges in the coming years; 
as North Sea production declines, Norway increasingly looks north for fossil fuels in the 
Arctic and how these resources are discovered, produced, and regulated will require new 
innovations to ensure the sustainability of this welfare state. Thus, the next chapter of the 
 vii 
Norwegian success story remains to be written and this dissertation explores how 
narratives about the past, present, and future of the Norway Model will shape the course 
of natural resource management policies. 
In presenting the case of Norway’s success from a narrative perspective, this 
research breaks new ground in both applied and theoretical territories. As perhaps the 
most successful system of its kind in the world, scholars and policy makers alike have 
much to learn from studying this model. But when it comes to understanding the dynamic 
connections between energy management, international policy, and global warming, 
positivistic models for prediction and causality have fallen short (Smil, 2005). In contrast, 
narrative can communicate nuanced meanings in complex systems of organization. 
Therefore, this research explores the connections between narrative and complexity, as 
well as the communicative applications of narrative for understanding and organizational 
decision-making. Overall, conceptualizing this model’s evolution as a narrative offers 
tangible entry points for understanding how one country’s story can change the world.   
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Our management of the petroleum resources has been a success. The objective of 
achieving a qualitatively better society is a good description of some of the results 
of our petroleum activity…Since the 1970s, the substantial revenues from the 
activity have helped build the Norwegian welfare society. 
Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (2011, p. 6) 
Narratives about the oil and gas industry are made for drama; these are tales of 
unimaginable wealth, unimaginable power, and oftentimes, unimaginable deeds. Indeed, 
the term “resource curse” was coined to describe the tensions between endless 
opportunity and pathological behaviors— poor fiscal management, social inequality, 
political instability, corruption, even violence—for societies with hydrocarbon-based 
economies (Auty, 1993; Watts, 2005). But what do we make of an oil and gas story 
without a blood feud or a villain? A story where the protagonist strikes it rich then uses 
the money to improve the lives of those around them. A protagonist who tells the truth, 
thinks about their actions, and realizes that more wealth or power is not always the 
answer. This is the story of the Norway Model. 
Through a combination of foresight, regulation, innovation, and cultural values, 
Norwegians have thus far avoided the pitfalls of a resource-based economy. Their unique 
system of managing a national petroleum sector, the Norway Model,1 is based on 
separate organizational structures for the commercial, political, and regulatory functions 
of government control (Al-Kasim, 2006a, 2006b; Thurber, Hults, & Heller, 2011; 
                                                
1 This model is also described to as “The Nordic Model” and “The Norwegian Model” and can refer to 
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Thurber & Istad, 2010). Since the 1960s when massive oil reserves were discovered on 
the North Sea continental shelf, the government has built a thriving industry to fund a 
national welfare system based on the principles of a social democratic political system. 
This approach to state-managed petroleum activity is a source of national pride, wealth, 
and international influence developed over fifty years of practice that continues to exceed 
expectations.  
Figure 1 (NPD, 2012) illustrates the developed regions of Norway’s continental 
shelf in the North, Norwegian, and Barents Seas. With these combined resources, these 
developments made Norway the seventh-largest oil exporter and fourteenth-largest oil 
producer in the world in 2012. Corresponding revenues translated to over four trillion 
NOK ($729 billion USD) in the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, currently the largest 
of its kind in the world (NPD, 2012). Today, Norwegians are some of the healthiest, 
wealthiest, and happiest people on the planet; the country has topped the United Nations 
annual Human Development Index nearly every year for the past decade. Despite these 
phenomenal results, the future of Norway’s oil economy faces new challenges in the 
coming years.  
North Sea oil production reached a plateau in 1995, a peak in 2001, and a decline 
in 2009 (MPE, 2010). Until recent years, petroleum activity has been contained to the 
southern and western regions of the continental shelf, but along with the rest of the world, 
Norway increasingly looks north in search of fossil fuel energy. Thus, the ways that 
Norway discovers, produces, and regulates petroleum will experience major transitions 
and require new innovations in the coming years.  
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Figure 1. Developed Regions of the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
 
Keeping the Success Story Going 
Overall, the government stresses that continuing to find undiscovered resources in 
Arctic, as well as making the gradual transition from focusing on oil to gas production, is 
vital to maintaining Norway’s vision for the future. As illustrated by Figure 2, the most 
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recent U.S. Geological Survey predicts that 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil 
and 30 percent of undiscovered natural gas resources are contained in the Arctic (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 2012). For Norway, almost all of these resources are 
located in the Barents Sea, regions collectively referred to as the High North, including 
recently delimitated territories between Norway and Russia. 
Figure 2. Resource Basins in the Arctic Circle 
 
After forty years of dispute, in April 2010, the countries finally agreed on 
maritime boundaries for oil and gas activity and this accord has been symbolic for 
Norwegian policymakers staking their future plans on the Arctic. However, the 
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challenges of harsh weather, darkness, and rich ecological diversity in the Barents Sea 
liken these regions to a Wild West for petroleum development—unchartered and 
unpredictable. In addition, the High North includes the island regions of Lofoten and 
Vesterålen (LoVe), areas steeped in cultural and environmental significance (see Figure 
3). As spawning grounds for the world’s largest cod and herring populations, LoVe is 
known for breathtaking beauty and a historic fishing industry, making it a popular tourist 
destination for Norwegians and world travelers alike.  
Figure 3. Lofoten Islands Region 
 
Over the last decade, opening these regions to petroleum activity has been a topic 
of public and political controversy. Many argue that stopping LoVe drilling symbolizes a 
larger international movement towards sustainable industries and energy resources in a 
climate change era. Thus, the next chapter of the Norwegian success story remains to be 
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written and this dissertation explores how narratives about the past, present, and future of 
the Norway Model will shape the course of resource management planning. 
Why Narrative? 
Narrative logic is evident in some of the most culturally symbolic aspects of the 
Norwegian petroleum sector. For example, the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy (2011) explains, “the names of many [oil and gas] fields are taken from Norse 
mythology, with strong roots and steeped in national tradition” (p. 7). However, now that 
“the strongest names from Norse mythology are already in use” the Ministry believes that 
Norway “should also consider new types of names…to reflect the industry’s importance, 
both for specific regions and for the nation as a whole…to ensure that they fit into a 
national context and history” (p. 7). What remains uncertain—how the Norwegian 
success story will continue as a national history—is how the Norway Model will adapt to 
interdependent and emergent challenges such as globalization and climate change. 
When it comes to studying and understanding the dynamic connections between 
energy management, international policy, and global warming, positivistic models for 
prediction and causality have fallen short (Smil, 2005). In contrast, narrative thinking can 
capture nuanced meanings in complex systems of organization, but is vastly underutilized 
in social science research about these topics. Therefore, to develop the theoretical 
implications of conceptualizing the Norway Model, this research explores the 
connections between narrative and complexity, as well as the communicative applications 
of narrative for understanding and organizational decision-making. The following 
chapters explore how studying the Norway Model from a narrative perspective can shed 
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new light on the overwhelmingly complex global issue of energy security. Overall, I 
argue that conceptualizing this Model’s evolution as a narrative offers scholars and 
policy-makers in both Norway and beyond a tangible framework for understanding how 
one country has been successful where so many others have failed. 
Chapter One provides a theoretical framework for interpreting individual and 
organizational narratives about the Norwegian success story. Through the lens of five 
metaphors of organizational narratology, this chapter argues the structural and functional 
aspects of narrative are ideal for conceptualizing and communicating about complexity in 
organizational settings. Next, Chapter Two describes the hybrid inductive 
methodology—a combination of interpretive, narratological, and case study methods—
that guided my research process. The results of this research are presented in the next two 
chapters from different narrative perspectives.  
Chapter Three offers a temporal framework for understanding the Norwegian 
success story by locating the Norway Model in a larger cultural-historical context of 
natural resource management. Overall, “The Ten Oil Commandments” explains the 
Norway Model as one of cultural values enacted through an innovative combination of 
organizational structures and adaptations for long-term success. The metanarrative of this 
success story is juxtaposed against a different temporal perspective in Chapter Four. With 
the future of Arctic petroleum development uncertain, the local stories from 
organizational leaders in “A New Chapter for the North” interpret a different ending. 
These narratives communicate that Norway must starts building a more sustainable 
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national industry now; with the inevitable end of fossil fuel energy, in twenty or thirty 
years, it will be too late.  
Furthermore, the stories in Chapter Four question whether the proposed petroleum 
activity in LoVe represents a cultural and moral tipping point for Norway. Moving 
forward with exploration and drilling could disrupt local ways of life, damage rich and 
diverse ecosystems, and endanger the lives of offshore workers. In the process, these 
interpretations reveal fascinating tensions between the historical and political traditions of 
the Norwegian people, how they have managed natural resources for two hundred years, 
and how newfound wealth has affected this country. Taken together, Chapters Three and 
Four identify how on both individual and institutional levels, narrative is applied to 
understand the meaning of events and communicate how that meaning influences 
decision-making and action.  
Within this broad scope of narrative applications, Chapter Five examines the role 
of circumspection in the Norwegian success story. Circumspection deals with the 
cognitive process of reflecting on past events to understand how to best plan for the 
future. Circumspection also can be described as prudence, or careful and thoughtful 
planning, a term frequently used to the policy-making strategies of Norwegian resource 
management. Whether the story is about environmental protection, foreign relations, 
investment strategy, or social welfare, the punch line is the same: the Norway Model is 
organized by a complex system of careful and considerate policies designed to balance 
the risks and rewards of petroleum activity over time. By examining the evolution of 
these policies through the lens of organizational narratology, this dissertation offers both 
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scholars and decision-makers valuable understanding on the future of energy 
management in a globalized world.   
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Chapter One: Theoretical Framework 
In choosing a narrative approach for this project, I follow a strong tradition of 
scholars studying complex forms of communication in complex forms of organizations. 
With roots in literary criticism, organizational narratology focuses on using narrative 
theory to study “what we gain from using [stories] as a vehicle for communication” 
(Browning, 2009, p. 673). In its simplest form, scholars such as Czarniawska (1998), 
Putnam and Fairhurst (2001), and Weick (1979) would describe narrative as “a type of 
communication that happens in conversation, is composed of discourse, appears in a 
sequence, and is interpreted retrospectively” (Browning & Boudes, 2005, p. 32). 
Czarniawska (1998) argues the most basic form of narrative “requires at least three 
elements: an original state of affairs, an action or an event, and the consequent state of 
affairs” (p. 2). This broad scope of analytic criteria involves the form, style, and purpose 
of organizational stories and can be applied to any number of organizational texts such as 
annual reports, conversations, interviews, mission statements, and technical documents.  
Within organizational communication research, narratology can be conceptualized 
from many different ontological and epistemological positions. Thus, this chapter 
outlines a theoretical framework that situates my research within organizational and 
communication studies, provides useful concepts and structures for interpreting 
narratological research, and makes epistemological and ontological assumptions about 
the value and application of narratives in this research. First, the open architecture 
metaphor explains the how different types of stories can be applied for different 
communicative functions. Second, the narrative mode thought metaphor offers a 
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structural framework for analyzing how stories can provide the type of nuanced cognitive 
understanding that is often lacking in more positivistic or scientific reasoning. Third, the 
sensemaking metaphor explains how narrative communication reflexively produces 
meaning and action. Fourth, the Tamara metaphor offers a postmodern perspective on 
interpreting multiple voices, contexts, and meanings in organizational stories. Finally, the 
homo narrans metaphor positions narrative as a useful structure for social and cognitive 
understanding, but more importantly, as the primary component of human 
communication. 
These five metaphors illustrate those positions I draw upon to inform this 
dissertation and locate my research in the broader context of the discipline. In addition, 
each of these sections also includes the relevant research questions that guided my 
interpretive process. While collecting and making sense of this data, these questions 
emerged as I dove deeper into the organizational narratology research. 
Open Architecture Metaphor 
Although there is no singular definition of what “counts” as a narrative, some 
would argue that stories are distinct from narratives (e.g., Gabriel, 1995, 2004). If story is 
a real-time account of something that happened, then narrative is the retrospective 
interpretation of what that story means in a larger context (Boje, 2001). An eyewitness 
account of a factory burning to the ground is a story; a newscaster’s telling of shoddy 
factory safety inspection records and the aftermath for workers and their families is a 
narrative. Yet, relegating story form to something “less-than” a narrative implies 
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limitations on the communicative and cognitive capabilities of both storytellers and story-
readers.  
Bruner (1986) explains that “placing limits on the kinds of stories…could mean 
either that the limits are inherent in the minds of writers and/or readers (what one is able 
to tell or to understand)…[thus] we would do well with as loose fitting a constraint as we 
can manage concerning what a story must ‘be’ to be a story” (pp. 16-17). The argument 
for a “loose fitting restraint” on what “counts” as a story or narrative, as well as the 
approaches we take towards studying and understanding them, is echoed by Browning 
and Morris (2012) who propose an open architecture metaphor for organizational 
narratology.  
This open architecture is grounded in narrative appreciation, a concept “analogous 
to music appreciation in that it brings theoretical concepts from narratology to bear on 
how people experience and assess stories” (Browning & Morris, 2012, p. 2). In terms of 
communication, narrative appreciation means applying theoretical ideas about the form, 
structure, content, and application of narratives to interpret how individuals understand 
and find meaning through stories. Like Bruner, Browning, and Morris, I agree that 
distinguishing between narrative and story offers limited heuristic value, and thus use the 
terms interchangeably.  
However, I also agree with scholars such as Boje (2001) that not all texts are 
stories; some stories are too fragmented to communicate developed meaning. Still, as 
Bruner (1986) argues, “narrative deals with the vicissitudes of human intentions. And 
since there are myriad intentions and endless ways for them to run into trouble—or so it 
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would seem—there should be endless kinds of stories” (Bruner, 1986, p. 16). What this 
means, “in English,” according to McAdams (2006), is “that stories are about what 
characters want, what they intend to do, and how they go about trying to get what they 
want or avoid what they do not want, over time” (pp. 77-78). Thus, narrative appreciation 
is a useful tool for studying the complex intentions, actions, and motivations involved 
with organizational narratives.  
Specifically, Browning and Morris (2012) argue that narratives have many 
different communicative applications. 
Table 1. Communicative Applications of Narrative 
Application Definition 
Explanation Goes from partial understanding of a set of events toward a fuller 
interpretation that reveals more precisely what happened and why 
(p. 13). 
Imagination Placing a set of circumstances and people in a different space and 
time continuum via a story and hypothesizing about them to 
construct an idea of what might have been, or what will be (p. 13). 
Celebration Calls attention to the qualities possessed by the actor and to the 
possibility of reauthoring the self by characterizing them in 
favorable way (p. 15). 
Transportation How a story moves, or transports, a listener or reader by its sheer 
power…that they lose awareness of their current setting, are 
shocked when they “come out of it,” and are affected…by the story 
to such an extent that they are changed by it (p. 14). 
Circumspection Reflecting upon what happened in the past, altering understandings 
about the circumstances of actions, and prudently anticipating future 
events (p. 15). 
Elevation Shifts the audience from a dulled to a thrilled attentiveness and from 
a base to an elevated horizon of possibilities (p. 16). 
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Table 1 illustrates the six applications Browning and Morris propose. Because of their 
familiar form, aesthetic appeal, and cultural significance, narratives are useful for 
communicating about complex topics such as identity, morality, and rationality. In 
organizational narratives, we see elements of learning, argumentation, and decision-
making in these communicative applications. In keeping with the open architecture for 
studying these applications, though, it is important to remember this list is not exhaustive. 
Instead, this list should be considered as an invitation to other scholars examining the 
communicative forms and functions of narratives in organizational research. 
For example, Czarniawska (1998) describes four common narrative forms in 
organizational research: “research that is written in storylike fashion (‘tales from the 
field,’ to paraphrase Van Maanen, 1988)…that collects organizational stories (tales of the 
field)…that conceptualizes organizational life as story making and organizational theory 
as story reading (interpretive approaches); and a disciplinary reflection that takes the 
form of literary critique” (pp. 13-14). These classifications are useful in understanding 
how I have presented the results of this dissertation and layers of story within them, 
which will be explained in Chapter Three. Furthermore, in terms of the content and 
structure of this dissertation, the open architecture metaphor guided my analysis and 
interpretations in answering the following research question: 
RQ1: What types of organizational stories and communicative applications of 
narrative are present in the High North? 
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Narrative Mode Thought Metaphor 
Much of the narratological work by contemporary organizational scholars is 
influenced by psychologist Jerome Bruner, who claims that narrative are their own form 
of human knowledge. Bruner (1986) introduces the narrative thought metaphor as an 
alternative to what he calls logico-scientific thinking: “there are two modes of cognitive 
functioning, two modes of thought, each providing distinctive ways of ordering 
experience, of constructing reality. The two (though complementary) are irreducible to 
one another” (p. 11). Tsoukas and Hatch (2001, p. 983) summarize how Bruner compares 
these two modes of thought in Table 2. This figure illustrates the different objectives, 
methods, and characteristics of logico-scientific and narrative mode thought grounded in 
what Bruner describes as the difference between sound arguments and good stories 
(Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001; Weick & Browning, 1986). For example, a sound argument is 
motivated by objective truth, but a good story is motivated on plausibility, or 
verisimilitude. What matters is whether or not that story is believable, not whether or not 
it is fictional.  
Furthermore, comparing these two thought modes reveals that “whereas in logico-
scientific thinking, propositions or rules connect categories of behavior of actors and 
situations, narrative thinking places these elements into a sequenced, contextualized 
statement with a plot” (Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001, p. 998). Events themselves are not a 
narrative; when placed in a temporal context, or a plot, events may be interpreted with 
causality and thus, become meaningful. This sequencing creates an identifiable schema 
for locating and remembering people and places, identifying the nuanced connections 
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between motivation and outcome, and constructing tangible understandings from fluid 
experiences.  
Table 2. Comparison of Bruner’s Two Modes of Thought  
 
Two scholars, American psychologist Donald Polkinghorne and French 
philosopher Paul Ricœur, are especially relevant in understanding how temporality and 
plot are intertwined in Bruner’s conception of narrative thought. Polkinghorne (1991) 
defines narrative as “the cognitive process that gives meaning to temporal events by 
identifying them as parts of a plot” (p. 136). Let us unpack that definition: narrative is a 
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cognitive process; temporal events are experiences with a beginning, middle, and end; a 
plot is a sequence of events; and locating temporal events within this sequence makes 
them meaningful. Events are the parts, and plot is the whole, of a narrative 
(Polkinghorne, 1988). This part-whole structure, or narrative configuration, provides a 
heuristic framework for organizing experiences with coherence (Polkinghorne, 1988, 
1991). That is, narrative configuration allows us to recognize when an event is starting, in 
process, or completed. The process by which narratives are configured is what Ricœur 
(1984, 1985) describes as emplotment.  
Carr (2008) explains that for Ricœur, “narrative is an essential feature of human 
existence by which we humanize and thus deal with time. It gives our individual and 
social existence sensible contours and projects, and thus gives meaning to life” (p. 27). 
Placing events in a larger context and sequence creates individual and collective meaning 
and memories. Similarly, Boje (2001, p. 43) compares synchronic narratives as “stories 
about a specific society at one time in history” to diachronic narratives, which take on 
“historical change, discontinuities, and ruptures (Best & Kellner, 1991, p. 172).” 
Organizational narratives dealing with societies and cultures, historical contexts, and 
specific events can be synchronic, diachronic, or have elements of both. 
In this dissertation, the narrative mode thought metaphor provides important 
structural features for analyzing and comparing the different stories about the timeline 
and trajectory of Norwegian resource management through exploration of the following 
research question: 
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RQ2: What are the major plotlines and temporal contexts of the organizational 
stories in this data? 
Sensemaking Metaphor 
Similarly to the narrative mode thought metaphor, from an ontological 
perspective, the sensemaking metaphor assumes that communication and knowing are 
intrinsically connected. This metaphor is based on the work of psychologist Karl Weick 
who explains that as a process of organizing, sensemaking involves the retrospective 
creation of identification and meaning. When faced with decisions for action in complex 
environments, organizations must engage in a process of dually producing and enacting 
situational contexts to decide what information to use (or not) and how to use it (Cheney, 
Zorn, & Ganesh, 2011). In other words, organizations must find ways to make sense of 
their environments by looking back on what is known about the past to move forward. As 
organizations make sense of their environments, they create stories about events not only 
to articulate meaning; stories can actually establish events as meaningful.  
As Browning and Morris (2012) explain, “a distinctive feature of sensemaking, 
and one that also distinguishes it from interpretation, is the way action and organization 
collaborate to make up the structure. Weick sees communication as a type of action 
because generating discourse is an act of performance and production” (p. 141). The act 
of communicating this discourse in narrative form takes meaning from being individual 
to organizational, from interpretation to action.  If storytelling articulates the “quest” of 
an organization, then future actions are evaluated and decided based on coherence with 
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this journey (Czarniawska & Wolff, 1998).  This sensemaking process is always ongoing 
and it is always retrospective.  
However, sensemaking is not just collective. From a cognitive perspective, 
“sensemaking is an effort to tie beliefs and actions more closely together…the outcome 
of such a process is a unit of meaning, two connected elements” (Weick, 1995, p. 135). 
McAdams (2006) argues “when it comes to human lives, storytelling is sensemaking. I 
cannot understand who you are and what your life might mean unless I have some sense 
of the story you are working on—the way you see your life as a plot enacted over time” 
(p. 76). This understanding is not only about one person understanding another, 
McAdams continues; “we expect stories to tell us who we are” (p. 76). In other words, 
we think about life events in story form to also make sense of our individual identities 
and what that means for future decisions. This meaning is essential for understanding the 
common events in organizational life when individual actors encounter something they 
don’t understand and ask “what’s the story here?” (Weick, et al., 2005, p. 410). In asking 
for the story, the explanation, individuals have potentially created a reference point for 
meaning.  
David Boje’s work on sensemaking is also important for understanding the 
meanings and actions that organizational communication in narrative form can produce. 
For example, Boje (1991) argues that telling stories offers organizational actors valuable 
“sense-making currency” for building stakeholder relationships (p. 106). As Boyce 
(1996) explains, Boje illustrates that “skilled storytellers and story interpreters are 
effective organizational communicators, demonstrate understanding of organizational 
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culture and history, and possess skills that managers dealing with rapid change might 
well develop” (p. 18). Furthermore, “Boje’s work draws attention to the uses of 
storytelling by internal stakeholders (predicting, empowering, and fashioning change) 
and by external stakeholders (making sense of the setting, negotiating alternative 
interpretations, and accommodating new precedents ” (Boyce, 2006, p. 18). Overall, “the 
sensemaker can build on the main nugget of the story to communicate a stronger grasp of 
the concept” (Browning & Morris, 2012, p. 13). Having this ability—to communicate the 
central “take-away” within a story in a way that also communicates a broader scope of 
meaning—provides organizations and organizational actors considerable advantage in 
managing their interests in fluid, complex environments. 
This metaphor is useful for researchers in examining how organizations and 
individual organizational actors use stories to interpret events, as well as how these 
stories can communicate meaning between internal and external stakeholders. Overall, 
sensemaking is about putting collective and individual identity into action by 
communicating. Thus, the following research question will deal with sensemaking: 
RQ3:  How do the organizational stories about resource management policies 
reflect elements of collective and individual identity? 
Tamara Metaphor 
Building on Weick and arguing a postmodern turn for organizational studies, Boje 
(1995) applies the Tamara metaphor to understanding what he describes as the 
“plurivocal interpretation of organizational stories in a distributed and historically 
contextualized meaning network” (p. 1000). Based on the Los Angeles play for which it 
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was named, this metaphor is a “wandering linguistic framework in which stories are the 
medium of interpretive exchange” in organizations (p. 1000). In Tamara, “a dozen 
characters unfold their stories before a walking, sometimes running audience” who can 
“chase characters from one room to the next…and cocreate the stories that interest them 
most” (Boje, 1995, pp. 998-999). With twelve stages and twelve characters, “the number 
of story lines an audience could trace as it chases the wandering discourses of Tamara is 
12 factorial (479,001,600)” (Boje, 1995, p. 999). These story lines are akin to the 
multiple performances, types, narrators, and interpreters, in storytelling organizations.  
This metaphor and the concept of plurivocality extends Boje’s (1991) previous 
work defining a storytelling organization as “collective storytelling system in which the 
performance of stories is a key part of members’ sense-making and means to allow them 
to supplement individual memories with institutional memories” (p. 106). Although 
storytelling does give “narrative order” to “chaotic experience,” Boje (2001) argues 
“sensemaking is not all there is” (p. 7). Sometimes, “experiences lack that linear 
sequence and are difficult to tell as a ‘coherent’ story,” and “telling stories that lack 
coherence is contrary to modernity” (p. 7). When encountering stories that lack 
coherence, we question the plausibility of how, when, and why these events occurred as 
they are narrated; we think to ourselves, “something doesn’t add up here.”  
However, Boje (2001) would argue these criteria for assessing the plausibility of 
stories is flawed; “in the postmodern condition, stories are harder to tell because 
experience itself is so fragmented and full of chaos that fixing meaning or imagining 
coherence is fictive” (p. 7). In reality, “storytelling is not actually linear or coherent, and 
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stories in organizations are emergent, fluid, and polyvocal” (Boje, 2001, p. 1). 
Organizations and organizational actors must dually interpret and enact meaning in the 
“indeterminate” and “differentiated events of daily life (Boje, 1995, p. 1001). Thus, 
organizational storytelling is grounded in managing the temporal aspects of learning and 
decision-making with the structural functions of narrative. 
Like sensemaking, the Tamara metaphor also has collective and individual 
implications. Storytelling organizations “exist to tell [and] live out their collective 
stories,” and are “in constant struggle over getting the stories of insiders and outsiders 
straight” (Boje, 1995, p. 1000). However, an organization is not one story with one 
interpretation, and such struggle can also occur between insiders. Since an organization—
and even the nature of organizing—is fluid, distributed, and emergent, the meaning of 
events communicated via narratives “depends upon the locality, the prior sequence of 
stories, and the transformation of characters in the wandering discourse” (p. 1000).  
Furthermore, organizational stories are co-constructed by both narrators and the listeners 
or readers. Thus, the potential for multiple individual and organizational interpretations 
cannot be ignored.  
In such a complex organizational environment as national resource management, 
multiple interpretations of storied events also cannot be ignored. Thus, the Tamara 
metaphor is used to frame the following research question: 
RQ4: What are the different interpretations of these organizational stories and 
how do they compare to one another? 
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Homo Narrans Metaphor 
Similar to other narratologists, Walter Fisher focuses on the role stories play in 
constructing collective and individual meaning. However, Fisher (1987) departs from the 
pack with Human communication as narration: Toward a philosophy of reason, value, 
and action and the concept of a narrative paradigm. Instead of viewing narrative as 
simply a communicative vehicle for social understanding or cognitive processing, Fisher 
argues with the homo narrans metaphor that narrative subsumes all other frameworks of 
rationality, truth, and knowledge as the primary form of human communication.  
“Like any other theory of human action,” the narrative paradigm seeks “to 
account for how persons come to believe and behave” (Fisher, 1987, p. 97). However, 
this metaphor “is a fabric woven of threads of thought from both the social sciences and 
the humanities” to project “narration not as an art, genre, or activity, but as paradigmatic 
of human discourse” (p. 97). According to homo narrans, the narrative paradigm 
supersedes dominant metaphors such as ideology and hegemony because they are 
concepts that illustrate reason and value, expressed through the narrative discourse of 
communication.   
This paradigm is based on “a philosophy of reason, value, and action” rooted in a 
logic of “narrative rationality” (Fisher, 1987, p. 47). Narrative rationality deals with “the 
reliability, trustworthiness, and desirability” of communicative discourse (p. 143). More 
specifically, these aspects of discourse are evaluated for narrative rationality based on 
coherence and fidelity. The probability of a narrative, if it is cohesive and believable, is 
determined by argumentative/structural, material, and characterological coherence. This 
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third type of coherence is “one of the key differences between the concept of narrative 
rationality and traditional logics” because “whether a story is believable depends on the 
reliability of its characters” (p. 47). The way to determine reliability of character is 
whether or not “interpretations of the person’s decisions and actions reflect values,” and 
whether or not these “organized sets of actional tendencies” illustrate contradictions or 
anomalies (p. 47). In other words, whether or not a character lives up to their story. 
Whereas coherence deals with plausibility, another aspect of narrative rationality, 
fidelity, relies on a logic of “good reasons” based upon “elements that provide warrants 
for accepting or adhering fostered by any form of communication” (Fisher, 1987, p. 48). 
Accordingly, this logic can be used to assess the fidelity—the truthfulness—of a story 
and thus, what that story is asking us to believe. Fisher argues that narrative fidelity can 
be assessed by asking “critical questions that can locate and weigh values...about fact, 
relevance, consequences, consistency, and transcendental issues” (p. 48). Furthermore, 
considering coherence and fidelity together is particularly useful for assessing narratives 
dealing with what Fisher describes as “public moral argument” (p. 71). Within this 
broader description are three important criteria for applying the narrative paradigm to 
organizational stories. 
First, public moral argument is publicized for broad consumption; it crosses 
professional fields (although different professional experts will usually participate in the 
argument and the perceived rationality of their arguments influences the public’s 
judgment) and “is often undermined by the ‘truth’ that prevails at the moment” (Fisher, 
1987, p. 71). Second, public moral argument is “founded on ultimate questions—of life 
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and death, of how persons should be defined and treated, of preferred patterns of living” 
(pp. 71-72). Third, public moral argument relies on “good reasons, according to the 
narrative paradigm, and “may also refer to public controversies—disputes and debates—
about moral issues” (p. 72). These nuanced descriptions underscore how as the primary 
form of human communication, narrative plays out into the public sphere to influence our 
reasons, values, and actions.  
As such, the core concepts of Fisher’s homo narrans metaphor, guided by a fifth 
and final research question, offer another useful framework for interpreting the narrative 
data in this dissertation: 
RQ5: How are narrative coherence and fidelity communicated through these 
organizational stories? 
Chapter Summary 
Taken together, these five metaphors represent the various epistemological and 
ontological positions from organizational narratology that guide my interpretations, frame 
the way results are presented, and illustrate where this research makes unique 
contributions to organizational and communication studies. Using these metaphors, I 
locate elements of temporality, context, culture, and action within the stories I collected 
during fieldwork. From there, I construct the narratives results chapters of this 
dissertation. Chapter Three, “The Ten Oil Commandments,” will examine the Norwegian 
oil and gas success story from the perspective of government organizations as told 
through the lens of public policies. Chapter Four, “A New Chapter for the North,” digs 
deeper into the plurivocal narrative of Norway’s next steps in Arctic petroleum 
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development and what those steps will mean for Norwegians on local, national, and 
global levels.  
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Chapter Three: A Hybrid Inductive Methodology 
Like a camera with many lenses, first you view a broad sweep of the landscape.  
Subsequently, you change your lens several times to bring scenes closer and 
closer into view.  
Charmaz (2006, p. 14) 
The present study was conducted using a number of inductive methods often 
found in qualitative organizational communication research. Researchers employing 
inductive methods are often challenged by the positivist assumption that an initial lack of 
specificity in theoretical backing, units of analysis, and predictive hypotheses equates 
with lack of focus. Yet the goals of inductive research are to generate new conceptions of 
“the daily realities (what is actually going on)” of social phenomena, rather than simply 
verifying existing theoretical constructs (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 238). As Patton 
(1980) explains, “inductive analysis means that the patterns, themes, and categories of 
analysis come from the data; they emerge out of the data rather than being imposed upon 
them prior to data collection and analysis” (p. 306). Essentially, working backwards 
through this emergent process is a pain-staking task. 
This chapter includes sections on interpretive, narratological, and case study 
methods that guided the inductive process of my dissertation research. The project began 
with a social phenomenon to study—the Norway Model of natural resource 
management—and from there, the patterns, themes, and categories of communicative 
realities in the data shaped methodological decisions and theoretical directions. In 
addition, this inductive process pushed me to seek out best methods for answering my 
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specific questions as they emerged. As such, methods from other social science traditions 
such as public policy, sociology, and management make this research uniquely 
interdisciplinary. The following sections will outline the specific elements of those 
traditions that shaped data collection, analysis, and reporting, as well as the measures I 
employed for ensuring reliability and validity throughout this research. 
Interpretive Methods 
Originally, this dissertation was conceived as part of a larger book project on 
communication and culture in northern Norway. My assignment was spending three 
months at the University of Nordland (UiN) Bodø Graduate School of Business (HHB) 
examining the political and cultural implications of petroleum development in these 
regions and when I entered the field, I had much to learn about Norway. In terms of the 
theoretical directions of this research, I also had much to learn about the implications of 
the Norway Model for organizational communication. During my first interview with 
Ivar Kristiansen, a member of Parliament from Nordland county, he mentioned that 
Norway has “accepted foreign companies since the start of this fairytale.” At the time, I 
did not realize his comment would so heavily influence the way this project would 
develop, but the narrative seed had been planted. 
Before reviewing this narrative focus though, I will explain the interpretive 
methods I used from the start of this research process. Interpretive researchers are 
primarily concerned with “the human as instrument” approach (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
The interpretive approach to examining social science phenomena respects individual 
experiences in daily life, necessitating that researchers shape theoretical understandings 
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from the actions, beliefs, and perspectives of their participants. Within the broader scope 
of interpretivism, this section reviews how I collected and analyzed data using elements 
of ethnographic and grounded theory methodologies.  
Fieldwork 
The term fieldwork generally refers to the activities researchers perform at the 
physical site of a cultural group (e.g. listening, observing, conversing, recording, 
interpreting) and is especially useful when dealing with larger issues of ethics, culture, 
and politics (Wolcott, 1995). In an ethnographic context, fieldwork “requires one to 
spend time engaged in a setting, taking part in the daily activities of the people under 
study and recording, as soon as possible, observed activities in the form of fieldnotes” 
(Jackson, Drummond, & Samara, 2007). In organizational studies, these observations and 
notes can be incorporated with other forms of data (e.g., interviews, archival records) for 
interpretive analysis.  
In this study, the field sites for my work consisted of organizations throughout 
Norway, but were mainly concentrated in northern Norway— Bodø, Lofoten, and 
Harstad—and Oslo. Most of my time in the field was spent recruiting respondents by 
attending networking functions such as conferences for industry and political 
representatives, visiting organizations to conduct interviews, and working at the 
university. In addition to collecting interview and archival data, I learned a great deal 
about the cultural aspects of Norwegian resource management by observing the rituals, 
conversations, and practices taking place around me at these organizations. I took 
detailed fieldnotes about these observations as a cultural and professional outsider. 
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Figure 4: Fieldwork Cities in Norway  
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Figure 4 provides a geographic context for these regions (National Geographic, 
2012). For example, I spent one weekend attending an anti-petroleum protest in Svolvær, 
a historic fishing village in the Lofoten Island region. Several high-profile politicians and 
NGO leaders would be speaking at debate and had agreed let me interview them at 
various times throughout the weekend. The rest of my fieldwork trip was spent talking to 
protesters at the local pub, hearing their arguments against Northern petroleum activity 
over a piping bowl of fiskesuppe (creamy fish soup) and a pint. (Figure 5 is taken from 
my photos of the trip.) I also wandered amongst the rorbus (traditional fishing cabins 
often converted to vacation rentals) and hjell (wooden racks for drying cod in the winter) 
getting a sense of what life was—and still is—for these Northern communities. 
Figure 5. Rorbus in Lofoten  
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In Oslo, I saw Norwegian life below the Arctic Circle, its sushi restaurants and 
crowded trams a cosmopolitan contrast to the pastoral symbolism of Lofoten. As home to 
the Storting (Parliament), Norwegian bureaucratic headquarters, and international NGO 
regional offices, Oslo was where most political decisions about Norway’s oil and gas 
future were being made. This is a sticking point for many Northerners who oppose 
petroleum activity in their hometowns; they feel disconnected and underrepresented, 
questioning whether the rest of Norway should reap most of the benefits of their labor 
and resources. Northerners are stereotyped as rural, simple people, but they sometimes 
view Southerners as exploitive and arrogant. Spending time in these vastly different 
regions, observing and recording how nuanced cultural issues such as the North/South 
tension affect petroleum development, provided me with additional data and invaluable 
perspectives for interpretation. 
In addition, my role as a cultural outsider revealed how central my own identity 
was to the interpretive process. Czarniawska (1998) describes fieldwork as  “a situation 
in which a person leaves his or her own field and more or less established identity to 
enter another field” (p. 42). This entrance “begins with extensive positioning,” something 
I certainly experienced at different stages of my fieldwork and recorded in my notes 
(Czarniawska, 1998, p. 42). To recruit participants, I learned to position myself as a 
curious and politically neutral American graduate student; higher education and global 
citizenship are strong cultural values in Norway. During interviews, respondents often 
asked questions about my personal background, coursework and studies, future career 
plans, and perspectives on their system as an American.  
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At first, such positioning felt disingenuous, but over time, I realized my 
discomfort was an asset. As Czarniawska (1998) explains, when you no longer identify as 
an outsider, perhaps “it will be time to go home: the feeling of estrangement is gone and 
with it the main source of insight” (p. 41). For certain, each time I returned to Norway to 
collect data and work at the university, I felt more like an organizational and cultural 
insider. In turn, my observations reflected more expertise and I had to remain cognizant 
of how of this shifting identity could influence my interpretations. 
Semi-structured Interviewing 
As another part of fieldwork, semi-structured interviewing that begins with 
standard questions, and then allows researchers to deviate from the schedule based on 
how a conversation unfolds, provides the most flexibility and responsiveness to emergent 
themes (Charmaz, 2006; Jackson, et al., 2007). My interview protocol thus took shape in 
the form of both standard questions and exploratory probes designed to elicit different 
responses from different participants (see Appendix A). Each interview always began 
with “how would you define the High North?” and ended with “based on our discussions, 
is there anything you think I am missing?” These questions were meant to provide some 
consistent points of comparison during data analysis. Between those opening and closing 
inquiries, I selected questions from a list of different topics relevant to each interviewee’s 
area of expertise with petroleum activity. Upon request, I emailed participants an 
interview schedule before our meeting. 
Consistent with the constant comparative method of analysis discussed later in 
this chapter, my interviewing strategies and questions adapted as theoretical directions 
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became clearer. Overall, I completed 24 semi-structured, in-depth interviews (23 face-to-
face and one via telephone) with elected officials, NGO leaders, policy analysts, and 
researchers from a variety of organizations involved with the political, regulatory, and 
environmental aspects of the national petroleum sector (see Appendix B for a list of 
participants and their affiliated organizations; see Appendix C for descriptions of the 
organizations represented in interview and archival data). These efforts resulted in 
approximately 17 hours of recording and 296 single-spaced pages of transcribed data 
uploaded into Nvivo software for analysis. All but one participant consented to interview 
recording and use of their actual names and organizations during analysis and reporting. 
The participant who declined allowed me to take notes during the interview and report 
their responses using a pseudonym. These sampling, interview, and consent procedures 
were approved by The University of Texas at Austin Institutional Review Board and 
Norwegian Social Science Data Services. 
Theoretical Sampling 
To recruit interview participants, I employed theoretical sampling, a foundational 
aspect of grounded theory methodology. Grounded theorists sample based on emergent 
directions of theoretical development, rather than using the logic of selecting participants 
to confirm hypotheses and create generalizable theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Corbin & 
Strauss, 1990; Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1998). Because it begins with a broad scope of 
potential experiences and narrows with greater understanding, theoretical sampling 
ensures representativeness and consistency of theory development (Corbin & Strauss, 
1990; Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1998).  
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Researchers must also weigh the benefits of wide and narrow sampling (Cutcliffe, 
2000) and in line with Lincoln and Guba (1985), I approached my first round of 
interviews—from May to August 2010—with the belief that wide sampling would offer 
more varied data in terms of experiences, situational factors, and interpretations. In 
addition, Glaser and Strauss (1967) advocate that participants should be selected for both 
similarity and difference. I articulated my wide initial sample as organizational actors 
involved in current public policy debates about petroleum development in northern 
Norway and narrowed that criteria based on constant comparative analysis. 
Potential participants were initially recruited through my personal contacts at 
Bodø Graduate School of Business. As a prominent research facility for Arctic energy 
issues, faculty members at HHB have an extensive network of organizational contacts 
with relevant expertise for this project. After a faculty member introduced me to potential 
participants via email, face-to-face or telephone meetings, I followed up with each recruit 
to set up a formal interview. I also looked up various administrators within the 
Norwegian ministries pertinent to my topic and “cold” contacted them via telephone or 
email in hopes of scheduling an interview. As my fieldwork continued, I relied on 
suggestions for future informants and introductions from interview respondents.  
For example, Frederic Hauge (president of Bellona Foundation) advised me to 
contact Gaute Wahl (president of People's Action Oil-free Lofoten, Vesterålen and 
Senja). Mr. Wahl invited me to Lofoten for the previously mentioned weekend anti-
drilling protest sponsored by his organization. During that weekend, I was able to 
interview the leaders of two national political parties who were participating in a festival 
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debate about northern oil drilling. One of these party leaders I cold contacted via email 
from her party website; the other agreed to meet with me after an administrator at HHB 
put in a call on my behalf. And just as my interview protocol became more refined with 
more time in the field, my sampling strategy narrowed as theoretical directions became 
clearer. For example, during my third data-collection trip in May 2011, I focused on 
recruiting participants with direct involvement in the upcoming municipal elections, since 
Northern oil drilling was one of the issues being debated among candidates.  
Archival Data Selection 
In addition to collecting observations and interview data, part of my fieldwork 
relied on learning as much as I could about Norwegian petroleum activity as soon as 
possible. I had to be sensitized to the jargon, organizational structures, current events, and 
main actors involved in this aspect of the petroleum sector to conduct productive 
interviews. For example, when a participant mentioned “the 4% rule,” I learned they were 
referencing Norway’s sovereign wealth fund and the related controversies about how 
much of the government’s annual budget should come from those savings. Most of this 
knowledge came from reading white papers and other organizational documents that 
interview participants either gave or directed me towards, such as a strategic report on 
Arctic foreign policy from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I also gathered a multitude of 
online annual reports, policy papers, histories, and news articles to prepare for interviews.  
With more time in the field, I realized these documents were not just helpful 
preparation materials; they were valuable data. Thus, I continued collecting and began 
analyzing them in the same fashion as interview transcripts. In fact, Chapter Three of this 
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dissertation is primarily based on my interpretations of the stories in this archival data. I 
continued this analytic process continued until I reached theoretical saturation (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967) as described in the following section. Overall, 39 of these documents are 
interpreted in this dissertation (see Appendix D and the list of references). 
Constant Comparative Analysis 
The constant comparative method of analysis involves concurrently gathering and 
coding data, letting emergent concepts guide directions for theoretical development 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). According to Corbin and Strauss (1990), the basic units of 
analysis in this method are concepts, or the “the incidents, events, and happenings are 
taken as, or analyzed as, potential indicators of phenomena” as labeled by the researcher: 
“Every concept brought into the study or discovered in the research process is at first 
considered provisional…[then] earns its way into the theory by repeatedly being present 
in interviews, documents, and observations…or by being significantly absent” (p. 7). 
Concepts are constantly grouped into higher-level, more abstract categories through 
constant comparisons of similarity and difference. However, not all concepts will become 
categories, which serve as the “cornerstones” of theory development by providing “the 
means by which a theory can be integrated” (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 7). Categories 
should work together to explain the relationships between abstract concepts represented 
in a data set, thus generating theory.  
Objectivist methods to coding during the constant comparative process can be 
highly procedural (e.g., LaRossa, 2005) but I approached this process from a more 
constructivist perspective (e.g., Charmaz, 2006). First, during open coding (word-by-
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word, line-by-line, incident-by-incident) I stuck closely to the data instead of 
precipitously applying existing constructs. This also involved in-vivo coding (Charmaz, 
2006; Lindlof & Taylor, 2010), or labeling of words and phrases participants use to 
reflect cultural knowledge. Second, during focused coding (using significant and frequent 
codes to sort through large amounts of data) I tested the fit of categories and made 
decisions about directions for theory development (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser, 1978). Third, 
I followed Strauss and Corbin’s (1990, 1998) guidelines for axial coding as the next step 
in the constant comparative process, where categories are related to specific 
subcategories; the subsequent core categories and subcategories were used to develop 
frameworks for understanding the emergent theory in my data set.  
Categories can be deemed saturated when “gathering fresh data no longer sparks 
new theoretical insights, nor reveals new properties of these core theoretical categories” 
(Charmaz, 2006, p. 113). I used Nvivo software to help me sort and diagram the 
categories and their connections; these are all useful tools for determining saturation 
(Charmaz, 2006). Three other concepts from the constant comparative method also 
helped me move between coding stages towards saturation: theoretical memos, isolating 
data examples, and theoretical sensitivity. 
Theoretical memos. A central step of the constant comparative method, writing 
theoretical memos, is designed to help the researcher carefully and accurately navigate 
the task of tracing their interpretive process. Despite the deceptively simple label, 
theoretical memos are not just casual notes a researcher records about their “ideas” 
during data collection and analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1998). No formal standard 
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for writing memos exists, but researchers can envision this process in a number of ways. 
Strauss & Corbin (1990, 1998) describe memo writing as accurately recording categories, 
properties, hypotheses and generative questions when they occur, rather than after the 
fact. They advocate that researchers begin writing memos in conjunction with the start of 
coding and continue this process until a project concludes.  
Similarly, Charmaz (2006) describes memos as conversations researchers have 
with themselves, a process of making ideas concrete and manageable through writing. As 
the “pivotal step between data collection and writing drafts of papers,” these early memos 
can be used to explore early codes, direct further data collection, and develop basic 
questions (Charmaz, 2006, p. 72). Based on these recommendations, I began writing 
theoretical memos in GoogleDocs after completing my first interview in Norway and 
continued throughout fieldwork and analysis (see Appendix F for sample memo). These 
memos—approximately 80 single-spaced pages in total—were subsequently imported 
into NVivo and helped me visualize the graphic relationships between my categories, 
write up descriptions of categories, and determine when categories had become saturated. 
Isolating data examples. Glaser and Strauss (1967) state that another important 
part of the constant comparative process is isolating data examples during analysis, 
working to “take apart the story” within the data (p. 108). When the time comes to write 
up theory by rearranging memos and field notes, not only is the story broken up by 
theme, but examples for each category have also been put aside. Isolating examples as 
they occurred to me, rather than waiting until I was writing up results, helped to ensure 
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the accuracy of my original interpretations. In addition, this strategy helped shape the 
narrative focus of this analysis and directions for theory building.  
Theoretical sensitivity. According the Charmaz (2006), researchers using 
interpretive methods often have “guiding empirical interests to study…[that] give a loose 
frame to these interests” (p. 16). As such, from a practical perspective, being sensitive to 
existing theory allows researchers to articulate units of analysis, directions for interview 
schedule refinement, theoretical sampling, and goals of theory development. This notion 
is similar to what Blumer (1954) first described as sensitizing concepts in social research 
and can provide “a sense of how observed instances of a phenomenon might fit within 
conceptual categories” (Bowen, 2006, pp. 7-8). However, theoretical sensitivity is a 
controversial issue within grounded theory tradition.  
On one hand, Glaser (1992) argues that researchers should refrain from reviewing 
relevant literatures prior to beginning a study, believing this approach offers the greatest 
possibility for new theoretical development. On the other hand, Strauss and Corbin 
(1990, 1998) and many management scholars (e.g., Parry, 1998; Suddaby, 2006) urge 
researchers to enter the field with as few assumptions about what they will find as 
possible, while still employing theoretical sensitivity. This implies that researchers should 
gleam what is useful toward interpreting their data from existing theory but resist the urge 
to force data into emergent categories based on that knowledge.  
Although I entered the field as a cultural outsider, my approach towards gathering 
and analyzing data certainly relied on theoretical sensitivity. At first, I entered the field 
unsure of exactly what I was studying, how I would study it, or how it related to 
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communication; this was a truly inductive project. But as previously discussed, after 
returning home from my first fieldwork trip, I immersed myself in the organizational 
literatures for narrative studies to build the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 
One. This framework helped me adapt my data collection and analysis strategies to 
reflect a narrative focus. 
Narratalogical Methods 
Studying organizations with narratological methods “attempts to describe and 
understand behaviors and beliefs by evoking a discourse of organizational reality” 
(Luhman & Boje, 2001, p. 159). From this perspective, my methodological choices were 
already aligned with those used in narrative research when I decided to move in this 
direction. I also began researching specific strategies for narrative interviewing (e.g., 
Lindlof & Taylor, 2010; Polster, 1987) to refine my questions to elicit more stories from 
participants (e.g., “Can you tell me about a time that strategy worked out successfully?”). 
Once I decided to incorporate archival data into this research, I also needed more insight 
into methods for locating and interpreting narratives from public policies. I found that 
just as organizational studies have taken a “narrative turn” over the last twenty years 
(Czarniawska, 2011), other disciplines are using narrative to studying complex issues. 
For example, researchers have argued the connections between narrative and 
ethnographic fieldwork (e.g., Gubrium & Holstein, 1999), public policy (e.g., Jones & 
McBeth, 2010; Roe, 1994), cross-cultural management studies (e.g., Soin & Scheyt, 
2006), and psychology (e.g., Hoshmand, 2005; McAdams, 1993; Polkinghorne, 2005). 
Moving forward, I relied on tools from two such perspectives—narrative inquiry and 
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narrative policy analysis—to complement the organizational narratology methods (e.g., 
Boje, 2001; Czarniawska, 1998) I deemed relevant for data collection, analysis, theory 
building, and reporting.  
Narrative Inquiry 
Within psychology research, narrative inquiry draws primarily from the work of 
Donald Polkinghorne, whose relevance to the narrative mode thought metaphor was 
discussed in Chapter One. Narrative inquiry is “directed at narrativized human experience 
or inquiry that results in narrative forms of data” (Hoshmand, 2005, p. 181). This can 
involve different methods of collecting data, such as fieldwork. Gubrium and Holstein 
(1999) compare ethnography, which “points broadly to the careful and usually long-term 
observation of a group of people that are locally experiences,” and narrative research, 
which “refers loosely to the examination of the diverse stories, commentaries, and the 
conversations engaged in everyday life” (p. 561). As previously mentioned in this 
chapter, much of my fieldwork involved careful observation of the communicative 
practices in organizations where I conducted interviews, as well as the cultural dynamics 
I observed in my daily experiences living and working in Norway. These field notes—
approximately 40 single-spaced pages—became one data source for narrative inquiry. 
Narrative inquiry can also rely on “the general use of recorded conversations 
and/or collected texts (e.g., memos, emails, reports) as a data source” (Luhman & Boje, 
2001, pp. 158-159). Hoshmand (2005) explains that interviewing participants involves 
“soliciting stories and oral histories,” but also agrees with Polkinghorne that “the original 
research data” does “not have to be narrativized” as a precondition for narrative inquiry; 
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researchers “can construct a story about a person’s life from chronological data as well as 
other kinds of observational data that are not presented in story form” (p. 181). However, 
Hoshmand and Polkinghorne also insist that narrative inquiry needs to distinguish data 
from that used in other forms of qualitative research.  
Polkinghorne (2005) explains “the purpose of qualitative data is to provide 
evidence (i.e., to make evident) the characteristics of an experience” and “it is common in 
qualitative research to refer to this interview-produced collection of prose responses as a 
narrative account” (p. 142). However, in narrative inquiry, the term “narrative” is 
reserved for “a particular kind of produced discourse and to distinguish narrative 
responses from other prose responses” (p. 142). As such, other inductive qualitative 
methods do not always align with narrative inquiry; this distinguishes my project from 
using grounded theory in the strictest sense of the methodology. I utilize several iterative 
methods from the grounded theory tradition (e.g., constant comparative analysis, 
theoretical sampling), but do not present a new theoretical model of communication as 
the final results of this research. 
Responses in narrative inquiry “have the form of a story with the beginning-
middle-end structure” and from this form, “the described events and happenings are tied 
together by a plot, through which they are attributed meaning in terms of their 
contribution to the story’s denouement” (Polkinghorne, 2005, p. 142). This unique 
structure and consequential function is based on the central process of both the narrative 
mode thought metaphor and narrative inquiry: emplotment. As I moved through 
interpretation with coding and categorization, I paid particular attention to aspects of 
44 
emplotment discussed in Chapter One. The first and simplest aspect of this process 
involved isolating and labeling each story in the data. I utilized the narrative mode 
thought metaphor to look for temporal cues (e.g., “This policy dates back to hydropower 
legislation from the 1900s”) signaling a story’s beginning, middle, and end. Furthermore, 
a plot can be organized by the unfolding sequence of events as characters attempt to 
achieve their goals (McAdams, 1993). As Hoshaman (2005) argues, “most life-story 
accounts also involve psychic or social conflict and its resolution as an organizing 
principle” (p. 182). This sequential aspect of emplotment also became important to 
organizing the many stories within this data set and how they related to one another.  
Within the data I gathered from government organizations, I located many 
references to a larger narrative about the petroleum sector grounded in historical patterns 
of cultural resource management. This story was reminiscent of a biography; in tracing 
the origins and evolutions of a complex network of organizations for managing the 
policies and structures for managing the petroleum sector, I located one main character: 
the Norway Model. Thus, I set about piecing together this biographical history in Chapter 
Three using the “methodological principle of selectivity”:  
Rosenthal (1993) explained that in reconstructing a narrated life story, such as 
with the help of interactive interviews, the narrator and the biographer make 
selections on the basis of sequentiality. Selection of action sequences from 
reported activities takes into account the range of possibilities and the decision to 
eliminate certain possibilities as opposed to others...While the biographer is 
carried by the narrative flow in the storytelling, each text sequence is interpreted 
for relevance in the context of the overall construction of the main narration. 
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Thus, in addition to the thematic hypotheses, a part-to-whole configuration is 
involved in a holistic rather than reductionistic or linear analysis. (Hoshmand, 
2005, p. 182) 
Each of the stories presented in Chapter Three were selected based on their relevance as 
action sequences in the overall construction of a larger narrative.  
Overall, the data I collected, as well as the analytical methods I use to interpret 
these data, are consistent with narrative inquiry. A third methodological component, 
reporting, is also important in qualifying narrative inquiry. Hoshmand (2005) argues that 
“at least three types of report” are appropriate for this type of research: “a descriptive 
report of a privately constructed self-account in its original narrated form; a recounting of 
a dialogically generated narrative or set of narratives in a story form; and a storied 
account of an experience constructed from interviews, written reports, observations, and 
artifacts” (p. 181). Chapters Three and Four of this dissertation blend these three types of 
reporting. The chapters are written in a narrative style, describe individual and 
organizational stories in their original forms, and present a collection of stories I collected 
during fieldwork. Chapter Three is framed within a larger narrative of the cultural history 
of Norwegian resource management; Chapter Four is framed within a larger narrative of 
my field experiences in the Lofoten Islands and Oslo. Within both of these frameworks, 
organizational stories and local stories are woven together to form sequential and 
thematic narrative categories.  
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Narrative Policy Analysis 
Jones and McBeth (2010) explain that in response to an epistemological and 
ontological divide in their discipline, Roe (1994) introduced narrative policy analysis for 
studying “policy areas of high uncertainty, complexity, and polarization” (p. 335). The 
first step of this method involves identifying “policy narratives (defined as having a 
beginning, middle, and end)” (p. 335). Next, “alternative narratives that do not conform 
to the dominate policy narrative(s)” are identified; these two groups are compared in step 
three and a “grand policy metanarrative is derived from the comparison” (p. 335). In the 
fourth and final step, the researcher decides how this metanarrative could be examined 
using more traditional tools for policy analysis such as statistics and microeconomics. 
As previously mentioned, using narrative inquiry provided a reference point for 
interpreting a larger, biographical narrative of the Norway Model. Similarly, the notion of 
locating a grand policy metanarrative is related to Boje’s (2001) conception of grand 
narrative. Boje (2001) describes a grand narrative, or what Lyotard (1984) calls 
metanarrative, as one that “subjugates and marginalizes other discourses” (p. 33). Borins 
(2011) argues that within public administration research, narrative policy analysis 
recognizes “the importance of narrative as both social mechanism (a means of forming 
and communicating identity and an understanding of the world) and hermeneutic practice 
(a mode of knowing, a way of organizing, and making sense of experience” (p. 167). 
These descriptions are reminiscent of the narrative mode thought and sensemaking 
metaphors described in Chapter One.  
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In addition, Borins (2011) argues that narrative polyphony, a concept similar to 
Boje’s (1995) plurivocality from the Tamara metaphor, must be recognized when 
analyzing and reporting narrative research: 
Public administration scholars often communicate their research as though they 
were the omniscient narrators of 19th-century novels, confident of their ability to 
see into the minds of their protagonists to produce a single, self-authorizing 
story…Narratology accepts as a fundamental tenant that there are many 
conflicting and often irreconcilable narratives to be read within the frame of a 
single text…Pursuing this approach obligates the scholar to engage with the 
conflicting narratives, to account for their presence and implications, and, if she 
chooses, to privilege some over others, to explain why. (p. 185) 
Since narratives have multiple interpretations (i.e., plurivocality), it follows that some 
stories may be privileged above others, and grand narratives are likely to be privileged 
over their local counterparts. Labeling a story as grand or metanarrative connotes a 
hegemonic angle, which is certainly relevant when interpreting the local stories presented 
in Chapter Four. However, researchers can encourage multiple interpretations by utilizing 
“discursive metaphors [that] ‘read’ story plurivocality…back into the constructions that 
organizations collectively ‘write’ as their history” (Boje, 1995, p. 998). As described in 
Chapter One, I use discursive metaphors throughout this dissertation to examine the 
underlying assumptions of what is being communicated by these stories. 
Roe (1994) suggests that scholars look for “arguments that underwrite the policy 
assumptions of policymaking” in these narratives (p. 155). Guided by the open 
architecture framework, I looked for different ways that narrative is applied to 
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communicate policy assumptions. For example, I noticed a recurring theme in many 
stories about Norway overcoming large and difficult challenges despite their status as a 
small and peaceful country by working hard and planning ahead. I created a category 
called “David & Goliath” for these stories and considered what an actor or organization 
was trying to communicate by applying this metaphor in a narrative account. For some, it 
was a sense of pride in successfully dealing with the unpredictable giant-of-a-neighboring 
country Russia during decades years of border disputes. Others implied the Norwegian 
petroleum sector has accomplished almost fantastical results when considering they are a 
country of only five million people; they almost can’t believe it has worked out so well. 
Furthermore, in researching the history of major oil and gas field developments such as 
Snøvit, I found references to Norwegian folk tales depicting the same plotlines of small 
yet smart characters defying the odds to succeed where many others have failed.  
Each of these “David and Goliath” stories celebrated cultural Norwegian values in 
action and as such, were coded as celebration narratives. This example also illustrates the 
connections between metaphor and narrative in producing cultural meaning. Hoshmand 
(2005) explains “metaphors can serve to organize a story and persuade the reader of its 
broader cultural implications…certain story lines make sense in light of larger cultural 
scripts and background understandings” (p. 182). The stories in this category 
communicate a larger cultural understanding with a familiar organizational structure. 
Furthermore, I coded this category with my own metaphorical reference; these narratives 
deal with Norwegian values, but the story of David and Goliath is ubiquitous enough to 
communicate cross-cultural lines of understanding.  
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In conclusion, Borins (2011) explains how public administration scholars who 
employ a narrative approach can “share a methodological common ground” (p. 167). 
Similarly, Roe (1994) envisioned narrative policy analysis as “a technique best applied 
using a case study approach prior to engaging more traditional positivistic applications of 
policy analysis” (p. 12). This leads to the next section, where I discuss how case study 
methods are complementary to other interpretive and narrative tools in this project.  
Case Study Methods 
While researching existing literature on the Norwegian petroleum sector and 
culture, I discovered that most qualitative research on this topic utilizes case 
methodology (e.g., Hatakenaka, et al., 2006; Ihlen & Berntzen, 2009; Vaaland & Heide, 
2005, 2008). Case study methods are used for analytic generalization (Yin, 1994) and are 
appropriate in three scenarios: when the researcher seeks to answer ‘‘how’’ or ‘‘why’’ 
questions; when the researcher has little control over the contemporary real-life context to 
be studied; and when the boundaries between the context and phenomenon are not clear 
(Jackson, et al., 2007). This project certainly meets such requirements based on my 
research questions, the fluidity of the context I am studying, and the clarity of boundaries 
between the theoretical contexts and communicative phenomena in this data.  
Furthermore, according to Yin (1999), case study methods are favorable for 
studying complex “mega-systems” with “high-flux” rules and affiliations (p. 1210). The  
“desirable features” of case studies include “systematic and intense use of archival 
data…insightful and detailed fieldwork by single investigators…[and] a thorough sifting 
of policy documents and interview data related to decision making in a nationally 
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prominent setting” (Yin, 1999, p. 1210). Again, these criteria are much aligned with the 
contexts of this project, and thus, I adopted several case study methods to situate my 
research within the social science literatures about the Norway Model and the theoretical 
literatures about organizational narratology. 
There are many overlapping concepts between interpretive, narrative, and case 
study methodologies such as fieldwork, constant comparative analysis, and theoretical 
saturation (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, a distinct concept in case study methods, the 
degrees of freedom approach to analytic generalization (Campbell, 1975), helped me 
clarify the unique theoretical contributions of this research, in addition to offering 
additional measures for reliability and validity. 
Degrees of Freedom 
As with other qualitative methods, case studies do not definitively test theory. 
Case study methods examine the relevance of theories to one set (N) of data relating to 
specific phenomena, as well as those theories’ relevance to other aspects of culture. 
Campbell (1975) first outlined the degrees of freedom approach in case study research, 
asserting that social sciences required “a tradition of deliberately fostering an adversary 
process in which other experts are encouraged to look for other implications of the theory 
and other facts to contradict or support it" (p. 186). Campbell (1975) states: 
In case study done by an alert social scientist who has thorough local 
acquaintance, the theory he uses to explain the focal difference also generates 
predictions or expectations on dozens of other aspects of the culture, and he does 
not retain the theory unless most of these are also confirmed. In some sense, he 
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has tested the theory with degrees of freedom coming from the multiple 
implications of any one theory. (p. 181) 
Related to the idea of theoretical sensitivity, the degrees of freedom approach means that 
researchers use existing theory as a starting point for examining a social phenomena.  
Using a method like constant comparative analysis, the possible scope of relevant 
theories is narrowed based on their fit with emergent concepts from the data.  
For example, at first, I was interested in the relevance of stakeholder theory to 
understanding the communicative implications of the Norway Model. As with case study 
methods, much of the existing communication and management research about the 
Norwegian petroleum sector relies on stakeholder theory. However, as I collected and 
analyzed more data, stakeholder theory did not seem to fully capture the nuances of 
communicative phenomena in this cultural context. As Woodside and Wilson (2003) 
argue, a case study should illustrate “deep understanding of the actors, interactions, 
sentiments, and behaviors occurring for a specific process through time” (p. 497): 
In many case studies, multiple individuals participate in different conversations 
and behaviors within one time period in the case…much like actors appearing in 
different scenes in a play, different individuals in the same group may participate 
in conversations and behaviors in different time periods…when examined deeply, 
most cases involve three or more (in)formal groups or organizations that affect the 
process and outcomes under study…[and] not every person within a group 
communicates with every other member in the same group. (p. 505) 
The processes and outcomes of study in this project are communications between and 
within numerous organizations involved with the long-term success and development of 
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Norwegian petroleum activity. Utilizing a degrees of freedom approach, the perspectives 
of these multiple actors and organizations, as well as how they are situated within the 
larger context of Norwegian culture, can be considered N=1.  
Additional Measures for Reliability & Validity 
As illustrated by the previous example of stakeholder theory, the degrees of 
freedom approach also offers an important measure for reliability and validity in this 
project: theoretical triangulation. Eisenhardt (1989) asserts that when interpreting theory, 
comparing emergent concepts with a broad range of conflicting and similar literature is 
an “essential feature” of case study methods to build internal validity, sharpen 
generalizability, and improve construct definition (p. 544). In addition, theoretical 
triangulation allows researchers to remain open to new directions for theoretical 
development (Creswell & Miller, 2000; Maxwell, 2004).  
In addition to theoretical triangulation, within interpretive, narratological, and 
case study approaches, multiple data sources can be triangulated (e.g. interviews, 
previous research, observations, documents) to enhance the validity of theoretical 
categories (Creswell & Miller, 2000; Lindlof & Taylor, 2010; Maxwell, 2004). Utilizing 
multiple sources of data, such as interview transcripts, government documents, 
newspapers, and books, is consistent with these three methodologies. According to Yin 
(1994), using case study methods allows a researcher to further triangulate data during 
the collection process by following a directed line of inquiry and evidence gathering. 
Furthermore, “the more all of these techniques are used in the same study, the stronger 
the case study evidence will be” (Yin, 1999, p. 1217). As previously mentioned, in 
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addition to semi-structured interview data, I used archival data, fieldwork observations, 
and theoretical memos for triangulation. 
Finally, combining these multiple methodological approaches through the lens of 
case study also provides what Geertz (1973) described as “thick description” of a 
phenomena based on the rich and detailed nature of discussion. In accordance with 
Campbell (1975) and Yin (1994), Woodside and Wilson (2003) state that the 
distinguishing characteristic of case study research is “focusing on the research issues, 
theory, and/or empirical inquiry on the individual (n=1)” to offer thick description. 
Rather than assessing external validity based on the generalizability of their research 
findings, researchers employing case study methods can use thick description to enhance 
what Guba and Lincoln (1989) refer to as transferability. While the exact findings from 
cases cannot be generalized to larger populations in a quantitative sense, emergent 
theoretical concepts should still be transferable to other contexts and settings. This deep, 
longitudinal perspective is aligned with the narrative focus of how this research was 
conducted, its presentation in this dissertation, and its transferable value to other contexts 
of organizational communication research. 
Chapter Summary 
Overall, this hybrid inductive approach—combining relevant aspects of 
interpretive, narratological, and case study methods—ensured that throughout the 
research process, I was choosing the appropriate tools for answering the research 
questions presented in Chapter One. Utilizing these connected approaches further situates 
this project within the broader context of organizational communication research and 
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provides unique interdisciplinary appeal for social scientists studying complex issues of 
natural resource management, culture, and narrative.  
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Chapter Three: The Ten Oil Commandments 
“Norway’s petroleum resources belong to the Norwegian People, and they must 
be managed in a way that benefits the entire Norwegian society.”  
Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (2011, p. 5) 
This chapter presents the grand narrative of how Norway has created and adapted 
organizational structures and policies for managing natural resources to ensure the benefit 
of past, present, and future generations. The Norway Model was officially established 
with “The Ten Oil Commandments,” a historic policy approved by Norwegian parliament 
(Storting) in 1971 and rooted in a centuries-long history of cultural values: connection 
with nature, reverence for tradition, strong national identity, and egalitarian social 
democracy. Using the strategic philosophy outlined in the Ten Oil Commandments—oil 
and gas should benefit the whole nation—the organizations and regulatory policies for 
guiding state petroleum activity have anticipated and adapted to challenges over this 
fifty-year adventure.  
Drawing upon policy documents, white papers, and other texts I collected from 
the government organizations that belong to this management system, this chapter 
examines the “official” story of how Norway has transformed itself from a small 
Northern maritime country into a successful global energy producer (see Appendix E for 
a chronological listing of influential policies). Within each section of this chapter, 
different narratives illustrate how the Ten Commandments have been interpreted and 
enacted throughout the history of the Norway Model.  
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The Oil Adventure Begins: Establishing the Commandments 
The story of Norway’s “oil adventure” began in the late 1950s (MFA, 2006; 
MPE, 2010a; NPD, 2012). Until that time, the country relied on imported petroleum and 
coal, lacking the geological expertise required for petroleum development. Many people 
were skeptical that the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS) contained enough oil and gas 
to make exploration a worthwhile endeavor. But when Shell discovered natural gas in the 
Netherlands in 1959, attitudes towards the North Sea’s potential began to shift; it was 
only a matter of time before foreign oil companies started knocking on the Norwegian 
government’s door. In 1962, the Phillips Group from Bartlesville, Oklahoma applied for 
exploration licenses in the North Sea, which the government granted the next year. 
However, these licenses only allowed Phillips to conduct seismic studies and other 
exploration activities; the state refused to offer any one company exclusive production 
rights over the NCS. This refusal was officiated by a Royal Decree2 in 1963: 
The company wanted a licence for the parts of the North Sea that were on 
Norwegian territory, and that would possibly be included in the Norwegian shelf. 
The offer was 160,000 dollars per month. The offer was seen as an attempt to get 
exclusive rights, and for the authorities it was out of the question to hand over the 
whole shelf to one company. If the areas were to be opened for exploration, more 
companies had to participate. In May 1963, Einar Gerhardsen’s government 
proclaimed sovereignty over the NCS. New regulation determined that the State 
owns any natural resources on the NCS, and that only the King (government) is 
authorized to award licences for exploration and production. (MPE, 2010a) 
                                                
2 Royal Decree of May 31, 1963, Relating to the Sovereignty of Norway Over the Seabed and Subsoil 
Outside the Norwegian Coast 
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The proclamation that “only the King” could control licensing and production of NCS 
petroleum reflected a larger historical context of Norway’s centuries-long quest for 
sovereignty. After nearly four hundred years under Danish control, Norway declared 
itself an independent kingdom and ratified a constitution on May 17, 1814, which is still 
the country’s official national holiday. Later that year, a short war with Sweden forced a 
union between the countries, allowing Norway to keep their constitution and self-govern 
all but their foreign affairs. In June 1905, Norwegian parliament voted to dissolve their 
Swedish union and another war seemed imminent. However, the countries were 
eventually able to peacefully negotiate separation and Sweden recognized Norway as an 
independent constitutional monarchy on October 26, 1905. 
Another important precedent for the Royal Decree dealt with hydropower 
legislation dating back to 1906. As a mountainous coastal nation filled with waterfalls, 
lakes, and rivers, Norway has long relied on hydropower for cost-effective electricity. 
Around the turn of the twentieth century, energy-intensive manufacturing industries such 
as aluminum and fertilizer, as well as foreign electricity investors, began looking at 
Norway for these plentiful hydro resources. However, the government struggled with 
how to profit from foreign investors without ceding too much control over their 
resources. According to former Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy Torre Tønne (1983): 
The rapid increase of foreign interest in Norwegian hydro resources triggered one 
of Norway’s most complex and important political struggles. According to 
Norwegian law, rivers, waterfalls and lakes may be privately owned. As a result, 
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it soon became clear that foreign capital could gain control of substantial natural 
resources. This led to the passage of legislation in 1906 that required anyone, 
Norwegian or foreign, to obtain a “concession” from the public authorities before 
acquiring a waterfall.  (p. 723) 
Concession, in this context, referred to permission from the King for proprietary use of 
waterfalls generating over a certain amount of horsepower. Since Norway had only 
recently received its independence from Sweden, and the political climate of 1906 was 
still somewhat “hectic,” this temporary legislation was also known as the Panic Act 
(Tønne, 1983, p. 724). Not only were foreign investors urging private owners to sell what 
many Norwegians “considered national resources,” many of these owners were unaware 
just how much their properties were worth (Tønne, 1983, p. 724). In 1917, two more 
permanent pieces of legislation were passed—the Concession Act and the Water 
Regulations Act—that have “together regulated the development of hydropower in 
Norway ever since” (Tønne, 1983, p. 724).  
Nearly fifty years later, the government once again focused on establishing 
Norwegian sovereignty over its natural resources. The first task was demarcating 
Norway’s territories from their North Sea neighbors. Expanding on the May 31, 1963 
Royal Decree, Storting passed the Submarine Resources Act a month later3 to address 
exploring and exploiting subsea regions of the continental shelf belonging to Norway 
(Tønne, 1983). In March 1965, the government negotiated border agreements with 
                                                
3 Act of 21 June 1963 No. 12, Relating to Exploration for and Exploitation of Submarine Natural Resources 
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Denmark and Great Britain for the southern regions of the NCS.4 With those boundaries 
established, in April 1965, Norwegian authorities announced the first round of NCS 
concessions; 278 blocks would be available for licensing applications (Kvendseth, 1988). 
At an August press conference, the Ministry of Industry announced concessions—22 
permits for 78 blocks—that granted companies such as Phillips, Esso, and Amoco 
exclusive rights for exploration, drilling, and production in their licensing areas on the 
continental shelf (MPE, 2010a).  
Great Discoveries: Vikings & Fish 
When the first major field in Norway’s oil history, Ekofisk, was discovered in 
1969, “the Norwegian oil adventure really began” (MPE, 2010a). Still a significant 
producer some forty years later, Ekofisk is also an important part of Norwegian cultural 
history. In addition to a dedicated exhibit at the Norwegian Petroleum Museum, the 
Norwegian Directorate for Cultural Heritage and Phillips Group Norway commissioned a 
national online archive initiative for documenting Ekofisk’s first development phase. As 
part of this project, Stig Kvendseth, (1988) wrote Giant Discovery: A History of Ekofisk 
Through the First 20 Years to chronicle the inception and development of this important 
field. According to Kvendseth, when Phillips was initially granted exploration permits in 
1963, as a newer company, they were also looking to garner public support and capitalize 
on Norwegian shipbuilding expertise. So in 1965, Phillips contracted with another 
American company, Ocean Drilling and Exploration Company, to lease the first 
                                                
4 These agreements were based on the Geneva Convention of 1958, although Norway did not officially 
ratify the treaty until 1971, after negotiating a delineation agreement with Sweden in 1968 (Tønne, 1983). 
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Norwegian-built drilling rig, the Ocean Viking. Figure 6 illustrates the rig (Kvendseth, 
1988, p. 20). 
Figure 6. The “Ocean Viking”  
 
Phillips also joined Esso—the first company to drill on the NCS with its 
American-built rig, Ocean Traveler—with operations headquarters in the southern 
coastal city of Stavanger. In addition to utilizing Norwegian builders for Ocean Viking, 
Phillips advertised jobs for local rig workers in Stavanger, with nearly 2000 interested 
men responding. When Ocean Viking drilled its first well in 1967, it was clear that 
exploring the North Sea would be no easy feat for the Norwegians and Americans on 
board. Extreme storms, icy waters, and tumultuous waves created steep learning curves 
and dangerous working conditions, but the crew foraged ahead for two more years, 
tweaking their technology and operations all along the way. In December 1969, Phillips 
finally hit pay dirt when Ocean Viking explorers discovered an estimated 2.7 billion 
barrels of recoverable oil on the NCS. The field already had a name—Ekofisk—but the 
story behind it was “something of a linguistic anomaly,” according to Kvendseth (1988): 
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Right from the start, Phillips had used letters to identify the various exploration 
areas on the Norwegian shelf. This was done in order to group the blocks 
geographically and make it easier to identify them. It started with A-blocks, B-
blocks, etc. The idea was to call the fields by the names of types of fish. When the 
discovery was made in an exploration area “C,” it was easy to find the name of a 
fish to correspond—Cod [an unsuccessful commercial field]. But what fish had a 
name that began with E? Eel had already been used on a structure block at 2/7. 
Earl Walters at Phillips’ London office suggested Ekofisk, and no one objected. 
So Ekofisk it was—even though it should have been spelled Ekkofisk in 
Norwegian, or Echofish in English. Confusion as to the correct name arose, and in 
reports, letters, newspaper articles—yes, even in parliamentary papers from the 
early days, the three different spellings were used interchangeably. (p. 33) 
Ekofisk’s name was not the only source of confusion for Norwegian authorities, media, 
and citizens; the world was watching to see if the North Sea really could produce oil. But 
after five years of hopes and disappointments in these cold waters, Phillips and Norway 
hesitated to confirm their giant discovery.  
On May 14, 1970, the Norwegian government communicated their official 
position on Ekofisk as cautiously optimistic until further testing confirmed the size of the 
field and the quality of its oil. On that same day, the chairman of a Phillips subsidiary 
company in Belgium effectively issued a “declaration of commerciality” at their annual 
meeting by announcing “that Ekofisk contained several hundred million tons of crude oil 
of very fine quality,” (Kvendseth, 1988, p. 38). Amidst a whirlwind of international 
media speculation, Storting issued a formal report on June 12, 1970, estimating the 
government payout from Ekofisk could range from 100 to 500 kroner (approximately 
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$16-$85 USD) per year for the next twenty to thirty years. In a follow-up report one year 
later, Storting revised its estimations to an astonishing 2.5 to 3.5 billion kroner 
(approximately $45-65 million USD) in tax income from Ekofisk per year and more than 
twice the petroleum needed to satisfy Norwegian consumption at that time. 
To Benefit the Whole Nation 
As Ekofisk and other fields signaled an increasingly long-term potential for 
petroleum activity on the NCS, the government was also rethinking its regulatory system, 
realizing that organizational change was necessary (NPD, 2009). Norwegian authorities 
gradually opened other NCS areas for exploration and production, but still placed heavy 
restrictions on the number of blocks awarded to foreign companies during each licensing 
round. From the beginning, Norway recognized the importance of maintaining 
sovereignty over their resource-rich land. According to Austvik (2012), 
The Norwegian state was one of those states outside OPEC that wanted to control 
revenue, production, and management of what in the early 1970s was a new and 
potentially economically and politically dominant industry for the country. Long 
social-democratic traditions, which were shared across party lines, of strong state 
participation in many economic activities made it possible to formulate 
consensus-oriented visions and policy goals for an independent Norwegian 
petroleum administration and industry in the early 1970s…The slogan was that oil 
and gas activities should “benefit the whole nation.”  (pp. 321-322) 
As evidenced by this slogan, there was a strong political imperative—built on social 
democratic ideology and a consensus-based approach to public policy formation—to 
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keep petroleum activities within the public sector and maximize profits to be filtered into 
social welfare programs (Kristoffersen & Young, 2010).  
Again, we see the historic continuity of how cultural traditions have influenced 
the organizational policies for managing Norwegian resources. Early-twentieth century 
hydropower legislation emphasized “that the Norwegian people are the owners of the 
water resources, and that the economic rent should fall to the greater community,” and 
these “same principles have been followed in the administration of petroleum resources” 
(MPE, 2011, p. 5). Yet despite such precedent, when NCS petroleum activity exploded 
with the Ekofisk discovery, the government still hadn’t legislated an official plan for 
maximizing the long-term social and economic benefits of Norwegian oil and gas. 
Storting took up that task with White Paper No. 76 (1970-1971), Exploration for 
and exploitation of subsea natural resources on the Norwegian continental shelf, etc. As 
a result of this policy paper, Storting endorsed the famous Ten Oil Commandments on 
June 14, 1971 and outlined a comprehensive national management system for petroleum 
activity that would benefit the whole of Norwegian society. Figure 7 illustrates the 
commandments (MPE, 2011). These ten stipulations established three functions of state-
controlled petroleum development: (1) centralized control of official policy formation 
and development; (2) administrative control of licensing, inspection, and surveying; and 





Figure 7. The Ten Oil Commandments   
 
To realize these functions and goals, the government would create a formal 
organizational structure for managing the economic, social, and environmental impacts of 
petroleum activity to benefit the whole nation: the Norway Model.  
Structural Organization of the Norway Model 
These organizations and policies have adapted since 1971, but consistently 
reflected the values communicated through the Ten Oil Commandments. Figure 8 
illustrates the current structure of the Norway Model (MPE & NPD, 2012, p. 17). 
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Storting, as representatives of the people, sits at the top of the hierarchy. Under the 
umbrella description of “the Government,” various ministries work together to oversee 
the regulatory aspects of NCS petroleum activity such as industry, safety, pollution, and 
taxation. In addition to the five agencies illustrated below, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
deals with many issues of Norwegian sovereignty and diplomacy related to oil and gas. 
Other organizations (e.g., political parties, local governments, NGOs) are also connected 
to this elaborate network of policymaking, regulation, and commercial activity. 
Figure 8. Organizational Structure of the Norway Model  
 
To further understand the relationships between these organizations and policies, 
the remainder of this chapter continues the Ten Oil Commandments story and how it has 
shaped the Norway Model over time. Commandments One and Seven are embodied in 
the centralized control and administration functions of organizations such as the Ministry 
of Petroleum and Energy and Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. These organizations, in 
66 
partnership other government ministries, have combined industry-savvy business 
practices, innovative technology, and environmental considerations to realize 
Commandments Three, Four, Five, Six and Eight. Finally, Commandments Nine and Ten 
have presented new environmental, political, and economic challenges to the Norway 
Model and this oil and gas fairytale.5 
Developing Centralized Control & Administration: Commandments One & Two 
Commandment One: That national supervision and control of all activity on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf must be ensured. 
Commandment Seven: That the State involves itself at all reasonable levels, contributes to 
the coordinating Norwegian interests within the Norwegian petroleum industry, and to 
developing an integrated Norwegian oil community with both national and international 
objectives. 
Commandments One and Seven clarified the goals of state supervision and 
control by building on the 1963 Royal Decree declaring “only the King” could issue 
exploration and drilling permits for Norway’s territories on the continental shelf. Until 
the commandments were issued, all government resource management responsibilities 
fell under the purview of the Ministry of Industry as dictated by the national constitution. 
In 1972, Storting established a more centralized body within the Ministry, the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate (NPD), to handle the administrative functions—licensing, 
inspection, and surveying—of regulating petroleum activity. The NPD would be 
                                                
5 Commandment Two was realized almost immediately after Ekofisk signaled Norway’s energy 
independence for the foreseeable future.  
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headquartered in Stavanger, which by now had become Norway’s “oil capitol” since 
Phillips first set up operations there in 1965. 
Since the Ministry of Industry was still constitutionally responsible for ensuring 
worker safety and environmental disaster planning on the continental shelf, these duties 
were also shifted to the NPD. However, in 1978, the government decided that oil and gas 
concerns necessitated not only a separate regulatory agency, but also a separate ministry. 
Through the newly established Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE), the state would 
“approve all steps and at all levels in the sector in order to promote both competition and 
cooperation so that the value of each license would be maximized” (Austvik, 2012, p. 
321). The following year, Storting also deliberated whether the same agencies tasked 
with supervising state business interests should be monitoring worker and environmental 
safety interests. The resulting decision transferred the latter responsibilities to the 
Ministry of Local Government and Labour; for the next two-and-a-half decades, the NPD 
would report to two ministries.6   
Several other policies would emerge over those decades to support 
Commandments One and Seven. A revised Royal Decree was issued in 1972 to include 
additional Norwegian territories on and around the continental shelf.7 These decrees, as 
well as the Submarine Resources Act, were both replaced by a more comprehensive legal 
                                                
6 In 2001, working environment and safety responsibilities were again transferred to the renamed Ministry 
of Labour and Government Administration.  
7 Royal Decree of December 8, 1972, Relating to Exploration for and Exploitation of Petroleum in the 
Seabed and Substrata of the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
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framework in 1985.8  This framework was expanded again by the 1996 Petroleum Act9 to 
reflect the evolving organizational structures and social contexts of state regulatory 
agencies. For example, the Petroleum Act reinforced that all NCS petroleum activities 
(e.g., licenses, exploration and development plans, transport contracts, sales contracts) 
fall under MPE jurisdiction, but that Storting has the final say over any plans with 
“significant economic or social impact” (Statoil, 2009, “Regulation”). Storting again 
deliberated on the division of safety and business interests with White Paper No. 17 
(2002-2003), Related to State Supervision (NPD, 2003). As a result, the NPD was split 
into two independent agencies; henceforth, the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway 
(PSA) would supervise all regulatory safeguards for working conditions and emergency 
preparedness on the NCS.  
In addition to involving itself in these regulatory and organizational aspects of 
petroleum activity, the state has implemented Commandments One and Seven through 
Norway’s unique petroleum taxation system. With the Petroleum Taxation Act10 of 1975, 
onshore commercial oil and gas activities were taxed at 28% and subsea (offshore) 
activities at 50% because of their “extraordinary profit” potential (MPE & NPD, 2012, p. 
16). This taxation system, still in place today and overseen by the Ministry of Finance 
(MoF), was “designed to be neutral,” (i.e., profitable for investors both before and after 
taxes) in order to “safeguard the consideration both for substantial income for society as a 
whole, as well as the fact that companies want to implement profitable projects” (MPE & 
                                                
8 Act of 22 March 1985 No.11, Relating to Petroleum Activities 
9 Act of 29 November 1996 No. 72, Relating to Petroleum Activities 
10 Act of 13 June 1975 No. 35, Relating to the Taxation of Subsea Petroleum Deposits 
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NPD, 2012, p. 16). In other words, Norway’s taxation rates may be high when compared 
with other resource-rich nations, but regulators frame this system as a “win/win” for the 
both state and the private companies.  
Overall, this organizational and regulatory system of centralized control and 
administration enabled the state to maintain sovereignty over its natural resources and 
facilitated the growth of a national oil and gas industry in Norway. As the following 
sections will elucidate, the state began this industry by capitalizing on the tax income and 
resources of foreign investors and never losing sight of one primary goal: Norway would 
be the most successful and powerful operator on the Norwegian continental shelf. 
Developing New Business Activity: Commandment Three 
Commandment Three: That new business activity must be developed based on petroleum. 
National economies that experience large economic booms from natural resource 
exploitation often suffer from what is known as “Dutch disease” (The Economist, 1977).  
As the Netherlands experienced in the 1960s when “natural gas discoveries clearly hurt 
the competitiveness of Dutch manufacturing,” resource booms are usually associated 
with appreciated currencies and exchange rates, as well as the “crowding out” of other 
industrial sectors (Krugman, 1987, p. 49). While the term “disease” can be misleading 
since boom are theoretically favorable, historically, this effect has been detrimental for 
many countries with resource-based economies (Krugman, 1987; Torvik, 2001). 
Economists attribute this to the “spending effect” of booms (Corden & Neary, 1982), or 
in simpler terms, when a country invests new resource money right back into their 
70 
domestic economy or immediately to fund social programs  (e.g., poverty reduction). As 
a result, these countries can experience unstable economies; natural resource markets are 
hard to predict.  
Although the term “Dutch disease” had not yet come into academic or public 
discourse when the Oil Commandments were created, the Norwegian government knew 
that to build an oil economy for the long-term, they needed measures for preventing 
inflation and building other industries. Thus, Commandment Three outlined two ways the 
Norwegian state planned to avoid these pitfalls: (1) cultivating petroleum-related 
industrial sectors to build a national culture of oil and gas expertise; and (2) creating a 
balanced domestic and international investment strategy. 
Developing a National Culture of Expertise 
Developing strong petroleum-related industries over time has been a core value in 
the state’s overall strategy. Because of the unique challenges associated with exploring 
and developing oil and gas on the Norwegian continental shelf—huge waves, icy waters, 
tumultuous storms—“the petroleum industry provides a strong impetus to technological 
development within other Norwegian industries” such as manufacturing, shipping, and 
subsea technology (MPE & NPD, 2012, p. 22). Figure 9 explains how traditional 
Norwegian maritime industries laid the foundation for building a new national expertise 
(MPE, 2012, p. 137). This figure—part of a 2011 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
report to Storting entitled An industry for the future: Norway’s petroleum activities—
portrays the Normand Prosper ship as a symbol of merging past and present “traditions 
and knowledge.”  
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In the beginning, Norway didn’t have the geological know-how or the financial 
resources to start a national petroleum industry on their own. But the North Sea quickly 
showed foreign companies they needed Norwegian experience to build their ships, adapt 
their technologies, and work on their rigs. 
Figure 9. Industry Founded on Traditions  
 
Since the Ocean Viking was built in 1965, the supplier industry has become a vital 
part of the national economy, employing more than 200,000 Norwegians (NPD, 2011) 
and quintupling international export sales in the last fifteen years alone (MPE & NPD, 
2012). And as the international industry increasingly looks North in search of oil and gas 
resources, Norway has uniquely positioned itself as a global expert on discovering, 
extracting, and transporting petroleum from these very hard-to-reach places based on 
their cultural heritage of work and innovation. 
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Strategic Domestic & International Investing 
Another aspect of the state’s planning for avoiding Dutch disease and maintaining 
Norway’s petroleum wealth for years to come was implementing strategic domestic and 
international investments. In 1967, the government had revised its social security scheme 
by passing the National Insurance Act.11 This legislation expanded public assistance and 
financial benefits to nearly every Norwegian citizen and established a new organization 
under the Ministry of Finance, Folketrygdfondet, to manage state pension fund 
investments. Part of ensuring the oil money benefited the whole nation included 
expanding government social welfare programs, but a more long-term action plan was 
necessary. As a follow-up report to the Ten Oil Commandments, in White Paper No. 25 
(1973-1974), Petroleum activity and its position in the Norwegian society the government 
called for a “qualitatively better society.”  
This report communicated that in addition to developing a national expertise for 
petroleum management and commercial activity, the government was concerned with the 
short-term effects of their quickly overflowing coffers such as extreme inflation (Reiche, 
2010). According to a 2011 MPE white paper: 
When the Bratelli government presented the first comprehensive report to the 
Storting on the integration of the petroleum sector into the Norwegian economy in 
1974, an ambition was adopted which stated that the oil revenues should primarily 
be used to develop “a qualitatively better society”…The report stated that “A 
rapid and uncontrolled growth in the use of material resources should be avoided, 
unless the social structure is otherwise substantially changed.” Moreover, it was 
                                                
11 Act of 17 June 1966 No.12, Relating to National Insurance 
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recognized early on that the large revenues from the petroleum sector are not 
income in the normal sense, but to a large degree involve the extraction of a non-
renewable resources. Accordingly, to ensure long-term balance in the economy, it 
was important to limit the use of state oil revenues. (p. 9) 
In addition to implementing restrictions on domestic spending, the 1973 report “implied 
that, at times, it would be necessary to invest some of the revenues from the petroleum 
sector outside Norway” (MPE, 2011, p. 9). The thinking was “to transfer resources from 
the bottom of the sea to international financial markets” to “protect the economy from 
boom-and-bust cycles” (Austvik, 2012, p. 327). The path towards accomplishing this 
goal would emerge as the state adapted existing organizational structures for government 
social security investments over the next fifteen years. 
Until 1990, much of the petroleum sector revenue was used to pay off national 
debts and fund the annual government budget (MPE, 2011). Oil and gas production had 
risen steadily since the Bratelli report but global prices continued to fluctuate, much of 
the oil money had been spent on expanding the national welfare system, and a recession 
was on the horizon. Amidst these rising concerns with the “macroeconomic and social 
long-term” implications of their petroleum sector revenue boom, Storting established the 
State Petroleum Fund (the Fund) to invest the money outside of Norway12 by passing the 
Government Petroleum Fund Act in 1990.13 Since inception, the Fund has been overseen 
                                                
12 The Fund consists of state petroleum revenues from licensing fees, taxes on companies, Statoil 
dividends, and the SDFI. 
13 Act of 22 June 1990 No. 36, Relating to the Government Petroleum Fund 
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by the Ministry of Finance and managed by Norges Bank, the central bank of Norway.14 
The ministry has worked with Norges Bank to develop core strategies for investing the 
Fund that reflect these values and have broad support from Storting, who are considered 
political representatives of the Fund’s owners—the Norwegian people (MoF, 2011). 
These values are professionalism, accountability, and transparency (Eriksen, 2006).  
Overall, the MoF (2011) “wants to ensure that the…Fund is the best managed 
fund in the world” (p. 10). This goal depends on a “long-term horizon” for investing 
Norway’s petroleum wealth, grounded in “responsible investment practices that promote 
good corporate governance and take social and environmental factors into account, in 
accordance with international best practice” (MoF, 2011, p. 14). According to these 
investment strategies, the Fund needs to be managed aggressively enough to produce 
long-term revenues, but also with enough “temperance” as to avoid inflation and 
overspending (Englund, 2008). After 1990, the Fund’s value continued to grow steadily 
and when global oil prices rose sharply in 2001, Storting established a new regulation for 
domestic spending: only four percent of the total value should be used for Norway’s 
annual budget.  
Known as “the four-percent rule” (handlingsregelen), this “self-imposed” 
regulation stipulates, “the government can use the real return [four percent] of the oil 
fund…to cover the ‘non-oil’ deficit in the national budget” (Englund, 2008). Any 
additional capital gains over the annual four percent are designated for Fund investments. 
                                                
14 Reiche (2010) explains that profits from oil and gas activities are invested in the Petroleum Fund, “which 
includes the difference between revenue (such as taxes and dividends from energy-producing companies, 
some of which the state receives) and the expenses of the state’s oil and natural gas transactions” (p. 3571). 
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Although this rule is often debated in national politics—some political parties believe 
more of the funds returns should be used for state-funded projects such as transportation 
and infrastructure development—this emphasis on “sustainable development” is 
considered fundamental to the long-term success of Norway’s sovereign wealth and 
realizing “a qualitatively better society that protects individuals and delivers inter-
generational solidarity” (MoF, 2011, p. 9). In addition to implementing the four-percent 
rule in 2001, the state also reevaluated the macroeconomic perspective of the Fund; the 
structures of society had changed since its inception and “international” now had a 
broader meaning.15  
According to Reiche (2010), “in the late 1990s Norwegian civil society 
introduced the notion that the ‘sovereign wealth fund and ethics’ theme had yet another 
facet: what will concretely be produced with the reserved money? Does it contribute to 
the spread of values in the Scandinavian state, or does it work against them?” (p. 3571). 
As owners of the Fund, the public believed the oil money should be invested not only 
toward building a qualitatively better Norwegian society, but also a global society. In 
response to this growing sentiment, a 2004 Royal Decree16 called for the formation of the 
Council on Ethics, a committee tasked with establishing and monitoring principles for 
investing the Fund’s assets.  
                                                
15 A small amount of the Fund’s assets were—and still are today—in the Government Pension Fund-
Norway (GPFN), which invests in Norwegian and other Scandinavian businesses. However, since 2007, 
almost 95 percent of assets have been directed to the Government Pension Fund-Global (GPFG), which 
invests completely in overseas businesses to avoid over-stimulating the domestic economy (Reiche, 2010). 
16 Royal Decree 19 November 2004 
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The Council produced a report entitled Ethical Guidelines for the Petroleum 
Fund, which was formally issued by the MoF later that year. These guidelines were based 
on a premise that state investments should not “contribute to unethical acts, such as 
violations of fundamental humanitarian principles, serious violations of human rights, 
gross corruption, or severe environmental degradation” (Englund, 2008). As the only 
country with such regulations for a sovereign wealth fund,17 with these guidelines, 
communicating to Norwegian citizens and the world a strong belief that oil money can be 
invested ethically and profitably. 
Commandments One and Seven outlined guidelines for developing organizational 
structures for centralized control and administration of the Norwegian petroleum sector 
based on core values such as tradition, temperance, transparency, solidarity, and 
sustainability. These same values have guided the government in enacting 
Commandment Three and developing new petroleum-related business activity to avoid 
Dutch Disease. Commandments Four and Five build on this activity, illustrating two 
more important contexts of Norwegian tradition: fishing and environmentalism. 
Developing a Considerate & Protective Industry: Commandments Four & Five  
Commandment Four: That the development of an oil industry must take place with 
necessary consideration for existing commercial activity, as well as protection of nature 
and the environment. 
Commandment Five: That flaring of exploitable gas on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
must only be allowed in limited test periods. 
                                                
17 Other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, manage their sovereign wealth funds according to Islamic law, 
but Norway is the only one to implement this type of secular ethical guidelines (Reiche, 2010).  
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In this larger narrative, the government has recognized the salience of Norwegian 
cultural heritage throughout its resource management history while also attempting to 
merge past and present for the future. On one hand, Commandment Four reflects a 
reverence for that heritage by considering the continental shelf’s surrounding 
environment and a historic maritime industries; Commandment Five similarly reflects the 
environmentalism so central to Norway’s culture. On the other hand, these 
commandments provide further illustration of how cultural traditions are continuously 
evolving in the context of a new national expertise. 
The Coexistence Principle 
Before oil and gas took over the government’s industrial focus, other maritime 
industries such as commercial fishing and shipping were cultural and economic traditions 
in Norwegian society. In the context of Commandment Four, the government stipulates 
that “a fundamental precondition for the petroleum activities is coexistence between the 
oil industry and other users of the sea and land areas which the petroleum activities will 
impact” (MPE & NPD, 2012, p. 35). According to Solveig Strand (2002), former 
Parliamentary secretary for the Ministry of Fisheries (now the Ministry of Fishing and 
Coastal Affairs), the petroleum sector has affected the fishing industry in two ways: (1) 
restricting “fishing operations because of its physical structures, like platforms, pipelines 
and cables;” and (2) discharging “harmful substances” into the water that “may in the 
worst case reduce the productivity of the sea and thereby what we can harvest from it.”  
These issues may seem straightforward, but achieving the government’s goal of 
coexistence between the Norwegian petroleum and fishing industries as outlined by 
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Commandment Four has not been easy. Strand (2002) explains that “right from the start it 
has been a challenge to ensure that these activities could take place alongside the 
traditional use of the sea, the fisheries, and without negatively affecting the marine 
resource base, the environment and consumer safety.”  
Recall the long-standing Storting debates regarding organizational division of 
industrial and environmental/safety interests that resulted in splitting the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate and Petroleum Safety Authority in 2003. Similarly, coexistence 
between the petroleum sector and other continental shelf stakeholders, as well as 
surrounding natural ecosystems, has been a controversial subject for decades. One of the 
most influential policies relating to coexistence, The Petroleum Act of 1996, addresses 
what the government considers “consideration for existing commercial activity” and 
“protection of nature and the environment” in this context. Section 10.1 of the act, 
“Requirements of Prudent Petroleum Activity,” explains that activities “shall be 
conducted in a prudent manner and in accordance with applicable legislation…[and] take 
due account of the safety of personnel, the environment and of the financial values which 
the facilities and vessels represent, including also operational availability” (p. 22). More 
specifically, to be considered “prudent,” petroleum activities: 
Must not unnecessarily or to an unreasonable extent impede or obstruct shipping, 
fishing, aviation or other activities, or cause damage or threat of damage to 
pipelines, cables or other subsea facilities.  All reasonable precautions shall be 
taken to prevent damage to animal life and vegetation in the sea, relics of the past 
on the sea bed and to prevent pollution and littering of the seabed, its subsoil, the 
sea, the atmosphere or onshore. (p. 22) 
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The act stipulates that any operator violating these regulations may be subject to financial 
or criminal penalty, as well as liable for any destruction to fisheries or marine life.  
To avoid the need for such loss and damage, however, the government now relies 
on “management plans,” or “guidelines for carrying out comprehensive management” 
and facilitating “value creation through sustainable use of resources and ecosystem 
services” in “Norwegian maritime areas” (MPE & NPD, 2012, p. 35). Facts 2012, an 
annual joint report between the NPD and MPE about the petroleum sector, explains that 
management plans “establish framework conditions that balance the interests of the 
fishery industry, the petroleum industry and the shipping industry, while simultaneously 
ensuring consideration for the environment” (p. 35). A primary component of 
comprehensive management plans requires impact assessments before major activity:  
Before opening up a new area for petroleum activities, developing a discovery or 
closing down a field, Norwegian law requires an impact assessment. The 
assessment describes the possible environmental, social and economic effects that 
the planned activity could have, including its potential impact on fisheries. The 
impact assessment is circulated for comment to among others the fishing industry, 
relevant central and local government bodies and other interested parties such as 
environmental organizations. This public consultation process is important for 
identifying the measures that will have to be taken to minimize potential conflicts 
of interest between the petroleum industry, fisheries and environmental 
considerations. (Strand, 2002) 
As further sections will elucidate, impact assessments are part of a larger trend towards 
knowledge-based policy making in the Norwegian petroleum sector. These frameworks 
have been especially salient as the government moves north in search of more resources.  
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Becoming a Global Environmental Leader 
During the past two decades, the government has steadily promoted increased 
petroleum activity in northern Norway. Later in this chapter, northern activity will be 
discussed in detail, but it is also important in the context of Commandments Four and 
Five. Technological expertise in the petroleum sector stemming from a history of 
maritime industries is a recurring theme in this narrative; it also serves as justification for 
expanding petroleum activity in environmentally sensitive and traditional fishing regions 
such as the Barents Sea. Put differently, although the Norwegian government and oil 
industry acknowledge the commercial and environmental risks of developing these 
regions, many in the government believe that Norwegian expertise will be able to 
mitigate long-term damage.  
For example, “flaring” is common in the international oil industry, but 
Commandment Five restricted this practice on the Norwegian continental shelf from the 
start. The Petroleum Act requires that “burning of gas in flares beyond what is necessary 
to ensure normal operations is not permitted without approval from the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy (MPE & NPD, 2012, p. 54). According to Ole Anders Lindseth, a 
current Director General at the MPE, “very much of the technology [for] production 
without the flaring of gas, for instance, has been developed in Norway or for the North 
Sea. Because of the [environmental] conditions, but also, for instance, we don't accept the 
flaring of gas. That again is a cost factor and a technical challenge, because you have to 
re-inject the gas. We simply don’t want that emission” (O. A. Lindseth, personal 
communication, July 10, 2010). In addition to innovating environmentally responsible 
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petroleum technologies, the government considers itself a pioneer for regulatory 
ecologism.  
Kristoffersen and Young (2010) argue that the 1970s and 1980s constituted an era 
of “environmentalism of the state” where government leaders pushed for stricter 
domestic regulations (p. 579). The Ministry of the Environment (MoE) was established in 
1972 and tasked with domestic environmental protection; it was the first ministry of its 
kind in the world. Regulatory policies were implemented to curb carbon emissions and 
pollution, both from the petroleum sector and Norwegian society as a whole. Prominent 
leaders such as former prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland also brought international 
attention to Norway’s environmental policies. While serving as Chair of the UN World 
Committee on Environment and Development in 1987, she published Our Common 
Future, also known as the Brundtland Report, calling for global cooperation in finding a 
path towards sustainable development.  
This report also illustrates the government’s increasing emphasis on influencing 
international policies for reducing climate change. In 1990, Norway was one of the first 
countries to implement a carbon tax.18 As an ardent supporter of the Kyoto Protocol, 
“Norway has an emissions target which entails that the country’s average emissions of 
greenhouse gases for the years 2008-2012 shall not increase more than one per cent 
compared with the emissions level in 1990” (MPE & NPD, 2012, p. 53). Furthermore, 
White Paper No. 34 (2006-2007), Norwegian climate policy argues the government 
                                                
18 Act 21 December 1990 No. 72, Relating to Tax Discharge of CO2 in the Petroleum Activities on the 
Continental Shelf, later amended by Act 27 June 2008 No. 58 
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should “exceed the Kyoto goal by ten percentage points” (MPE & NPD, 2012, p. 53). 
Such proclamations illustrate how in addition to maintaining a thriving petroleum sector, 
the Norwegian government increasingly considers how it can be an environmental leader 
for energy-producing nations worldwide. 
Developing a State Petroleum Industry: Commandments Six & Eight 
Commandment Six: That petroleum from the Norwegian Continental Shelf must, as a 
main rule, be landed in Norway, with the exception of special cases in which socio-
political considerations warrant a different solution. 
Commandment Eight: That a state-owned oil company be established to safeguard the 
State’s commercial interests, and to pursue expedient cooperation with domestic and 
foreign oil stakeholders.  
In terms of Commandments One and Seven, 1972 was an important year for the 
Norwegian petroleum sector; Storting established the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
in Stavanger to facilitate government control over the regulatory and administrative 
functions of NCS development. On June 14, 1972 Storting also made an important 
decision to fulfill the commandments by establishing the Norwegian State Oil Company, 
or Statoil. With Statoil, the Norwegian state shifted its focus from being a landlord—
renting or leasing their oil fields to foreign companies—to being an entrepreneur building 
their own international political and economic petroleum capital on the continental shelf. 
A Two-Part Strategy 
Looking back on the major events in company history, a 2012 Statoil report 
entitled 40 Years of Amazement traces this strategy from the beginning. According to the 
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report, on September 18, 1972, Statoil was incorporated as a limited liability company 
and held its first general meeting:  
The protocol from the meeting spans for 6 pages and lays out some of the basic 
aspects of the company—including the establishment of Stavanger as Statoil's 
headquarters. It also states the company's total share capital of NOK 5 million, 
which is split into 50,000 shares worth NOK 100 each. The next day, summons 
were already issued for Statoil's first board meeting on 5 October in Oslo. While 
the company was now underway, it still had quite a bit of growing to do. At the 
beginning of 1973, Statoil had a grand total of two employees. This rose to 54 
employees by the end of the year, and again to 118 employees by the end of 1974. 
This “growing up” was facilitated by a two-part government strategy. First, Statoil was 
granted a fifty percent stake in every developed field on the NCS after discovery without 
running the risks or costs of exploration (Gordon & Stenvoll, 2006). Commandment Six 
supported this “success at no cost” strategy by requiring NCS petroleum to be landed in 
Norway. Thus, the state created an organizational vehicle for managing its stake in 
developing essential export infrastructure such as a gas pipeline system to Germany and 
the United Kingdom  (Gordon & Stenvoll, 2006, p. 23).  
The second part of the government’s strategy included transferring the 
technological knowledge and expertise from experienced international companies to 
Statoil. In addition to building up infrastructure, the fifty percent stake meant that Statoil 
could observe these companies as they explored and developed NCS petroleum while still 
creating an inviting and competitive business environment. According to Lerøen, (2010), 
“competition on the NCS ensured the participation of the world’s leading technology 
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specialists” (p. 13). As Ocean Viking and Normand Prosper illustrated, international oil 
companies brought much-needed experience and resources to developing the continental 
shelf, but also relied on Norwegian expertise to successfully overcome North Sea 
conditions. This same spirit of cooperation and competition would be necessary to 
transition Statoil from an infant company to international leader.  
To facilitate this exchange, Statoil (2012) explains the government “put forth 
technology agreements into place with foreign oil companies during the fourth NCS 
licensing round in 1979. Their funding and expertise helped not only to ensure that the 
international companies made more petroleum research investments in Norway, but also 
to transfer know-how to Norwegian research and industry, including us.” One of the 
company’s most important fields, Statfjord, illustrates how this strategy paid off. Statoil 
was a partner in the field when development started in 1979 and took over production in 
1987. Not only have Statfjord production figures “been huge, the field has been just as 
significant for us in terms of learning lessons as an operator and of developing and 
utilising new technology” (Statoil, 2012). For example, based on Commandment Six, the 
field would need a new system for transporting natural gas from the North Sea to 
Norwegian land, and then back out for export (Lerøen, 2010). However, this system 
would have to cross through the nearly-1200-meters-deep Norwegian Trench, and foreign 
companies were hesitant. According to Statoil (2012), 
The scepticism was so great when we unveiled our concept for the Statpipe gas 
transport system to connect Statfjord and Gullfaks with continental European 
markets that no other companies went along with it. Given just 14 days to present 
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a development proposal to the Norwegian government, the master plan for the 
Kårstø gas plant was constructed out of matchboxes on a large piece of cardboard 
… and approved. Construction of Statpipe started in 1982 and the 880-kilometre 
system opened three years later. 
The Statpipe system was the first to cross the Norwegian Trench and successfully pipe 
gas to Kårstø just north of Stavanger. Furthermore, this narrative theme—an underdog 
beating the odds with hard work and innovation—is reflected throughout the Ten Oil 
Commandments success story.   
Transitioning to a New Structure of State Ownership 
Many doubted the continental shelf’s potential when Phillips first set out on the 
Ocean Viking, but when a 1973 OPEC embargo caused global oil prices to skyrocket, the 
North Sea “between Norway and Britain became the single largest site for oil investment 
and extraction efforts in the world” (Kristoffersen & Young, 2010, p. 578; Yergin, 1991). 
In addition to taking advantage of infrastructure development and technology transfer 
from foreign oil companies flocking North, the fifty percent share on existing fields 
meant Statoil earnings were soon exceeding even the greatest expectations. In fact, Statoil 
was so successful that by the 1980s, the company’s profits were almost as high as 
Norway’s entire GDP. However, political unease with Statoil’s wealth was mounting; 
many worried the company’s burgeoning power could violate the first and most 
important commandment of centralized state control over the petroleum sector (Austvik, 
2012). The government wanted to protect domestic and international competition on the 
NCS and Statoil was becoming too big to manage. 
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Until 1984, the MPE regulated all state licensing regulation, including the fifty 
percent share of production licenses awarded to Statoil, and the Ministry of Finance 
collected all taxation income. To meet growing concerns and further safeguard tax 
income, the state again reorganized its petroleum sector investments in January 1985 with 
White Paper No. 33 (1984-1985) Concerning the effect of the reorganisation of the 
State’s participation in the petroleum industry, splitting them between Statoil and the 
newly established State’s Direct Financial Interest (SDFI). Under this arrangement, the 
state pays “a share of all investments and operating costs in projects on the NCS” that 
corresponds to “its direct financial interest in the SDFI portfolio” (MPE, 2012). These 
projects include on and offshore resources and infrastructure, and each “government 
take” is determined on a case-by-case basis when production licenses are awarded (MPE, 
2010a). Then, “on the same terms as the other owners, the government then receives a 
matching share of revenues from the sale of production and other income sources” (MPE, 
2012). The SDFI budget is annually approved by Storting and included in the central 
government budget.  
The net cash flow from the SDFI was envisioned as yet another “predictable, long 
term and secure revenue to the Norwegian State” (MPE, 2012). As another important step 
toward that security, in 2001, Storting approved the sale of 21.5 percent of the SDFI 
portfolio, with 15 percent going to Statoil. That same year, the company was listed on the 
Oslo and New York stock exchanges “and now operates on the same terms as every other 
player on the NCS” (NPD, 2012); with this final move, the state had successfully 
privatized Statoil. Also in 2001, the government established Petoro, a limited company to 
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manage the state exploration and production licenses on the NCS. As with the SDFI, 
Storting appropriates Petoro’s annual budget and all revenues are filtered back into the 
central government (MPE, 2010b).  
As with Commandments One and Seven, Commandments Six and Eight were 
designed to ensure that Norway not only reaped the benefits of administrating state 
petroleum activity, but also became a major player on its own continental shelf. By 
balancing its central control, administrative, and business roles to create and manage 
Statoil, the SDFI, and Petoro, the state has leveraged profits not only to offset the costs of 
their own investments in the Norwegian petroleum sector, but to also net substantial 
sovereign wealth.  
Developing the High North: Commandment Nine 
Commandment Nine: That an activity plan must be adopted for the area north of the 62nd 
parallel which satisfies the unique socio-political factors associated with that part of the 
country. 
The original Royal Decree and Ten Oil Commandments were based on a cultural 
history of state resource management. Following in the footsteps of nineteenth-century 
hydropower legislation, these policies communicated a long-term strategy for 
establishing Norwegian sovereignty and control over the petroleum on their continental 
shelf. At the same time, the government espoused a strong commitment to considering 
existing commercial activity and environmental constraints in the regions targeted for 
development. According to this narrative, the same approach has applied to developing 
the Northern regions above the 62nd parallel.  
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When the commandments were established in 1971, petroleum activity was 
concentrated in the southern and western regions of the North Sea, but these areas of the 
NCS contained only a fraction of the potential oil and gas lying in Norwegian waters. 
Now, the government predicts that nearly sixty percent of undiscovered petroleum 
resources remain below the surface in Arctic waters (NPD, 2012). These areas are often 
referred to as the “High North.” Kristoffersen and Young (2010) explain how this term 
came into being during the early stages of the Norway Model:  
Knut Frydelund, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, introduced the term 
“high-north” to describe the Barents region in 1973. It has since been recognized 
as a politicized term that does not refer to a clearly geographically demarcated 
area but works to establish Norway’s sovereign rights and interests in the Arctic 
region, including the Barents Sea…[and] has increasingly been talked about as the 
“land of possibilities.” (p. 581)  
Developing the High North would require long-term planning and 
implementation. According to Lerøen (2010), the government interpreted “socio-political 
concerns” in Commandment Nine as “both domestic and foreign-policy concerns” (p. 
13). In terms of foreign policy, establishing and maintaining Norwegian sovereignty over 
the continental shelf was, and remains today, a top priority. During the 1960s, that meant 
delineating maritime borders with the countries that shared parts of the North Sea: 
Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. North of the 62nd parallel, the NCS contains 
both additional petroleum resources and more complicated geopolitical and 
environmental development concerns. These concerns have also been the focus of 
continued domestic debates about the High North for nearly forty years. 
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Prior to 1980 when the government first opened the Barents Sea for exploratory 
drilling, everything north of the 62nd parallel was considered too much of an 
environmental and economic risk to develop. But the government has always planned to 
develop northern Norway to be developed after the North Sea was depleted (Knol, 2010). 
Thirty years ago, much of this region was a virtually one big sheet of ice, inaccessible to 
rigs, ships, or any development infrastructure. However, since 1987, global warming has 
melted these icy waters at an increasingly rapid pace. Figure 10 (Norwegian Ministry of 
the Environment, 2011) illustrates the extent of polar sea ice in coverage 2010 (green 
shading) compared to the extent from 1979 to 2000 (orange line). 
Figure 10: Extent of Polar Sea Ice Coverage in 2010 and 1979-2000 
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In the last thirty years, the previously inaccessible Northwest Passage has become 
“a viable transportation route” for Arctic petroleum activity (Harsem, et al., 2011, p. 
8037). However, extreme weather and environmental sensibility make developing these 
regions unpredictable and dangerous. These concerns lie at the heart of many domestic 
controversies surrounding Arctic development; many environmental and safety advocates 
challenge the notion that existing infrastructure and rig technologies can handle a major 
disaster. Furthermore, increased shipping traffic could disrupt or destroy the many fragile 
ecosystems relying on the Barents Sea.  
As consistently seen throughout this metanarrative, the government’s strategy for 
implementing Commandment Nine is based on a historical-cultural background of 
Norwegian values stemming back well before the Barents Sea was opened in 1980. In 
fact, resource exploration above the 62nd parallel can be traced back hundreds of years to 
the Svalbard island region in the Arctic Ocean. 
Out to the Cold Edge 
Svalbard, which loosely translates to “cold edge,” is an archipelago region 
halfway between Norway and the North Pole (see Figure 11) (U.S. CIA, 2013). Now an 
important mining, tourism, and research location, the islands have served as Arctic 
fishing, whaling, and hunting stations since at least the sixteenth century. Svalbard was 
terra nullius—a no man’s land—until 1920 when the Spitsbergen Treaty formally 
established Norwegian sovereignty over the territory. The 1925 Svalbard Act19 expanded 
the Treaty’s provisions; rather than simply being considered a demilitarized and free-
                                                
19 Act of 17 July 1925 No. 11 
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economic zone, Svalbard would now fall under the provision of Norwegian laws and 
regulations. Rolf Einar Fife (2013), current Director General of Legal Affairs with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explains the historical context for these international 
agreements: 
In 1871 Norway and Sweden invited a number of States to express their views on 
a possible Norwegian annexation of the archipelago. Most responded that they 
had no objection, while Russia expressed reservations…Fully independent from 
Sweden since 1905, Norway invited Russia and Sweden, and then other States, to 
successive conferences in Kristiania (Oslo) in 1910, 1912 and 1914. These 
explored the possibility of establishing a joint administration of the archipelago to 
respond to regulatory and policing needs related to prospective coal mining 
activities…the proposals made at the Kristiania conferences met with opposition 
and were deemed unfeasible. Furthermore, World War I brought these discussions 
to an end. After the war, it was again Norway that took the initiative to achieve a 
definitive resolution by bringing the issue before the 1919 Peace Conference in 
Paris…A key explanation had to do with the casualties suffered by Norway, in 
spite of its neutrality…The major powers felt that they had “a debt of gratitude” 
for the Norwegian sacrifices, and expressed sympathy with the Norwegian 
arguments put forward at the conference.   
Much like hydropower legislation influenced the Ten Oil Commandments, Norway’s 
history as a peaceful country has influenced its approach to establishing sovereignty over 
territories such as Svalbard. Furthermore, this approach is consistent with a 
comprehensive, long-term strategy for developing a national petroleum sector that 
respects its surrounding environment.  
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Figure 11. Svalbard and Surrounding Regions 
 
In addition to annexing Svalbard to Norway, the 1925 legislation dealt with 
protecting the “pristine natural environment” and “fragile ecosystems in these Arctic 
areas” with “prudent policies” (Fife, 2013). Much of the archipelago is closed to any 
economic activity and successive government policies “have moreover defined the 
protection of Svalbard’s distinctive wilderness character as one of several overriding 
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policy objectives” to ensure “one of the world’s best managed wilderness areas” (Fife, 
2013). For example, Stoting passed the Svalbard Environmental Protection Act20 in 2001 
to “preserve a virtually untouched environment in Svalbard with respect to continuous 
areas of wilderness, landscape, flora, fauna and cultural heritage.” In a 2002 press release, 
former Minister of the Environment Børge Brend said this act fulfilled a moral and legal 
obligation to protect a “national treasure” in Norway. 
Ash Lad & Snow White 
Statoil discovered the Askeladd natural gas field in 1981 (Emmerson, 2010). The 
field’s name comes from a character in Norske Folkeeventyr, a compendium of classic 
Norwegian folk tales by Peter Christen Asbjørnsen and Jørgen Moe. Askeladden (Ash 
Lad) is the youngest and smallest of three brothers; in many of these tales, he defies all 
odds to triumph where many others have failed. Fittingly, Statoil discovered the Snøhvit 
(Snow White) field21 in 1984 when it was still a government corporation.  
Snøhvit was the first gas discovery in the Barents Sea to be developed (Statoil, 2012b) 
and the first field in Europe to yield natural gas (NPD, 2012). Although these fields have 
been important to Norwegian petroleum activity since the early 1980s, as with the North 




                                                
20 Act of 15 June 2001 No. 79, Relating to the Protection of the Environment in Svalbard 
21 This name is also used to refer to a larger development comprised of the Snøhvit, Askeladd, and 
Albatross fields. 
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Figure 12. Snøvit Development in Northern Norway 
 
As illustrated by Figure 12 (Statoil, 2012b), the development lies outside of Hammerfest 
on the 70th parallel. The Gulf Stream winds keeps surrounding waters free from ice, but 
still present challenges like winter storms.  
In addition to still being a major gas producer, Snøhvit is one of the most 
important developments for the Norwegian petroleum sector because of the technological 
challenges and successes associated with its extracting and transporting resources. For 
example, according to Statoil (2012b), Snøhvit “took a long time to become 
commercial…[and] involved multiphase flow transport over a longer distance than had 
ever been attempted before. When it came on stream in 2007, Snøhvit was the first NCS 
field operated entirely by remote control from land, and includes Europe's first gas 
liquefaction plant.” Figure 13 (Statoil, 2012b) illustrates the new LNG plant, on the 
shores of Hammerfest, operated by Statoil. 
 
95 
Figure 13. Snøvit LNG Plant  
 
In keeping with the folk symbolism of its namesake, Snøhvit represents the future 
potential of expanded northern petroleum activity; despite the environmental risks of 
these Arctic waters, the Norwegian petroleum sector can persevere.   
LoVe: Prospective Acreage for Sustainable Activity 
As oil production on the NCS has experienced steady decline since 2009, a new 
host of domestic concerns have emerged about Norway’s petroleum sector. One of the 
most controversial domestic debates involves the island regions of Lofoten and 
Vesterålen (LoVe), an area steeped in Norwegian cultural significance and environmental 
diversity. The government has considered LoVe “prospective acreage” for exploration 
and development during the 1970s, but then decided to focus on the North Sea 
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(Kristoffersen & Young, 2010, p. 578). Since then, different government administrations 
have essentially kicked the can down the road on opening LoVe for oil and gas activity, 
calling for more exploratory studies and environmental impact assessments to appease a 
divided national electorate. Figure 14 locates the regions targeted for development in 
LoVe and surrounding areas based on NPD’s 2009 estimates (Barents Observer). 
Figure 14. Lofoten Regions Targeted for Development  
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As spawning grounds for the world’s largest cod and herring populations, LoVe is 
known for breathtaking beauty and a historic fishing industry, making it a popular tourist 
destination for Norwegians and world travelers alike. Because of the environmental 
constraints of this region, drilling would have to occur closer to the shore than previously 
permitted by Norwegian authorities. Not only would an oil spill have a better chance of 
reaching shorelines and causing long-term damage to Lofoten’s fish stocks, some local 
residents decry the idea of oil rigs and transport ships cluttering their awe-inspiring 
vistas. However, this area also represents a potential wealth of subsea petroleum. For 
these reasons, the LoVe issue really heated up when Prime Minister Kjell Magne 
Bondevik took office for his second term:  
In 2002, a full moratorium on oil and gas activity in the Norwegian part of the 
Barents Sea was put in place due to environmental constraints, which lasted three 
years. This moratorium was a direct consequence of the political statement of the 
Bondevik government in 2001. This declaration stated that the Barents Sea would 
not be opened for new petroleum activity before a comprehensive impact study of 
year-round petroleum activity in the Barents Sea was carried out. The declaration 
committed the government to a proactive environmental and resources policy 
based on the principle of sustainable development, which prioritizes research and 
development. Furthermore the declaration stated that the government should 
establish an integrated management plan for the Barents Sea, in which 
environmental, fisheries, petroleum, and maritime transport considerations are 
valued comprehensively. This announced a leading role for the Ministry of the 
Environment, which was assigned the task to head the process towards integrated 
management of the Barents Sea. (Knol, 2010, p. 253) 
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Storting formalized this “principle of sustainable development” in White Paper 
No. 12 (2001-2002), Protecting the riches of the sea, emphasizing the primary goal of an 
integrated management plan for the Barents Sea should “contribute to consensus about 
the management of the marine areas between sector interests, local, regional, and national 
authorities, environmental organizations, and other interest groups” (Knol, 2010, p. 253). 
In other words, the management plan was to be a vehicle for intra-organizational 
negotiations on balancing environmental and economic interests in the Barents Sea. 
Soria Moria: Economic, Environmental, & Political Security 
The government’s focus on High North development once again shifted when 
Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg was reelected in 2005 as leader of a three-part ruling 
coalition between the Labour, Socialist Left, and Centre parties. After their September 
victory, coalition leaders met at the Soria Moria Hotel in Oslo to negotiate the focus and 
goals of their term. The resulting “Soria Moria Declaration” avowed to uphold 
“Norwegian economic, environmental and political security interests in the North shall 
have a high priority and be considered as closely related” (Kristoffersen & Young, 2010, 
p. 581). The hotel name and declaration title are taken from another classic Norwegian 
folk tale in Asbjørnsen and Moe’s Norske Folkeeventyr, “Soria Moria Castle.” The 
story’s protagonist, Halgor, is a poor young boy who rises from humble beginnings—
much like Ash Lad—to discover the Soria Moria castle and find true love with its 
princess. His journey is one of solidarity and triumph, as no clear path to the castle exists 
and many challenges arise along the way.  
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As a result of the Soria Moria Declaration, in 2005, the Ministry of the 
Environment published the Barents Sea Management Plan. Drawing from the Ministry’s 
statements in a September 2006 Norwegian newspaper, Kristoffersen and Young (2010) 
argue this integrated management plan for the Barents Sea and LoVe “is closely 
connected to this strategy [Soria Moria] as it posits Norway as the ‘best resource manager 
in the North by supporting petroleum development that satisfies strict environmental 
regulation’…[and] will ‘form the foundation for a long-term and environmentally 
responsible economic growth from petroleum development” in the High North (p. 581).  
That same year, Jonas Garr Støre, former head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
announced the Stoltenberg government’s High North strategy would focus on three main 
issues: (1) settling the Russian delineation conflict; (2) building the case for Norwegian 
sovereignty in the North, and (3) increasing LoVe petroleum activity (Dale, 2011). Støre 
spoke of a “new chapter in the North” (Kristoffersen & Young, 2010, p. 581) and in 
2006, the MFA published The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy to solidify 
these foreign policy goals.  
A central factor in accomplishing the third goal was actually determining how 
much petroleum is actually contained in the LoVe region. From 2007 to 2009, the 
government sponsored a series of seismic studies to determine LoVe’s actual petroleum 
value. Originally thought to hold two million barrels of oil, the studies determined the 
waters are more likely to contain 1.3 million barrels (Moska & Fouche, 2010) . NPD 
(2010) estimates the potential net value of these future oil and gas resources at 
approximately 500 billion NOK (approximately $86 trillion USD). During this time, 
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Bondevik’s moratorium on opening new areas was extended from until 2010 when an 
updated Barents Sea Management Plan was to be published. However, in the wake of the 
April Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, Norwegian officials again 
placed this decision on hold, calling for more risk assessments, scientific research, and 
public hearings. Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg announced in early 2013 that any 
decisions about LoVe petroleum activity would wait until after the fall national elections.  
It’s a Cooperation, Not a Race 
Another important development relating to Commandment Nine occurred in 
2010, when after forty years of dispute, Norway and Russia agreed on a demarcation deal 
for the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean. This was not the first border agreement between 
these nations; Russia conceded to Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard in 1925, while 
Norway conceded to Russian sovereignty over the Franz Josef Land island region in 1926 
(Fife, 2013). Some forty-five years and Russian governments later in 1970, Norway again 
initiated border discussions regarding the remaining shared continental shelf areas. Based 
on the United Nations Law of the Sea, Norway argued the boundary should be drawn 
along an equidistant midline between the two countries, but Russia argued for a 
“meridian line boundary running more or less straight north from the mainland, which 
would have provided it with an additional 67,000 square miles of economic territory—
about equal to the entire Norwegian sector of the North Sea” (Gibbs, 2010). Russian 
seismic surveys in the 1980s determined this disputed area was rich with mineral 
deposits, but more recent assessments estimate almost 6.8 billion tons of oil and gas lie 
beneath these waters (Amos, 2011).  
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Figure 15. Norwegian Maritime Borders with Russia  
 
The maritime borders were finally resolved in April 2010 (see Figure 15) with a 
joint announcement by the Norwegian prime minister and Russian president Dmitry 
Medvedev in Oslo: 
Stoltenberg said it showed good will in the face of rising international anxiety 
over who controls the Arctic seabed, which by some estimates contains a quarter 
of the world’s undiscovered fossil fuels. “This is a confirmation that Norway and 
Russia, two large polar nations, do not have a policy about racing, but a policy 
about cooperation,” he said. When Russian scientists planted a flag on the seabed 
at the North Pole in 2007, it seemed that a “race to the Arctic” was on, with 
northern nations aggressively jostling for the right to exploit resources that were 
previously out of reach. (Gibbs, 2010) 
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The formal treaty was unanimously approved by Storting in April 201122 and split the 
disputed area nearly in half, although Russia’s territory likely contains more petroleum 
deposits. As with previous border negotiations, the deal signaled an important milestone 
for Norway in establishing sovereign rights over Arctic territories using cooperation 
instead of aggression. Furthermore, as illustrated by Stoltenberg’s comments, this 
agreement set an example for other countries “racing” North in search of oil and gas. 
Developing Foreign Policy: Commandment Ten 
Commandment Ten: That Norwegian petroleum discoveries could present new tasks to 
Norway’s foreign policy. 
The tenth and final commandment can be interpreted on several levels. First and 
foremost, foreign policy is an integral aspect of the Norway Model. However, the more 
nuanced interpretation lies in the simple and straightforward, yet ambiguous, language of 
the commandment; “new tasks” related to “petroleum discoveries” could involve just 
about anything at anytime. Put differently, this commandment leaves the door open for 
interpreting other commandments based on the emergent nature of Norwegian petroleum 
activity in a global energy landscape.  
As the previous section discussed, the current government’s High North strategy 
is certainly important because of the aforementioned global interest in Arctic petroleum, 
but it also illustrates the overwhelming nature of three current and future challenges of 
adapting the Norway Model: (1) maintaining a balance of power with foreign actors; (2) 
                                                
22 Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation 
and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean 
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factoring environmental impacts of petroleum activity into a comprehensive strategy; and 
(3) recognizing the oil belongs to all Norwegians. In addition, climate change has pushed 
environmental issues to the global stage of energy policy. These factors mean that 
Norway is now, more than ever, part of a worldwide network of decision-making for both 
business and regulatory issues.  
More specifically, the NPD (2012) stresses that continuing to find undiscovered 
resources in Arctic, as well as making a gradual transition from producing oil to gas, is 
vital to maintaining Norway’s vision for the future. Natural gas consumption is expected 
to rise considerably in the European Union by 2030, and with the increased energy needs 
of emerging countries like China and India, overall global natural gas consumption is 
projected to rise by fifty percent in the same amount of time (Harsem, et al., 2011). The 
most recent U.S. Geological Survey predicts that almost 25 percent of the world’s 
undiscovered petroleum resources are contained in the Arctic, with 80 percent of that oil 
and gas lying beneath ocean floors (Lindholt & Glomsrød, 2012). The majority of those 
resources—a total of 41 percent of all oil and 70 percent of all gas—are located in Russia 
(Lindholt & Glomsrød, 2012).  
However, Russian political climates and infrastructure capabilities have proven 
unreliable many times in the past, and despite their current government’s focus on Arctic 
petroleum activity. Conversely, as the third largest exporter and fifth largest producer of 
natural gas in the world, Norway is considered one of Europe’s most important and 
reliable energy sources (Reiche, 2010). By 2013, gas production is expected to 
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compromise over half of Norwegian petroleum activity and will continue to grow over 
the next decades (MPE, 2011). 
In the beginning of this oil and gas fairytale, foreign policy related to petroleum 
activity focused on establishing and building Norwegian sovereignty on the NCS with 
both foreign oil companies and neighboring countries. Today, the focus on sovereignty 
over the NCS remains the same, but the context has shifted. From this perspective, 
Commandment Ten illustrates the cornerstone of the state’s current and future 
management strategy: government policies and organizational structures should promote 
new oil and gas discoveries and maximize existing outputs if the Norwegian petroleum 
sector is to benefit the whole nation. 
Chapter Summary 
The success story of the Ten Oil Commandments describes how the Norwegian 
state, by implementing incremental regulatory and organizational changes to the way it 
manages petroleum resources, has been able to blend its long-term, comprehensive goals 
as a social and political entrepreneur with the shorter-term, profit-maximizing goals of a 
private business. The state has certainly taken on more risks with such entrepreneurial 
roles, but clear values rooted in cultural history and outlined by the Ten Oil 
Commandments, comprehensive regulatory planning like the NPD and taxation system, 
and smart investments like Statoil have come together with symphonic precision; 
Norway’s oil industry went from infant to world leader in under twenty years.  
Overall, this metanarrative describes how different events, especially when 
framed around public policies, punctuate the plotlines of the Norwegian success story. 
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Every story has a conflict though, and in the Ten Oil Commandments, the conflict is 
finding a way to keep the success going. In modern Norway, this conflict represents a 
latent tension between the government’s continued focus on the oil and gas fairytale and 




Chapter Five: A New Chapter for the North 
Realising the potential of the Arctic will not be easy. The dilemmas related to 
increased economic activity in the High North must be carefully thought 
through…But we are on the right path. Petroleum and marine resources in the 
High North will help provide a foundation for our future prosperity, and we 
remain determined to preserve the unique Arctic environment. Finally, let us 
remember that the legal and political frameworks needed to maintain the Arctic as 
a region of peaceful coexistence. 
Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gate Støre, September 21, 2012 
The metanarrative presented in Chapter Three describes how different events 
punctuate the plotlines of the Norwegian success story. The conflict of this narrative lies 
in keeping the oil and gas fairytale going; the resolution lies in finding and developing all 
available petroleum resources—especially those in the North—with same spirit of 
regulatory and technological innovation that got Norway this far. In 2006, Foreign 
Minister Jonas Garr Støre called for a “new chapter in the North” for the Norwegian 
petroleum sector (Kristoffersen & Young, 2010, p. 581). In addition to settling the 
Russian maritime border and building Norwegian sovereignty in the Arctic, the 
Stoltenberg government believed that writing this new chapter depended on promoting 
Barents Sea and LoVe development. 
However, as Browning and Morris (2012) state, “narrative realities are contingent 
and local…competing narratives and interpretations [can] coexist…and there may and 
often are different versions of the truth” (p. 154). And while most Norwegians would 
concur the petroleum sector has benefited their nation, not everyone agrees that more oil 
107 
and gas development is the way forward. In these contingent interpretations, the 
“conflict” of the Norwegian success story also centers on the future of petroleum activity 
in the North, but is told a bit differently each time. Norway is surely at a crossroads, but 
there is more at stake than petroleum; the very values that define the Norwegian success 
story—consensus, transparency, and environmentalism—hang in the balance. 
Thus, this chapter will explore alternate perspectives on developing the High 
North set against the backdrop of my fieldwork experiences and interview data. The 
leader of a grassroots anti-petroleum organization explains why many locals in LoVe, 
and a growing number of Norwegians throughout the country, are questioning the 
government’s motives for discovering new oil and gas in the North. The founder of an 
influential Oslo environmental NGO recalls how the local movement got its start when 
fisherman found their voices. The leader of that local movement explains how their 
organization has brought local voices to the national policymaking stage. The former 
national leader of the Socialist Left party and current managing director of World 
Wildlife Norway build their stories on how LoVe development is symbolic of a larger 
global initiative towards sustainable energies and economies. Often quoted together in 
media stories, these organizational leaders offer provocative perspectives on the local, 
national, and international implications of continuing the Norwegian oil and gas fairytale.  
Folkefest: A Weekend of Local Stories 
In July 2010, I interviewed Frederic Hauge, the leader of Bellona Foundation, an 
influential environmental think tank headquartered in Oslo. Hauge told me of a growing 
grassroots movement against Lofoten oil drilling and how Bellona was helping local 
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fisherman organize legal and protest actions. He mentioned one organization in 
particular, Folkeaksjonen oljefritt Lofoten, Vesterålen, og Senja, (People’s Action 
Against Oil Drilling in Lofoten, Vesterålen, and Senja), that was leading the local cause 
and gaining national support. Hauge put me in touch with the head of People’s Action 
(PA), Gaute Wahl, who invited me to see his organization in action the very next 
weekend; PA was sponsoring Folkefest, a huge anti-oil protest in Svolvær, a historic 
fishing village in the Lofoten Island region. 
This would not be my first time to LoVe; I spent a week in Henninngsvær, one of 
the region’s smaller islands, for a qualitative research camp the previous summer. We 
stayed at a locally owned rorbu, ate traditional Northern cuisine like rehydrated stockfish 
and potatoes, watched fisherman unloading a whale on the rorbu pier, and soaked in a 
traditional wooden hot tub after hiking Austvågøya. Just one year later when I returned 
for Folkefest, I saw a different view of LoVe. My friend and research partner, a UiN 
doctoral student, had come along to help me with Norwegian translations and conduct her 
own fieldwork at the protest. We were staying in Svolvær, a 5000-person town located in 
the Vågan municipality of Nordland County. Tourism is increasingly one of LoVe’s most 
important industries and the shiny new waterfront hotels, restaurants, and gift shops I saw 
were striking departure from the town’s thousand-year-old cod fishing roots. After we 
settled into the Thon Hotel—one of many in a popular national chain—a five-kilometer 
taxi ride took us to Kabelvåg to interview Gaute Wahl.  
With just 1600 residents, Kabelvåg is a smaller and more traditional Vågan 
village than Svolvær. Most of the protesters were bunking up at the historic Vågan 
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Church, also known as the Lofoten Cathedral, but much of the weekend activities were 
happening at Prastengbrygga, the village watering hole (brygga means pier in 
Norwegian) where we were meeting Wahl. As we sat down at sunny pier-side table, 
Wahl explained how he got involved at the beginning of People’s Action in 2007 and 
“immersed” himself in the cause as the group began gaining media attention. For the next 
year, Lofoten Aksjonen—as it was called until 2009—concentrated on establishing “more 
formal cooperation with environmental organizations like Friends of the Earth, Young 
Friends of the Earth, WWF, and Bellona.” Together with these NGO partners, Wahl 
recounted, “we had this big conference in Svolvær the autumn of 2008, which was very 
broadly represented both from Vesterålen and Lofoten and the environmental 
organizations.” It was there and then that “we decided that we wanted to make a national 
organization, a people’s campaign.”  
At first, Wahl split his time between working for the organization and teaching at 
a local elementary school. “None of us imagined that it would take off the way it did,” he 
explains, “but this was the most debated political issue all of last year.” In January 2009, 
PA hosted a foundation meeting in Svolvær that Wahl says turned out to be “one of the 
most visited political meetings since the 1970s,” and by 2010, with nearly 4,000 
registered members from all over Norway, the PA board could afford to hire him as a 
fulltime leader. Since then, Wahl has become a “major figure in the national debates 
about petroleum development” (Kristoffersen & Young, 2010, p. 582). 
After the interview, Gaute went back to running the protest logistics and we 
treated ourselves to a well-earned pint. At a nearby table, I overheard two people 
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speaking in American English and couldn’t help but introduce myself. Dave, a marine 
biologist from Alaska, was in town to speak about his experiences cleaning up a 2006 
Prudhoe Bay oil spill. His visit was sponsored by World Wildlife Norway (WWFN), 
which is where his travel companion, Mali, also worked as a marine biologist. They 
invited us to their table and soon our group of four became thirty or forty as more 
protesters arrived for the weekend festivities. As the evening wore on, we headed to Mali 
and Dave’s rorbu for a nachspiel (afterparty) of homemade fiskesuppe (fish soup) and 
sing-alongs with our new friends. We said our goodbyes for the night and Dave 
mentioned that upon their return to Oslo that coming Monday, he would also be speaking 
at WWFN headquarters. Since I would also be in Oslo, Mali invited me to participate and 
interview her boss, Nina Jensen. As luck would have it, I had already scheduled an 
interview with Nina’s sister, the national leader of the pro-oil Progress Party Siv Jensen, 
that same Monday morning at Storting.  
The next day back at Prastengbrygga, the village center had been transformed into 
a festival-like setting of vendor tents—serving whale burgers, no less—colorful banners, 
and a large stage for the afternoon’s debate over LoVe development. Among the debaters 
was Ivar Kristiansen (the source of my narrative inspiration), a Storting member from 
Bodø whom I had interviewed that June in Oslo. As a Conservative Party (H) a 
representative for Nordland County and member of the parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, Kristiansen is a strong advocate for the 
petroleum sector in the North. Also on stage was Kristin Halvorsen, arguably one of the 
most powerful women in Norwegian national politics over the last decade. As the former 
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Minister of Finance, current Minister of Education, and leader of the Socialist Left (SV) 
party, Halvorsen and her party are some of the most vocal opponents of LoVe petroleum 
development in Norway; I would be sitting down with her the next morning at her rorbu 
for an interview before heading back to Bodø. 
The interview data and field notes I would collect as a result of this trip sparked a 
much deeper understanding of how the Norwegian oil and gas fairytale is playing out in 
the High North. Although these organizational leaders believe the petroleum sector has 
been important for Norwegian success, they are skeptical that government policies and 
structures for managing the future of natural resources will continue to benefit the whole 
nation. The government claims that coexistence and knowledge are the way to keep this 
success story going, but these leaders counter the evidence is crystal clear; Arctic 
petroleum development is the wrong direction from Norway and its time to write a new 
chapter for the North. 
Coexistence or Crowding Out? 
Remember that Commandment Four requires petroleum development to consider 
existing commercial activity and the surrounding natural environment. According to the 
government, the Petroleum Act of 1996 and other legislative initiatives have created a 
regulatory framework for ensuring this coexistence. More recently, with White Paper No. 
12 (2001-2002), Protecting the riches of the sea the Bondevik government established a 
more comprehensive framework for “integrated management plans” that promote 
consensus between stakeholders in new marine areas targeted for development (Knol, 
2010). According to former Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs state secretary 
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Solveig Strand (2002), because of these management plans, “cooperation between the 
petroleum and the fishing industries has steadily improved over the years, and is 
formalized in different ways so as to ensure a good basis for decision-making.” However, 
not all stakeholders would agree that coexistence between the petroleum sector, fisheries, 
coastal communities, and the natural environment in the High North has actually worked 
out the way the government claims (Knol, 2010).  
Particularly in LoVe, many political and environmental groups have decried the 
idea of exploration and drilling, arguing a spill would have disastrous effects on the local 
economies, cod and herring spawning grounds, seabird colonies, and coral reefs. 
According to Kristoffersen and Young (2010), “whilst the CEO of the Statoil, Helge 
Lund, has argued that his company has a ‘democratic right’ to argue for access” in LoVe, 
local fisherman from have questioned the government’s consideration, raising “concerns 
about who has a ‘right to the ocean’” (p. 582). Beyond this being a rights issue, the 
practical “challenges associated with both industries effectively sharing the same 
territory” were illustrated by controversy over government-sponsored seismic studies 
during the summers of 2007, 2008, and 2009; “whether the subsequent reduction in 
fishing catches was due to natural variation or seismic surveys has led to severe political 
debate” (Kristoffersen & Young, 2010, p. 582). Wahl agrees the oil industry has glossed 
over local and fishery reactions to encroaching on these waters.  
He explains that although the NPD would call this exploratory activity a success, 
“the fishermen have really gone bananas the last three years when they have been 
shooting [conducting] seismic [studies].” Furthermore, Wahl believes such government 
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oversight is part of a larger “politically planned process” with the petroleum sector to 
dismantle the local fishing industry in LoVe: 
The oil lobby is extremely strong and money powerful, and they have just 
systematically been like talking down to the fisheries. We have had, you could 
call it, structuring or rationalization of the fisheries in this area; the small coast 
fisher with a small boat is about to not exist anymore. That has been a politically 
planned process. You have [fishing] quotas, and quotas are now for sale, so big 
companies can now buy up a quota and they can rationalize the fisheries, bigger 
boats, more income, less work, and that has been harsh on several small 
communities, especially in this area who have been living on the smaller boats.   
Such distrust is rooted in a cultural belief that the oil industry and government are in 
cahoots to drown out local voices and promote their own economic agendas. I found 
these comments surprising based on previous interviews and my understanding of the 
Norway Model; such behavior seemed counterintuitive to the government’s official 
coexistence stance, as well as a seemingly historical-cultural tradition of transparent, 
consensus-based resource management and policymaking. Still, it was not the first time I 
had heard of missteps in these democratic legislative processes.  
Manufactured Consensus23: The Oil Industry’s Campaign 
Strand (2002) explains government organizations such as the Ministry of 
Fisheries and Coastal Affairs require a stakeholder review process as part of the impact 
assessments included with integrated management plans. These reviews and assessments 
must occur before most major petroleum activities get a government green light: 
                                                
23 The term “manufactured consensus” represents a core category interpreted from participants actual 
words, not to be confused with the theoretical concept advanced by Herman & Chomsky (1988). 
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Before opening up a new area for petroleum activities, developing a discovery or 
closing down a field, Norwegian law requires an impact assessment. The 
assessment describes the possible environmental, social and economic effects that 
the planned activity could have, including its potential impact on fisheries. The 
impact assessment is circulated for comment to among others the fishing industry, 
relevant central and local government bodies and other interested parties such as 
environmental organizations. This public consultation process is important for 
identifying the measures that will have to be taken to minimize potential conflicts 
of interest between the petroleum industry, fisheries and environmental 
considerations. (Strand, 2002) 
Thus, the government has espoused to uphold the coexistence policy and take all 
stakeholder interests into consideration. However, when I spoke to Frederic Hauge in 
June 2010 at his Bellona office in Oslo, he told me a story about the government 
sidestepping this “public consultation process.”  
In 2001, Norsk Hydro—a Norwegian energy company that merged with Statoil in 
2007—“had got permission to drill at Røst,” a Northern municipality in the LoVe region. 
“Before we could appeal to the Ministry of Environment and demand a formal review of 
the environmental impacts of new petroleum activity in Røst, Hydro was ready to start 
drilling,” explains Hauge. “And we said, well, this is a lack of democracy and we cannot 
be arrested” for protesting. Bellona activists “had just been in the Netherlands and got a 
new boat, and we sailed directly up and stayed at Røst where the platform was on its 
way,” Hauge continues. After Bellona threw out their anchors, effectively haulting the 
platform installation, “the Labour Party withdrew the [drilling] permission and said ‘we 
see that this is wrong from a democratic point of view.’” In other words, the government 
115 
admitted they had hastily granted Norsk Hydro drilling permits without a sufficient 
public review process, and that more environmental impact assessments were necessary.  
“Hydro had to turn around their platform and that cost them 400 million kroners.” 
The Ministry of Petroleum and Oil “got furious,” says Hauge. In addition to costing 
Hydro a fortune and ruffling the MPE’s feathers by blocking drilling in Røst, Hauge 
claims that Bellona also changed how petroleum companies do business with the 
government. This protest action played out right before the September 2001 general 
elections where the Labour Party ceded power to a coalition government led by Prime 
minister Kjell Magne Bondevik. As discussed in Chapter Three, Bondevik’s government 
was the first promote holistic management plans for Barents Sea development.  
Hauge explains the government “started asking, what is the ship traffic these 
petroleum activities bring with them, what is the global distillation” of organic air and 
water pollutants occurring from increased traffic and—perhaps most importantly—“who 
are the actors” with the most power over Arctic oil and gas decision making in Norway? 
The oil industry responded by building up their public relations and lobbying efforts. 
According to Hauge, “if you look at the number of people they [the oil industry] have 
employed since 2001, to do lobby and communication work, it is incredible.” 
While promotional campaigns may work in Oslo, according to Hauge, many 
Northern residents are skeptical, even when it comes to environmental NGOs. “When we 
come up to Lofoten in our boat, they judge us on our seamanship, if the boat is okay, if 
we are fanatics, if we eat whale meat, and if we can have a beer together,” he explains. 
That’s one reason for his mobile speedboat office and why Bellona has been especially 
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successful at grassroots efforts where others have failed. Instead of just swooping in with 
glitzy marketing campaigns and expensive lobbying efforts like Statoil and other 
petroleum companies, Bellona makes a big effort “to be a part of the daily life, in a way, 
at Røst, Værøy, Stamsund.” Hauge explains that Statoil “has the big luxury dinners with 
a lot of promises,” but they “have, in my opinion, misjudged the local attitude 
completely. It works for a while,” until the people realize “there is no second dinner.” 
Wahl agrees that LoVe locals aren’t persuaded by such communication strategies. 
When I ask him to reflect on Hauge’s characterization of the oil and gas lobby, he 
recounts a specific story about an industry PR stunt that didn’t take: 
After the parliamentary elections in the autumn last year, the two political parties 
with the [strongest] offensive [against drilling] in Lofoten, Vesterålen, and Senja 
were the ones that got the most cut in in their votes. That [loss] was used for what 
it was worth by the oil industry, and just some weeks after they had the OLF, the 
oil industry union’s [annual] meeting. They had a big meeting with the scene that 
had landscape from Lofoten [in the backdrop] but it was in Oslo. It looked like 
this artificial bird twittering and like the environmentalists or something. It was 
just a lot of propaganda, like coexistence has never been a problem. This is totally 
wrong…they are saying to us, you know, a lot of things that are not true, but it’s a 
political fight. 
Now, the locals are not afraid to put up their own political fight. For example, when the 
Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs decided to open up a Værøy harbor for 
exploratory activity in 2009, the fishermen mobilized some 70 to 80 boats to block it. 
This time, Hauge recalls, “it was the fishermen themselves” who organized the protest. 
Bellona has passed the torch for a direct action movement to local grassroots groups like 
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PA; now the NGO focuses on providing resources such as expert testimony for legal 
proceedings and regulatory hearings that local stakeholders could not otherwise afford. 
Territorial—not Holistic—Management  
Based on these stories, one has to question if the government actually has 
promoted integrated management plans in the spirit of coexistence and consensus. Are 
future in the North developments actually being planned with consideration for existing 
commercial activity and the surrounding environment, as stipulated by Commandment 
Four? Or is the government willing to stifle opposition voices via a politically planned 
process in cahoots with the oil industry? And if so, has the Norwegian success story just 
been based about finding more oil and gas…at any cost?  
Kristoffersen and Young (2010) argue this shift has been gradual, but it no doubt 
exists. Throughout the 1970s, “environmental security” was an integral aspect of 
government policymaking because “civil society organizations” pushed hard “for greater 
monitoring and regulation of environmentally hazardous petroleum activities” (p. 582). 
As such, “the actively inclusive structures associated with the state in Norway” have, for 
the most part, “worked to ensure that ecological modernization has remained moderate 
and centrally coordinated” (p. 582). However, such inclusive structures began to change 
in the 1980s when “concerns around ‘peak oil’ and its implications for ‘energy security’ 
and social spending created new, more exclusive spaces for collaboration between 
politicians and oil industry representatives around the turn of the century” (p. 582). As 
the Norwegian economy increasingly became dependent on the petroleum sector, the 
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boundary between government and industry interests—especially when it came to 
environmental issues—became even blurrier.  
Thus, although integrated management plans would seem to create a public space 
for negotiating coexistence between the petroleum sector and other stakeholders, “there 
has been little interchange between governmental representatives and environmental 
groups, or even between environmental groups on these issues,” which has “enabled the 
increasing marginalization of environmental actors and discourses from debates over oil 
drilling in the north of Norway over the last decade” (Kristoffersen & Young, 2010, p. 
583).  Instead, the trend has turned towards “exclusive spaces” for government-industry 
collaboration, such as KonKraft.  Kristoffersen and Young (2010) explain this “public-
private forum” held “quarterly, closed meetings” from 2001 to 2007 “and published 
several reports” in order to produce “a policy consensus regarding the opening up of new 
oil fields” in the High North: 
The main area in which the oil industry has been able to strategize with 
government officials for access to new oil fields is a forum called KonKraft. 
Although it is not traceable in any government documents or public registers this 
forum was likely established in 2000 with the objective of developing joint 
strategies between industry and state representatives to make the Norwegian shelf 
globally competitive. For the industry that means accessing ‘prospective acreage,’ 
primarily the unexplored hydrocarbon deposits in the Barents Sea and Lo-Ve 
region in particular. KonKraft facilitated a quarterly meeting between oil industry 
representatives and politicians, chaired by the Minister of Petroleum and Energy, 
called Toppledeforum (top-leader-forum). Meetings took place behind closed 
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doors so that participants had the chance to talk freely about sensitive political 
issues. (pp. 580-581)  
These closed-door meetings suggest that while the government was officially promoting 
“integrated” management strategies for coexistence such as the Barents Sea Management 
Plan, “securing the legitimacy of these policies involved producing new territorial 
management strategies, which largely excluded complex environmental concerns” 
(Kristoffersen & Young, 2010, p. 583). In other words, rather than finding ways to 
promote coexistence, KonKraft—in partnership with the Norwegian government—was 
solely focused on discovering and exploiting more petroleum resources. 
The government tells a different story about their relationship to KonKraft. In a 
2011 white paper to Storting entitled An industry for the future: Norway’s petroleum 
activities,24 the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy describes KonKraft as an industry 
agency whose participants—“trade unions, suppliers and oil companies”—“cooperate on 
factors that are crucial to the further development of the Norwegian Shelf” (p. 65). One 
of the most important aspects of this agency “involves directing focus to the oil and gas 
industry’s possibilities and challenges,” such as “improved recovery,” where “the 
Ministry believes that KonKraft can make a positive contribution” (p. 65). Based on “its 
participants and composition,” the MPE argues that “KonKraft is well-positioned to 
establish appropriate follow-up of the various areas where the industry is challenged…to 
improve recovery…as well as considering if, and potentially how, joint efforts to reduce 
operating costs on the Norwegian Continental Shelf can be organised” (p. 65). This MPE 
                                                
24 Meld. St. 28 (2010-2011) Report to Storting (white paper) 
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discourse—the only I was able to locate with specific mention of collaboration with 
KonKraft in English—focuses on improving recovery from existing fields and 
capitalizing on industry expertise and guidance.  
On one hand, this story corresponds to that of the Ten Oil Commandments; such 
policies, procedures, and organizational partnerships are motivated by the same historic 
values that Norwegian governments have always embraced for managing their natural 
resources to benefit the whole nation. If oil is good for Norway, and industry are the 
experts on oil, then the government is acting in everyone’s best interest. On the other 
hand, the closed-door nature of KonKraft meetings calls in to question a transparent 
administrative and regulatory process; industry executives themselves have stated “the 
meetings provided the petroleum industry with a ‘detailed context of the Norwegian 
agenda and the priorities in Norway’ …[including] information on upcoming decisions 
and actions from the government” (Kristoffersen & Young, 2010, p. 583).  
The issue is further complicated by a 2008 documentary by the Norwegian 
Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) revealing “KonKraft had been the major arena for the 
industry to work towards developing petroleum fields in northern Norway” and “the main 
bureaucrat in the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy responsible for KonKraft had secret 
meetings with industry representatives to advise them on how to run an effective lobby 
campaign” by improving their environmental image and concentrating on influencing 
mayors in northern Norway and politicians in Parliament” (Kristoffersen & Young, 2010, 
p. 581). It is not exactly surprising the MPE would want to help oil companies with their 
communication strategies; after all, the government owns 67 percent of Statoil. However, 
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the secretive and closed nature of these interactions left a bad taste in many Norwegian 
citizens’ mouths. 
North vs. South: Regional Power Divides 
KonKraft is not an isolated example in terms of northern skepticism of the oil 
industry’s motives-or the government’s motives, for that matter—when it comes to 
natural resources. According to Dale (2011), many northern Norwegians see LoVe 
petroleum development as “yet another example” of how they will be “exploited by the 
central government and the centralized financial elite. As with the fur trade of the middle 
ages and the fisheries of the past thousand years, critics in the north see themselves as 
once again having to succumb to the role as provider of raw materials for others to 
capitalize on” (p. 171). These “historical preconditions” of distrust, argues Socialist Left 
(SV) party leader Kristin Halvorsen, have cultivated a Northern identity of exploitation, 
an “understanding that [those in the North] have the resources, but people down South 
has been profiting from that.”  
Interestingly, Halvorsen explains this argument can go both ways. Some of those 
in favor of opening up the Arctic for more development, like her fellow debate panelist 
Ivar Kristiansen, have told Oslo to stay out of the way; this is what the North wants. She 
uses and example from yesterday’s debate: 
You heard this representative [Ivar Kristiansen] from the Conservative Party. His 
main point is that he comes from this region and I come from the South, so I 
should not come here to tell them what is the right thing to do when it comes to 
developing oil and gas resources outside in Lofoten and Vesterålen. And this is 
very important to be aware of with the discussion about the resources up north; it 
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has to be processes together with people up north and you have to respect their 
needs to develop their community…Because it is not possible to make decisions if 
the majority of people up north thinks this is just another way for the South and 
Oslo to overrule them.  
Despite Kristiansen’s accusations, Halvorsen disagrees she is out of touch with what 
Northerners want, stressing the SV party makes sure to keep “close contact” with its 
members in these regions to ensure their interests are represented in any national 
decisions about LoVe development.  
But this argument—that petroleum activity will bring economic and social 
benefits to local communities simply because it will bring more people to the North—is 
questionable, Halvorsen argues. Motioning to the clear waters and lush mountains, 
Halvorsen explains that “those who are in favor of developing oil and gas industry in this 
area, their argument is [that] the employment connected to fisheries, to tourism—to all 
the resources that we can see around us now— they will maintain, and employment 
connected to oil and gas, they will come on top of that.” The story of increased economic 
and social benefits from northern development communicates the petroleum sector won’t 
just coexist with other industries; it will compliment them.  
An Industry for the Future 
This complimentary perspective is central to the government’s core strategy for 
developing multiple aspects of the petroleum sector at the same time. Government 
organizations like the NPD and MPE increasingly use the phrase “an industry for the 
future” to describe the Norwegian petroleum sector. In addition to the MPE (2011) white 
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paper to Storting entitled with the phrase, Figure 16 comes from Facts 2012, the annual 
MPE and NPD joint report.   
Figure 16. An Industry for the Future 
 
According to this figure, “new economic activity” in the High North will lead the way for 
“long-term management and value creation from the petroleum resources” (MPE & NPD, 
2012, p. 21). The corresponding white paper argues “the Government’s petroleum policy 
is therefore based on a generational perspective” (MPE, 2011, p. 9). From this 
perspective, developing the North is the key to continuing the Norwegian success story 
for generations to come. 
Ripple Effects 
A central component of government and oil industry discourse on High North 
development deals with the benefits of petroleum activity for local communities. These 
“ripple effects” of NCS petroleum activity, such as jobs in the supplier industry and 
regional tax income, are framed as being vital to creating “the largest possible values for 
the nation” by contributing to local and regional life (Henriksen & Sørnes, 2010; MFA, 
2009; NPD, 2012, p. 21). For example, the Snøvit development has been called a 
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“paradigm shift” for the Hammerfest region in terms of jobs creation and tax revenues 
(Lerøen, 2010, p. 13). Two reports in particular have emphasized ripple effects in 
promoting High North petroleum development:  
First, there was the so-called ‘Barlindhaug report’ (2005). Barlindhaug, a 
consulting firm located in the city of Tromsø, in the north of Norway, sought to 
identify the ‘extended positive effects’ of new oil development. The report was 
initiated by the previous government’s Ministry of Local Government and 
Regional Development but jointly financed with the petroleum industry. [Second, 
there was] a report from the private consulting firm ECON on the future scenarios 
for the north of Norway in 2025. This report, called 2025 Rings in the Water, 
projected that by 2025 the ‘High North’ would be in the ‘front seat’ of economic 
development in Norway with 10,000 new jobs created through petroleum activity.  
(Kristoffersen & Young, 2010, p. 582) 
These reports frame petroleum development as a way for the North to reap the economic 
and political benefits of its own resources; new opportunities could even build the North 
a Stavanger of its own.  
 In a more recent report, KonKraft (2009) states the industry believes that “future 
development of oil and gas activity off northern Norway must be pursued in co-existence 
and spirit of mutual understanding with important local industries as fishing and tourism” 
(p. 8). As evidenced by the shiny new hotels lining Svolvær’s piers, tourism is thriving in 
LoVe, and KonKraft (2009) acknowledges “the tourism sector has become an 
increasingly important contributor to value creation, employment and settlement in 
northern Norway” (p. 9). However, this report also questions how viable tourism will 
prove to be in the long-term since “tourist season which only lasts for three to four 
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months of the year” (p. 9). Pointing to “an overview of guest nights at northern 
Norwegian hotels and hostels since 2000,” KonKraft argues “that vocationally-related 
demand has been at least as important for industrial value creation as revenues from 
tourism” (p. 9). In this way, the petroleum sector could add more value to the tourism 
industry by bringing oil industry employees and stakeholders North year-round.  
Similarly, KonKraft (2009) argues that although “the fisheries sector has 
historically been an important cornerstone for jobs and settlement in northern Norway,” 
that cornerstone has steadily declined over the past twenty years: “since 1990, the number 
of people in the region with fishing as their main occupation has almost halved and 
figures for recruitment to the industry look even more dramatic, with a steadily declining 
proportion of young people choosing work on fishing vessels” (p. 9). The North is 
experiencing a “brain drain,” or a dearth of young people returning home to work after 
completing their educations elsewhere in the country; the jobs simply aren’t there.  
As a result, local economies are suffering and populations are steadily declining. 
In addition, KonKraft (2009) argues that “fewer jobs in fishing have been offset to a great 
extent by the strong national growth in public sector employment.” In other words, the 
petroleum sector has provided enough jobs in Norway to offset a national economic 
decline, even if young people are moving to Stavanger or Oslo instead of back home to 
Tromsø or Lofoten. Petroleum sector jobs are attractive because “the oil industry is 
knowledge-intensive, with relatively high levels of education and pay” (KonKraft, 2009, 
p. 9). Thus, more petroleum jobs would encourage population growth by offsetting the 
declining fishing industry. 
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However, Wahl relates these lines of reasoning to his previous points about 
fishing quotas and a “politically-planned process” to promote High North petroleum 
activity. He explains that “the oil lobby has been saying that now the fisheries are going 
so badly, so we need another foot to stand on. We need another new industry in this 
area.” The same goes for tourism, Wahl continues, which has “been talked down [about] 
by the politicians, like it is not a real industry or it doesn’t earn any money.” But “if you 
look at Svalbard,” says Wahl, “the tourist industry has created enormous local revenue 
and all those restaurants that are open all year also for locals.” Halvorsen also has her 
doubts. In questioning the legitimacy of these industry projections, she once again ties 
LoVe petroleum development back into a broader story of southern interests over 
northern resources: 
I think that we have reports that have been completed recently [that] have 
underlined our argument and conclusions. The oil industry have estimated that the 
value of the resources are about double what they actually are—what our research 
says they are—and that the employment locally connected to development of this 
area is minor. That is part of what people up north feel. They contribute to the 
Norwegian economy, but get very little back. This story is the same story… that 
Oslo develops oil and gas in this part of Norway, [but] that all the revenues, all 
employment connected to them, are down south in Stavanger, which is even 
worse than [it going to] Oslo.   
And while Halvorsen admits that northern populations are declining, she counters that 
“everybody knows if you are going to develop communities like this, you need 
enterprises and activity that are interesting for educated young people.” Therein lies the 
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challenge for her party and others who against High North petroleum activity—how to 
promote the ripple effects of other enterprises.  
Peak Oil is Over: Building Sustainable Industries 
The oil industry and Norwegian government argue that time is of the essence; 
they must continue looking for more opportunities now or miss out in the long run. Once 
a field is discovered, it takes nearly twenty years to start producing. However, Wahl, 
Halvorsen, and WWFN managing director Nina Jensen also feel time is running out to 
develop a different kind of national industry. Rather than continuing the oil and gas 
fairytale, they argue its time for Norway to recognize a new chapter in their success story, 
as Jensen explains: 
I think everyone agrees that the oil industry has been good for this country and 
has generated a huge amount of welfare and benefits for the people. I think all 
environmental NGOs…pretty much everyone we know agrees to that. The point 
is that we’re now at a stage where we need to find a new future for this country... 
It’s not going to be a country where we have enormous wealth generated 
continuously from oil and gas. It will be something else. We just don’t know what 
that something else will be. We think it should be fisheries, it should be tourism, 
or it should be agriculture, to say a few. But unless we make sure that we keep 
these alive and do everything that we can to make sure that it’s sustainable, we’re 
pretty much jeopardizing an entire future...We need a new course.   
Similarly, Wahl explains that from a different perspective, it’s the temporal context of the 
fishing industry’s significance that’s changing in Norway, not the cultural context. 
Fishing is a historic industry, but it also represents a different kind of future industry—a 
sustainable national industry.  
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In a 2012 interview with Nature magazine, Wahl said that “fisheries and fishing 
have long been the most important foundation for employment and production in this 
region. Islanders are united against oil and their support of sustainable industries” (Allen, 
2012, p. 209). And as Halvorsen explains, the government and oil industry stress that new 
jobs in the petroleum sector will add to those created by existing Northern industries, not 
replace them. However, she argues that an expanded petroleum sector not only fails to 
coexist with other industries in the North, but it actually puts them in jeopardy. For 
example, “the employment connected to tourism, to fisheries, to production of clean food 
would be threatened if we opened these areas…if an accident happens, it will be a 
catastrophe. A lot of people up there who have invested in small enterprises will go 
bankrupt if such catastrophes happen.” But it’s not just about protecting these 
investments from accidents and oil spills, says Halvorsen; it’s also about ruining unique 
Northern brands: 
This concept of Lofoten and Vesteralen, the brand, is not like one out of 5,000.  
It’s one unique brand. It’s a symbol. For instance, there is an enterprise called the 
Lofoten production. They produce all kind of fish products. They sell because of 
the name and because people down south and in other parts of Europe connect 
clean food with their label. And if we start to have drilling around here, their label 
will suffer…That is the same for tourists. It is not one of 5,000 nice places where 
you can go. It is unique. The nature is special. 
Like Jensen, Wahl and Halvorsen think the government is disregarding the economic and 
social potential of building industries that already exist in LoVe—fishing and tourism—
in favor of developing an industry that inevitably cannot last forever. 
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“It’s a matter of what do we do when we run out of oil, because it’s only a matter 
of twenty to fifty years,” Jensen argues. “We know the peak oil is over. We know that oil 
and gas resources are running out. It’s only a matter of time, so we need to come up with 
solutions for the future.” Wahl echoes that “the oil is going to last just a couple of 
decades. That’s inevitable for the whole of the world.” In order to maintain all viable 
options for the future Norway must find a more sustainable national industry than oil and 
gas. In the meantime, the government is wasting time by maintaining a singular focus on 
the petroleum sector. This is deep and troubling concern for Jensen, one that has 
consequences not only for the environment, but also to the economic and social welfare 
of future generations of Norwegians.  
She explains the “constant focus on oil and gas as the only solution for this 
country” is essentially “sending us into doomsday, because once we run out of oil, the 
petroleum, or the pension fund is going to run out of money in a couple of years paying 
off welfare and social costs.” By then, it will be “too late to start a new business or 
industries because it takes ten, twenty, thirty years to establish it and make it work.” 
Norway is “so far stuck in the oil and gas ditch that we can’t see a way out,” Jensen 
argues, and as a result “we’re not investing in our future where time is of the essence; it’s 
right now.” Instead, Jensen believes the government should apply the same innovative 
spirit that built the petroleum sector towards developing a different type of energy 
resource: renewables.  
Rather than having a “back-up plan” or “alternative livelihoods generated from 
technological capacities or industries…like Brazil or Denmark or even Sweden and 
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Finland,” the government is “spending about 120 times more on fossil fuels than they are 
in sort of renewables, which is ludicrous,” says Jensen. For example, “Denmark made a 
decision a few years back that they wanted to be energy-independent, so that they’re not 
importing oil any more. They are self-supplied from wind power.” In addition to 
promoting energy independence in the face of declining continental shelf resources, 
government investments in renewable energy also have the potential for technology 
transfer to other countries.  
Much like Norway learned from foreign companies when they began developing 
the NCS, Jensen believes “developing industries that can deliver renewable technologies 
to other countries” represent “a huge potential for technology transfer.” And just like the 
petroleum sector helped Norway build a thriving supplier industry, renewable energy 
technologies could do the same, according to Jensen. For example, “the offshore wind 
industry in China could generate something like 70,000 workplaces in Norway, just from 
supplying the industry.” For these reasons, Jensen believes that government investments 
need to be allocated “at least 50/50” for renewable and traditional energy technologies. 
No More Knowledge 
In addition to coexistence with other industries, Commandment Four also deals 
with the petroleum sector’s impact on natural environments on the continental shelf and 
coastal communities. The previous chapter discussed the government’s strategy for 
knowledge-based management planning moving forward. This strategy requires 
collecting massive amounts of data about the environmental risks of developing the North 
in order to make informed decisions. However, instead of actually promoting 
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coexistence, Wahl believes the government knowledge-assessment strategy is just 
another way to kick the can down the road until the next election cycle. According to 
Wahl, “The government keeps saying we need more knowledge. What knowledge are 
you waiting for? We have the knowledge and what does it say? It says these areas are 
very vulnerable and resourceful and we have problems [for oil to] coexist between the 
fisheries. We know this, so what’s going to be the answer? We need no more 
knowledge.” Overall, he says, they know what they need to make a final decision about 
High North petroleum development; it’s just too risky.  
The Science is Crystal Clear: It’s Just Too Risky 
The government claims that many regions of the Barents, North, and Norwegian 
Seas are “frontier areas,” with “little knowledge of the geology, significant technical 
challenges and lack of infrastructure” (MPE & NPD, 2012, p. 33). And while 
“uncertainty surrounding exploration activity is greater here,” there is “also the 
possibility for making major new discoveries” (MPE & NPD, 2012, p. 33). That’s why, 
according to the government, integrated management plans include environmental impact 
assessments before opening new regions such as the Barents Sea and LoVe. In particular, 
one series of 2004 reports by WWFN and partially funded by the government, is 
important to the present discussion (Kristoffersen & Young, 2010). These reports classify 
the Barents Sea not as an “economic region in Norway’s ‘high north’ but as an 
‘ecoregion’ that crosses state borders” (p. 583); for the first time, the reports present data 
from Norwegian and Russian environmentalists and biologists on biodiversity from both 
countries’ sides of the Barents Sea. Furthermore, the reports also look “beyond the 
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impacts of isolated, offshore oil fields, or onshore pipelines to explore wider ecological 
impacts of oil activities” (Kristoffersen & Young, 2010, p. 583). For example: 
If plans proposed by oil companies are endorsed, the report suggests that shipping 
in the Barents Sea could increase by up to ten-fold. The coastlines in this region 
are also among the most hazardous in the world and the sea is strewn with 
innumerable small islands, skerries, and rocky shallows making it particularly 
vulnerable to accidents. Chronic pollution problems are already evident due to 
pollution from Cold War weapons development and illegal dumping of oil in 
region, and more traffic carrying radioactive waste or other hazardous waste 
would increase the likelihood of further environmental problems. (p. 583) 
According to Jensen, scientific reports like these prove that “at the end of the day…it’s 
crystal clear. There is absolutely no doubt that these areas should be protected from oil 
and gas activities…these are the most unique areas in Norway and the Arctic is obviously 
a hidden treasure chamber…It’s just too much of a risk.”  
That’s why environmental organizations like WWFN are “not saying ‘no’ to all 
oil and gas development; we’re just saying ‘no in the most vulnerable and valuable areas 
and in the areas where the risk is simply too big, because we can’t handle dealing with 
responses if something happened.” While the economic and social aspects of coexistence 
such as ripple effects and renewable technologies are yet to be determined, one thing is 
clear to Wahl, Halvorsen, and Jensen: Arctic petroleum development will be disastrous to 
these natural environments. 
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Not a Chance in Hell: Disaster Preparedness 
The government argues these risks can be mitigated. Figure 17, from Facts 2012, 
explains the organizational structures for emergency preparedness (MPE & NPD, 2012, 
p. 58). According to this figure, local governments, national ministries and agencies, and 
the oil industry share the responsibilities for preventing and responding to disasters and 
pollution. 
Figure 17. Oil Spill Preparedness 
 
Furthermore, the oil industry insists that in the Barents and LoVe regions, “it will be 
cautious and responsible in extracting oil and gas…and it rolled out an initiative to 
develop ways of coping with any accidents” (Schiermeier, 2012, p. 13). As Tim Dodson, 
executive vice-president of Statoil, told a 2012 conference in Tromsø, “technology will 
be there to clean it up” (Schiermeier, 2012, p. 13). 
But Jensen believes such statements from the government and oil industry “just 
show their arrogance and their lack of insight into themselves…if you would have an oil 
and gas accident in these areas, there would be no chance in hell about them ever being 
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able to clean it up.”  First of all, “Norway’s had lots of accidents and, even though most 
of them have been minor spills, I think in the past ten or fifteen years, there’s been 
something like 8,000 spills from platforms.” In terms of major incidents and “Norway’s 
capacity to respond, a good example would be the Full City oil spill that happened a year 
ago in the southern part of Norway, outside of Langesund,” says Jensen. “About 300 tons 
of oil was spilled and the cleanup has taken more than a year. It has been the most 
extensive and expensive cleanup operation in Norway to date, with 250 million 
Norwegian kroner in estimated costs and there’s still oil left in the area.”  
Jensen concedes that “even though we have one of the world’s best oil spill 
preparedness, and we do have a lot of good equipment,” it would be “it’s meaningless if 
you have a huge spill.” Furthermore, any major spill in the Arctic would be that much 
more disastrous because of extreme weather and limited infrastructure. She wonders 
“how on Earth do they imagine to deal with a spill of the magnitude that we’ve seen in 
the Gulf of Mexico where, even now, with the response technology and the 
manpower…three months of cleaning up and there is still 1,000 times more oil—or a 
thousand times as much oil than was spilled from the Full City left in the Gulf.” 
Technology can’t be there to clean it up when “in some of these areas, if you’re lucky, 
people work for maybe five to ten minutes per hour and then you have to take breaks 
because it’s so cold…parts of the area are 24 hour of darkness.”  
Even with the best equipment, “where would you put 40,000 people to clean up if 
you had a major blowout in this region? It just wouldn’t be possible. You won’t have 
enough manpower and for more than fifty percent of the year, the weather conditions will 
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be so bad or so difficult that you won’t be able to…set out oil spill booms to contain the 
oil.” That’s what happened during the Full City spill, Jensen explains. “The weather was 
rough when this accident happened, but it just goes to show that the equipment doesn’t 
work when the weather is bad.” Experts know that “oil spill booms do not work in wave 
heights more than three meters,” but the average height in LoVe and other Northern 
regions is “two-and-half to three meters. That’s not taking into the extreme, which would 
be every other day. Basically, it doesn’t matter if you have millions and millions of 
booms or lenses; it will not work.” Based on the story of what happened with Full City 
and the Gulf of Mexico, Jensen reasons that too much confidence in technology over 
nature is not calculated risk; it’s reckless decision-making driven by hubris. 
Halvorsen relates a similar reaction through the story of her recent travels “as a 
tourist from New York to Washington to Nashville to Memphis and then to New 
Orleans.” During this trip, she witnessed how Americans responded to a potential tropical 
storm that paled in comparison to those in High North waters: 
I spent a few days in New Orleans. I think that experience—because that was 
when they were preparing for Tropical Storm Bonnie, which wasn’t a tropical 
storm, it was a shower—that experience was…connected to the oil catastrophe in 
Mexican Gulf. They were told to go to the harbors, because they couldn’t be in 
this area when the storm came.  And they had to prepare how they should stop 
collecting all the oil and come back again when the storm was over. And a storm 
like this, that is normal in this area [the High North] and it is also, most of the part 
of the winter, it is dark. It is not daylight. It is very cold.  So this is a much more 
vulnerable part to protect if the accident happens. 
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“What I thought when I left New Orleans,” Halvorsen continues, “is that I have to take 
stress much more how local people who are dependent on the employment connected to 
tourism, fisheries, will suffer directly.” Although the government and oil industry in 
Norway say they can prevent and respond to environmental catastrophes with cutting-
edge technologies, Halvorsen says it’s just not their risk to take. Coastal communities 
“will lose their investments, not only maybe their generation’s investments, but what 
their father and grandfather invested.” To secure intergenerational justice for all 
Norwegians, therefore, “we must learn to protect these areas from the oil and gas 
industry.” 
LoVe is A Symbolic Struggle 
The “tug of war” between pro- and anti-development interests in LoVe petroleum 
development has been going on for more than twenty years (People’s Action, 2011). In 
many ways, this is a symbolic struggle for maintaining the cultural values of Norway’s 
past while making political decisions for the future. Furthermore, the implications of 
these decisions will have a greater impact on the global society in a climate-change era. 
Fifty years from now, Norway will be on the wrong side of history if the government 
does not stop focusing on the petroleum sector as the only path towards securing 
intergenerational social, economic, and environmental justice.  
Is Nothing Sacred? 
On one hand, the government believes these values are reflected by how its 
management plans and organizational structures have been adapted over time to the 
emergent challenges of developing a successful petroleum sector. On the other hand, 
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organizations like Bellona, People’s Action, the Socialist Left Party, and World Wildlife 
Norway believe these management plans and organizational structures are increasingly 
designed to stifle anti-development voices. Jensen argues the government’s management 
plans for Arctic development represent “a democratic problem, because, in many cases, 
they’re on both sides of the table.” She brings up the fact that “67 percent of Statoil is 
owned by the government,” asking “where do you draw the line and who’s making the 
decisions?” Such blurred lines illustrate a troubling shift for Norwegian culture. 
“That’s why,” Jensen explains, “specifically Lofoten and Vesterålen have been 
chosen” as battlegrounds for local and environmental causes. For WWFN, the LoVe 
islands are “high-ranking in natural values and high importance in terms of fisheries and 
renewable livelihoods, like tourism, fisheries, [and] agriculture. We are quite concerned 
about if nothing is sacred, if even these areas are opened up for developments, where 
does that leave us? What type of direction is that taking us for the future?” Wahl agrees 
the struggle in his hometown region is symbolic of a larger national discussion about 
culture and identity: 
We talk about natural values, but also about the fisherman’s protests, the 
tourism’s protests, and also about what, as locals, do we want. What are our hopes 
for the future? What is the identity of the people living in Lofoten and Vesterålen? 
Do they want the oil industry and why or why not? It also has something about 
cultural identity and which values are the most important: the fisheries or oil?   
The government would argue that LoVe development is just a new chapter of the 
petroleum success story that made their country the prosperous, ethical society it is today. 
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But Wahl disagrees, saying that the Norwegian identity is more than oil and gas. Rather, 
the culture of Norway is based on a government that serves the will of its people.  
 Yes, oil and gas have made this country rich, but this cultural identity is more 
important than money, Wahl continues:  
It is must be the richest of the richest that have a moral responsibility.  I think the 
Norwegian government is maybe the richest government that has ever existed in 
the world and throughout history. And we have some 100 billion in the oil fund, 
and more [oil] may be lying out here [in Lofoten waters]. But are we going to take 
it up in spite of local protests?  In spite of all the fisher organizations saying no?  
In spite of the tourist ministries saying no?  Or are we going to say “okay, maybe 
this area must be one of those where we are not going to take up the oil, because 
there are so many good reasons for not doing it here. 
Despite such good reasons, however, the government is “still considering it, which makes 
me question what are their motives? I mean, besides money, obviously? What can be 
driving them?” asks Jensen. She didn’t “want to say any names,” but argues “there are 
officials in the Parliament that are consistently disregarding the scientific advice because 
if they [did consider it] then they wouldn’t be able to help make the decisions that they 
want, which is basically going into the areas.”  
In addition to local attitudes and scientific knowledge, Jensen claims, “there’s 
also a major opposition amongst the Norwegian people, which keeps shifting, so now 
their position is more than fifty percent against oil development.” This changing 
sentiment is also symbolic of a larger cultural struggle over fossil fuels and Norway’s 
role as an energy-producing nation in a climate change era. 
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A War that Can Be Won 
Closing the door on LoVe petroleum development represents “a big choice 
between the fossil future, and the renewable future…that’s symbolic,” Wahl tells me as 
we start to wrap up our interview. “We are moving into an age that will have a rise in 
price of energy, of food, and will have lack of it,” he explains. “And the world’s climates 
will be changing and we will have to deal with that. So on a large scale, this is where we 
are heading, and we need to go in a more renewable direction.” In order to “to stake out a 
new course for the future,” Wahl believes Norway must “look for alternative livelihoods, 
alternative energy sources…[and] get away from the fossil fuel age.” Based on their 
strategic partnerships with national and international environmental NGOs, it’s not 
surprise the fight against climate change is one of PA’s top priorities. Within the People’s 
Action movement, “a lot of members that are extremely afraid of climate effect” and see 
LoVe “one place that Norway would be an example…that shows the world that we need 
to find another way. We need to have more priority on renewable energy, use our money 
on something else than drilling for more oil.” Thus, Wahl believes the government must 
start “drawing a line somewhere” as how far Norway will go to get more oil and gas. 
When I tell Wahl that other people have told me LoVe drilling is inevitable, he 
agrees “that a lot of local people here think that this is a hopeless struggle because the oil 
industry is so powerful [and] if there are billions of dollars in the ground, it’s a treasure 
and it will be. They’re going to get it somehow.” Although the oil industry had been 
“lying very low since the BP accident” and PA has been gaining national and 
international media attention for their campaign, Wahl knows the fight is far from over. 
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For example, the Stoltenberg government’s recent decision to delay LoVe exploration 
activity is a short-term win. Wahl believes this decision was not motivated by 
environmental concerns such as climate change.  
Rather, he believes the government hopes the “coexistence problem will be 
solved” in time “when the technology is better.” However, this decision was also a 
symbolic victory because “you see that this is a struggle that can be won.” LoVe 
represents “the most realistic possibility of stopping the oil industry ever in Norway here. 
And the oil industry usually gets what it wants, so being able to stop them for the 30 to 40 
years that we have—because the haste-away began in 1979, the first time they tried to 
open [Lofoten]—it’s been a long process. They haven’t won yet. But neither have we.” 
Chapter Summary 
While Commandment Four espouses “coexistence” between petroleum, other 
industries, and the environment, members and supporters of this organization tell a 
different story; oil and gas in LoVe would disrupt—and even endanger—their ways of 
life. The main narrative of Chapter Three, “The Ten Oil Commandments,” deals with 
how Norwegian government organizations have evolved over fifty years to uphold the 
values professed in a historic policy. This is an ongoing story and the most recently, the 
conflict to be resolved deals with the numerous cultural, political, and environmental 
challenges of developing Northern regions of the continental shelf. The narrative in 
Chapter Four uses this conflict as its starting point, but presents alternative resolutions for 
the future from different stakeholders.  
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Chapter Six: Theoretical Implications  
One does well to study the work of trained and gifted writers if one is to 
understand what it is that makes good stories powerful or compelling.  
Bruner (1986, p. 13)  
In Chapter One, five research questions were proposed from five metaphors for 
narrative interpretation. The results of my interpretation as presented in Chapters Three 
and Four reflect the intersections of these five metaphors; both “The Ten Oil 
Commandments” and “A New Chapter for the North” illustrate that narratology is 
relevant for examining how the Norway Model has evolved over time, adapted to 
emergent challenges, and planned for the future. To understand the theoretical 
implications of studying this Model, let us review the five research questions.  
In terms of the open architecture metaphor, I asked what types of organizational 
stories and communicative applications of narrative are present in this data.  
In terms of the narrative mode thought metaphor, I asked which plotlines and 
temporal contexts are present in these organizational stories.  
In terms of the sensemaking metaphor, I asked how organizational stories about 
resource management policies reflect elements of collective and individual identity.  
In terms of the Tamara metaphor, I asked about the multiple voices in these 
organizational stories and how do their interpretations compare to one another.  
In terms of the homo narrans metaphor, I asked how narrative rationality is 
evaluated and communicated through these organizational stories.  
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The answers to these five questions are found in a single premise: the Norwegian 
success story is remarkably consistent over time and across interpretations. Before 
turning to the types and applications of narrative in High North decision-making, let us 
examine the theoretical implications of these results. First, the plotlines of these stories 
all center around Norway’s rise to prosperity. This is a country that came from humble 
roots, as a newly independent nation, to exceed all expectations and transform itself into a 
happy and health society. Even within the organizations who oppose High North 
development, everyone can agree that oil and gas has been good for Norway. In fact, the 
primary rift between the stories in Chapter Three and those in Chapter Four deals not 
evolving plotlines, but with temporality. That is, in facing the global uncertainties of 
climate change, organizations and actors in this system have different interpretations of 
when the Norway Model must make its biggest adaptation: shifting from oil and gas to a 
new national industry. 
Second, among the stories of Chapters Three and Four, shared interpretations of 
cultural identity are reflected in organizational policies and structures. As a retrospective 
and ongoing means for understanding and action, sensemaking is often employed to 
interpret failures or breakdowns. And while disasters like the Full City spill or scandals 
like KonKraft, are certainly chapters of the Norwegian success story, the Norway Model 
has still done better than any other of its kind at preventing and learning from these 
breakdowns; these localized narratives are the exception, not the rule. Specifically, social 
values rooted in cultural identity—consensus, dialogue, transparency, and innovation—
have shaped the Norway Model’s inception and adaptation to challenges along the way.  
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Third, regarding plurivocality, these values have also provided a platform for 
multiple voices to participate in natural resource decision-making. As previously 
mentioned, however, the most interesting difference in these voices’ interpretations of the 
Norwegian success story center on the future. Fourth, from a similar perspective, these 
different interpretations are based on future policies’ coherence and fidelity with the 
cultural narrative of Norwegian oil and gas development. That is, some organizations 
argue the next chapter of this success story relies on continuing development with the 
same cultural values mentioned above; others argue future development plans—and 
reliance on fossil fuels for that matter—break from the narratives traditions of Norway’s 
cultural history. 
Following, this chapter explores how interpreting the narratives in Chapters Three 
and Four through the lens of this theoretical framework focuses our attention on the 
structural and functional applications of narrative in the Norway Model. And in keeping 
with the lines of inquiry in Chapter One and methods of Chapter Two, these applications 
are framed by the core categories and related thematic subcategories of my analysis. 
Specifically, I present the balancing acts metaphor as a descriptive theme of complexity 
and control in “The Ten Oil Commandments” and “A New Chapter for the North.” As a 
core category, the balancing act metaphor was inspired by two interview participants with 
nearly sixty years of combined experience working in some of the most instrumental 
organizations of the Norway Model.  
First, there is Petter Nore, director general of the Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation (NORAD), member of the UN High Level Group on 
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Sustainable Energy, and author of Oil and Class Struggle. Nore explains that when 
foreign oil companies came knocking in 1959, the government understood “that it’s not 
necessarily in your own interest just to lie down and be rolled over by the international 
companies. That it has to be a balancing act...the balancing act is the key to the 
Norwegian success story.” For Nore, the balance lies in managing tensions between 
government and industry interests so that everyone benefits.  
Second, there is former director general of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 
Tore Sandvold. Currently the chairman of his own energy holdings company, Sandvold 
also served as a former board chairman of Petoro, the government-owned oil company 
that has managed state interests on the Norwegian continental shelf since Statoil went 
public. Sandvold argues the most important element of the Norwegian success story “is 
how to find a sensible balance…between development, developing these new areas, and 
also having a concern for both the local and environmental impact.” From his 
perspective, this balancing act also deals with the middle grounds between government 
and industry, as well as how the government manages tensions between domestic, 
environmental, and global interests.  
Overall, “The Ten Oil Commandments” and “A New Chapter for the North” 
illustrate the emergent uncertainties and challenges of adapting the Norway Model over 
time. Petter Nore and Tore Sandvold described these adaptations as balancing acts, or 
what Merriam Webster defines as “an attempt to cope with several often conflicting 
factors or situations at the same time.” In a nutshell, that is what the Norway Model of 
natural resource management has done since inception. The entanglements between 
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economic, political, environmental, and cultural interests in managing the national 
petroleum sector represents a complex network of actors, policies, and structures related 
to ensuring that natural resources benefit the whole of the Norwegian people for 
generations to come. Managing natural resources is really about managing tensions 
between these interests; the Norway Model is an organizational balancing act. 
From this perspective, the model is a complex system of organization and 
Chapters Three and Four reflect how narrative can be applied towards understanding 
complexity. More specifically, circumspection narratives—reflective stories about 
learning from the past to plan for the future—illustrate how narrative structure is used to 
balance the tensions of complexity and control in the Norway Model. In order to 
understand these connections, we must first understand the features of complexity and 
complex systems, as well as the relationships between these concepts and narrative. 
Features of Complexity and Narrative 
Many aspects of Norwegian culture have been examined thus far in terms of their 
implications for policy-making, organization, and communication in the Norway Model.  
But if a different culture had been sitting on top of all this oil, would the success story 
have turned out the same? When I asked him this question, Petter Nore explains theirs is 
a success story based on “historic experience, luck, foresight—a combination of all of 
them. Luck had a lot to do with it. But remember what Jefferson said: ‘The more I work, 
the luckier I am.’” This quote inspires reflection on how all of the moving parts of the 
Norway Model have aligned through a delicate balance of complexity and control. While 
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some aspects of the Model are designed to reduce uncertainty, the risks of energy 
development require necessary and great risk. 
Citing Taylor (2000) and Morowitz (2001), Browning and Morris (2012) define 
complexity as “non-linear relations, driven by small forces that result in the emergence of 
sudden changes that produce unexpected outcomes” (p. 134). As the “opposite of 
predictability,” complexity “appears as a tension, a contrast to control over people, over 
their performance, over the mission, over the ways work is completed, or over the 
technology used to complete the goals of the organization” (p. 135). Within this broader 
definition, several aspects of complexity are important to this argument and its 
application to the Norway Model: sensory overload and systematic complexity; structural 
and dynamical complexity; and integrative complexity. 
Sensory Overload & Systematic Complexity 
Complex systems emerge from what Johnson (2001) describes as sensory 
overload, where by “stretching the human nervous system to its very extremes, and in the 
process teaching it a new series of reflexes” (Johnson, 2001, p. 38). For example, during 
industrial era development in cities such as Manchester, England, populations grew faster 
than infrastructure could at first sustain. In reaction, this overgrowth led “the way for a 
complementary series of aesthetic values which develop like a scab around the original 
wound” (p. 39). Over time, seasoned city dwellers see less of the individual moving parts 
and more of an Impressionistic painting; amidst all the hustle and bustle, “the noise and 
senselessness somehow transformed into aesthetic experience” (p. 39). These reflexes are 
emergent, a “mix of order and anarchy,” a chaos veiled in structure (p. 38). Sensory 
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overload somehow becomes a new interpretive framework in an overstretched city 
pulsing with reflexive movement and organization. 
In Chapter Three, the Norway Model was born out of sensory overload and 
reflexive organization. When “The Ten Oil Commandments” begins in the late 1950s, 
Petter Nore explains that “we knew nothing about the oil and gas business…the country 
was fairly weak…with a weak national bourgeoisie [that] never really had much…but 
always looked at their own position” and how to protect it “whenever they got into 
contact with international capital…that kind of reflex is the normal way of doing things 
you find again fifty years later in the oil and gas sector.” This reflexivity—a cultural and 
political norm in Norwegian government—is reflected by hydropower legislation that 
established a framework for managing natural resources in the early twentieth century. 
Norway was a newly independent nation and the government wanted to maintain control 
of their hydropower sector while also profiting from foreign interests.  
To do so, they needed to act both quickly and prudently. The Panic Act of 1906, 
so named for its passing only one year after Norway ceded from Sweden, gave 
Norwegian landowners time to assess property values and gauge the implications of 
selling to international companies. Eleven years later, the Concession Act and Water 
Regulations Act provided more comprehensive regulatory frameworks that still guide 
contemporary Norwegian hydropower development. Nore argues that “in many ways, 
what they did with the oil and gas sector was a reflection of that historic experience. That 
is an important and interesting element in this story…the attempt to control the 
hydropower sector.” When foreign companies came knocking again fifty years later to 
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stake their claim on the Norwegian continental shelf, the government knew better than to 
just sign away national resources before finding out how much they were actually worth.  
Nore argues “there is a kind of a historic continuity in the Norwegian way…living 
up to your historic tradition.” Like the era of hydropower legislation, the beginning of 
national petroleum sector history was a time of rapid decision-making, some confusion, 
and improvisation. There were relatively few established practices for issuing licenses, 
regulating and taxing activity, or even naming fields, as illustrated by the history of the 
Ekofisk name. However, just as they had fifty years before, the government implemented 
temporary legislative frameworks—later replaced with comprehensive organizational 
policies and structures—declaring natural resources the property of Norwegian citizens.  
In this historical context, the Norway Model was born from sensory overload; the 
existing system was stretched to its limits and new self-organizing patterns of behavior 
emerged. In addition to responding to sensory overload, complex systems develop their 
own “coherent” personalities that self-organize “out of millions of individual decisions, a 
global order built out of local interaction” (Johnson, 2001, p. 39). This self-organizing 
feature, argues Johnson, is systematic complexity, when the individual parts of a complex 
system are so intertwined they also function as one network. Like the city of Manchester, 
the “patterns of human movement and decision-making” in complex systems become 
visible as “a repeated structure that distinguishes them from the pure noise” of emergent 
improvisation (p. 40). Tsoukas and Hatch (2001) explain, “systematic behavior is the 
emergent outcome of multiple chains of interaction. As the level of organization 
increases, complex systems have the tendency to shift to a new mode of behavior” (p. 
149 
989). Put differently, new modes of behavior emerge as new norms when complex 
systems adapt with self-organization and structural patterns. 
In addition, complexity is not linear, and is thus “not directly controllable” 
(Browning & Morris, 2012, p. 139). These systemic processes of self-organization are not 
defined in terms of causal relations—A plus B equals C—but rather as an interconnected 
network of action—A creates B, B creates C, and as C adapts to A, C creates D. From this 
perspective, the Norway Model did not directly emerge out of any one decision or action. 
Similarly, as petroleum activity on the continental shelf exploded from the early 1960s 
onward, the Norway Model has shifted as the different structures for organizational 
management adapt over time.  
Structural & Dynamical Complexity 
In addition to sensory overload and systematic complexity, emergence, self-
organization, and non-linearity differentiate two aspects of complexity. Structural 
complexity involves sets of conditions “characterized by numerosity (e.g., the greater the 
number, the greater the complexity), diversity, and interdependence” (Browning & 
Morris, 2012, p. 135). Whereas structural complexity deals with these three inherent 
conditions, dynamical complexity describes “the actual process of things changing non-
linearly in a structurally complex system” (p. 135). Put differently, dynamical complexity 
describes processes of non-linear structural change in complex systems.  
These aspects of complexity—structural and dynamical—although “vastly 
different,” are “often compounded,” explain Browning and Morris (2012) with a 
hypothetical example: “100 leaders (numerosity) from 100 sovereign nations (diversity), 
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whose fates are connected, must reach a decision concerning the allocation of scarce 
resources (interdependent parts). The process of their decision-making is inevitably 
complex and the result equally uncertain, which is to say, unpredictable” (p. 137). When 
the possibilities for action are many, and the conditions for decision-making are fluid, so 
is uncertainty surrounding outcomes.  
This uncertainty is particularly salient for organizational decision-making in 
structurally and dynamically complex systems like the Norway Model, and even more so 
with growing concerns about climate change. Smil (2003) argues the complexity of 
modern energy systems is based on “above all on a multitude of uncertainties” 
concerning the risks of coal, hydrocarbon, nuclear, and renewable energies: 
Some of these concerns have been with us for generations, others are relatively 
new, and in either case perceptions and interpretations keep shifting with the 
changes in economic outlook, national and international security, as well as with 
the emergence of new environmental disruptions. An imminent end of the oil era 
is a perfect example in the first category while second thoughts about the benign 
character of renewable energy conversion belong in the second group of concepts. 
And, to use perhaps the most prominent environmental example, any long-term 
appraisals of energy prospects will be strongly influenced by changing 
perceptions concerning the rate and degree of global climate change. (p. 180) 
In this description, we see how climate has greatly increased the numerosity and diversity 
of environmental challenges for global energy production and consumption, as well as 
the structural interdependence of these factors.  
Furthermore, the temporality of these challenges is so dynamic that decision-
making structures for managing energy systems barely have time to adapt accordingly. 
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According to Smil (2003) “our record of looking ahead is very poor even when dealing 
with relatively orderly systems because their complex dynamics have repeatedly made 
most of the specific predictions obsolete in a very short time” (p. 317). Such uncertainty 
can be counterintuitive from an organizational perspective. Browning and Morris (2012) 
explain that for organizational decision-making, “linear relationships have historically 
been essential…because one of the basic purposes of organizations is to produce some 
kind of regularity or dependability in behavior or performance” (p. 137). However, linear 
structures are not always well suited for dealing with non-linear complications.  
Weick and colleagues have studied how high reliability organizations (HROs) like 
nuclear power plants and firefighting teams rely on complex structural systems of 
communication to avoid compounding errors that could lead to major catastrophes (e.g., 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 2007; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). These organizations 
reflect systematic complexity, the self-organizing feature of complex systems where 
many individual decisions create larger movements of behavior (Johnson, 2001). In 
addition, HROs in structurally and dynamically complex systems must plan for 
unpredictable events by creating and adapting organizational structures of decision-
making (Browning & Morris, 2012). Within the Norway Model, the oil commandments 
have shaped government structures for managing HROs—oil and gas companies 
developing the continental shelf—based on long-term coexistence and collaboration.  
However, the complexities of developing Artic regions where disasters would 
have severe environmental and social consequences are increasingly emergent and non-
linear. For this reason, narratives such as “The Ten Oil Commandments” and “A New 
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Chapter for the North” can provide meaning for action when logico-scientific reasoning 
fails to capture the nuances of complexity. Bruner (1986) argues “if classificatory 
schemes provide a science of the concrete, narrative may provide a science of the 
imagination. At the very least, a reemphasis on temporality may enable us to more 
directly deal with change, and thereby to make structural and symbolic studies more 
dynamic” (p. 141). The narratives in Chapters Three and Four illustrate that overall, 
organizations that recognize and adapt to, rather than overlook or resist, the qualities of 
their complexity, have a better shot at sustainability.  
Integrative Complexity 
On one hand, systematic, structural, and dynamical complexity in energy systems 
like the Norway Model creates uncertainty that is difficult to control. On the other hand, 
the “essential openness” of a complex system creates “many confining parameters but the 
realm of what is possible is eventually always larger than people had imagined because 
surprises—be they natural catastrophes, technical breakthroughs, or social upheavals—
keep reshaping human expectations and ambitions” (Smil, 2003). Capitalizing on the 
possibilities of openness requires integrative complexity, “the degree to which thinking 
and reasoning involve the recognition and integration of multiple perspectives and 
possibilities and their interrelated contingencies” (Browning, Greene, Sutcliffe, Sitkin, & 
Obstfeld, 2009, p. 103).  
In terms of openness, narratives about organizational decision-making in the 
Norway Model illustrate many moving parts within this complex system—major and 
minor characters, planned and unforeseen consequences, material and symbolic conflicts, 
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political and cultural implications, historical and global contexts, and so on. These 
moving parts are both emergent and fluid, yet the Norway Model system requires 
complex structures of organizational management to ensure that oil and gas benefits the 
whole nation over time. These structures are facilitated by integrative complexity, 
“focuses on information processing and decision-making—especially on how fixed or 
flexible the interpretation of information is and how, once interpreted, information is 
connected to decision-making structures” (Browning, et al. 2009, p. 102).  
One example of integrative complexity in the Norway Model is found in Barents 
Sea integrative management plans. These planning processes involve collecting massive 
amounts of data from a number of different sources, which is essentially a strategy for 
managing uncertainty and risk. Sandvold says Barents Sea management has been “a very 
long process that will continue for quite some time before it can conclude.” Although the 
government has communicated intentions for developing the North for decades, Sandvold 
believes they have also effectively integrated information from environmental NGOs, 
fishing unions, and safety regulators into management plans. For example, he says, 
“before we opened up new areas [in the Barents Sea] we brought in new regulations 
saying not to drill during the cod-spawning season.” Essentially for Sandvold, this 
integrative approach is about listening to many different organizational stakeholders and 
using many different information sources; “you will always have different views whether 
the balance is wide or whether it listens too much to business [but] it is a balancing act 
and you will never get it 100% correct.” 
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In this way, the balancing act of managing complexity and control in the Norway 
Model appears paradoxical; it will never be foolproof. Yet Tsoukas & Hatch (2001) argue 
“if practitioners are to increase their effectiveness in managing paradoxical social 
systems, they should, as Weick (1979: 261) recommends, ‘complicate’ themselves…by 
generating and accommodating multiple inequivalent descriptions” (p. 987). In other 
words, integratively complex decision-making increases the likelihood practitioners are 
matching the complexity of their approaches to the complexity of what they are 
managing (Bruner, 1996; Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001; Weick, 1979). From this perspective, 
by integrating paradoxical or inequivalent interpretations of the complexity of Barents 
Sea planning, the government is more effectively managing this system.  
Furthermore, “an integratively complex system is both stable enough to remain 
safe from destabilizing while experimenting to invent systems that create opportunity” 
(Browning, et al. 2009, p. 102). In Chapter Three, the story of Commandment Eight is a 
good example of this feature of integrative complexity. The Norway Model is based on 
balancing the administrative, regulatory, and business aspects of a national petroleum 
sector. Statoil was created to realize business opportunities for the government on behalf 
of the Norwegian people. When the company eventually outgrew the system, the 
government experimented with a series of structural policy changes to maintain control 
yet remain open enough to maximize economic profits. The same can be said about the 
way oil money has been invested in the national economy over time to avoid Dutch 
disease. Since the National Insurance Act of 1967, the government has experimented with 
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many different organizational and legislative structures for balancing its long-and short-
term financial goals, resulting in one of the largest sovereign wealth funds in the world. 
Complexity, Narrative Structure, and Interpretation   
The previous descriptions of complexity provide justification for conceptualizing 
the Norway Model as a complex decision-making system of organization. In addition, 
these dimensions of complexity can be applied to understanding narratives as the 
structurally and functionally complex forms of communication. The interpretive aspect of 
narrative is what makes it so ideal for communicating about complexity. As Browning 
and Morris (2012) explain, “the capacity of narrative to vary in punctuation (when they 
begin and end), pace (what is the speed and variation between sequences), and participant 
composition (casts can range from one person, to few, to ensembles) means the narrative 
is a communicative form that is frequently consistent with organizational complexity” 
(pp. 140-141). As communicative forms, narratives can reflect systematic, structural, 
dynamical, and integrative complexity based on an open architecture of interpretive 
capacities. 
To illustrate these capacities, let us return to the example of Manchester’s history 
as “a complicated, multithreaded tale, with many agents interacting over its 
duration…less a linear narrative and more an interconnected web” (Johnson, 2001, p. 38). 
There is no one objective beginning or end to the story, nor one objective plotline; the 
web can expand or contract based on the narrator. The many threads and agents in 
narratives provide numerous opportunities for interpretation. In the same way, the stories 
of Chapters Three and Four represent a complex network of narrators, plotlines, 
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timelines, and resolutions. Thus, the connections between complexity, narrative structure, 
and interpretation in these chapters involve ordering, predictability, and plurivocality. 
Second-Order Interpretation 
Tsoukas and Hatch (2001) argue that understanding the “puzzle of defining the 
complexity of a system leads directly to concern with description and interpretation and 
therefore to the issue of second-order complexity” (p. 985). As a communicative form, 
narratives have the interpretive capacity to describe complexity with simple structure and 
complex meaning. This logic of description can appear—at least on the surface—rather 
circular, so ordering is a useful strategy in piecing out the layers of social phenomena and 
communication in complex systems. From an interpretive perspective, complexity is a 
second-order phenomenon because it must first be described as complex to actually be 
considered complex. In other words, “the complexity of a system is not an intrinsic 
property of that system; it is observer-dependent” (Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001, p. 985). Thus, 
Tsoukas and Hatch (2001) argue the way an observer describes the complexity of a 
system depends on the complexity of their language. Features such emergence, self-
organization, and non-linearity are complex descriptions that provide focus and meaning 
for understanding how complex systems function. 
The observer-dependent nature of complexity, similar to how Weick (1979) 
defines organization as the outcome of sensemaking, also applies to narrative; a story is 
not a story until interpreted and described as such. And just as Tsoukas and Hatch (2001) 
argue there is no apparent consensus on when a system is should be considered complex, 
there is no consensus on when a story should be regarded as a narrative. From this 
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perspective, the Norway Model is a narrative because the narrators in this system 
describe it that way. For example, as I discovered during my first interview, the “oil and 
gas fairytale” is a term often used to describe this cultural success story. Norwegian 
families have been found to produce more narrative talk than American families, and this 
communication is focused on teaching cultural values such as collectivism, homogeneity, 
and egalitarianism, as well as implicit rules for social interaction (Aukrust & Snow, 
1998). As such, describing the Norway Model as an oil and gas fairytale is a way of 
interpreting how cultural values have influenced successful management planning. 
Predictability from Structure 
In addition to ordering, the processes of interpreting and communicating about 
complexity with narrative involve narrative configuration through emplotment (Bruner, 
1986; Polkinghorne, 1988, 1991; Ricœur, 1984, 1985).  Narrative emplotment allows 
narrators and audiences temporal contexts for interpreting situational meaning. And in 
non-linear, complex systems of organization like the Norway Model, emplotment is an 
element of communicative control. “The Ten Oil Commandments” is essentially a 
success story and the narrators are proud of what their nation has achieved. The narrator 
in these stories—a collective voice of government organizations interpreted from archival 
and interview data—communicates learning from the past to understand make sense of 
future possibilities. The way these stories are structured creates a temporal context for 
interpreting their meaning. Similarly, Polkinghorne (1988) argues that by recognizing 
contextuality, “narratives exhibit an explanation instead of demonstrating it” (p. 21). 
Locating the government’s management plans in the historical context of the oil 
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commandments makes the next stages of Arctic petroleum development part of the 
Norwegian success story.  
This is an ongoing story and most recently, the conflict to be resolved deals with 
numerous cultural, political, and environmental challenges of developing the High North. 
The nature of these conflicts is not necessarily new; establishing sovereignty over the 
continental shelf, maintaining coexistence with the fishing industry and nature, and 
finding new technologies for overcoming the environmental challenges of these regions 
have always been challenges to building a thriving national petroleum sector. And based 
on the previous events punctuating this narrative plotline, the Model has adapted 
successfully along the way. When Statoil became too powerful, Storting split the state’s 
financial interests and took the company public. When Storting worried about the 
division of economic and safety interests in the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, they 
created the Petroleum Safety Authority. When the public worried their pension fund was 
financing companies that violate human rights, the state created the Ethical Guidelines. 
Based on all of these events, why would the success story plot change now?  
However, the predictability of narrative structure can also limit interpretive 
capacity, as “once the causal relations are established and unquestionable in a story, it 
becomes a rule structure (do this and that will happen), or merely a rule to follow” 
(Browning & Morris, 2012, p. 138). Bruner (1990) claims “there are no structural 
differences between fictive and factual narratives, therefore, as their status is negotiated 
among the narrator, the text, and the listener/reader” (as cited in Czairnawska, 2011, p. 
340). Hence, the nature of multiple opportunities and possibilities for interpretation—
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which can also be considered threats to predictability—cannot be ignored in narrative 
complexity. 
Plurivocality 
Just as the narrative knowledge metaphor calls attention to the subjective nature 
of describing narrative complexity, the Tamara metaphor draws attention to the 
subjective meaning of organizational narratives. Boje (1991) defines a storytelling 
organization as a “collective storytelling system in which the performance of stories is a 
key part of members’ sense-making and a means to allow them to supplement individual 
memories with institutional memory” (p. 106). The plurivocality of storytelling 
organizations—the dynamic and emergent co-creation of meaning between narrators and 
audiences—means that different voices can tell different versions of the same story. In 
this way, the Norway Model is a storytelling organization and Chapter Four offers insight 
into how localized memories can be interpreted differently from institutional ones.  
Douglas (1986) describes the connections between individual and institutional 
memory, arguing that “institutions systematically direct individual memory and channel 
our perceptions into forms compatible with the relations they authorize” (p. 98). Thus, 
institutions largely determine how collective memories are perceived and remembered; 
individuals ascribe meaning to events that are labeled as meaningful by the institutions to 
which they belong. Furthermore, Douglas (1986) argues that institutions “fix processes 
that are essentially dynamic, they hide their influence, and they rouse our emotions to a 
standardized pitch on standardized issues…[and] the triumph of institutional thinking is 
to make the institution completely invisible” (p. 98). Science is one such invisible 
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institution that influences social thought. Czarniawska (1998) states that “modern 
institutions, including science, run on fictions, as all institutions always have” (p. 10). 
This assertion builds on “what Lyotard says about scientific knowledge being legitimized 
by a metanarrative (of progress) and then disavowing the narrative knowledge of its 
legitimacy” (Czarniawska, 1998, p. 10). Acknowledging and considering how 
metanarratives such as “progress” can construct and sustain social institutions such as 
“science” renders the institutional knowledge they produce more meaningful. 
Metanarratives can also have what Roe (1994) describes as “functional value” for 
decision-making in complex and uncertain policy debates. By analyzing the “warring 
narratives,” or those stories with very different explanations and prescriptions for 
addressing a policy problem, researchers can construct metanarratives to “reconcile (and 
transcend) their seeming contradictions…by revealing, or creating, common ground 
among disputants” (Borins, 2011, pp. 168-169). On one hand, the multiple layers of 
organization and regulation in the Norway Model are designed to invite plurivocality, as 
well as structural and dynamical complexity in terms of the numerosity, diversity, and 
interdependence of stakeholders and decision-making processes involved in petroleum 
sector development. On the other hand, stories in Chapter Four reveal that not all voices 
agree the system is successfully adapting to emergent challenges.  
Overall, a narrative approach can be used to investigate the motivations behind 
the creation and distribution of institutional metanarratives. By juxtaposing the localized 
stories in “A New Chapter for the North” against the institutional metanarrative of “The 
Ten Oil Commandments,” we can understand the relationships between interpretation 
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and plurivocal meaning in storytelling systems of organization like the Norway Model. In 
addition to these processes being retrospective and ongoing, the stories from Chapters 
Three and Four reflect how sensemaking can also be considered from an institutional 
perspective of collective memory.  
Balancing Complexity & Control in Circumspection Narratives  
In the narratives of Chapters Three and Four, the balancing acts metaphor 
illustrates how different tensions of complexity are managed in the Norway Model. Nore 
and Sandvold describe these tensions in terms of interested parties like environmentalists, 
the oil industry, the government, locals, and the global community. This balance also has 
much to do with managing the tension between control and complexity and one way to 
deal with complexity is by communicating with simplicity. This simplicity of narrative as 
a communicative form is found in structure, as even complex meaning can be 
communicated through story by establishing a beginning, middle, and end. And within 
this broad temporal scope, there are myriad types of narrative, as well as ways that 
narrative can be applied for understanding.  
Thus, we turn our attention to one narrative application for balancing complexity 
and control in the Norway Model: circumspection. Browning and Morris (2012) state that 
circumspection narratives “encapsulate” what narrators “took away from the incident, 
which is often a newfound sense of understanding and capability, but sometimes go on to 
suggest prudence on the narrator’s part about how to approach similar situations that may 
arise” (p. 147). Chapters Three and Four identify how on both individual and institutional 
levels, narrative is applied to understand the meaning of events and communicate how 
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that meaning influenced future action. Within these circumspection narratives, three 
themes of managing complexity and control emerge: balancing past, present, and future; 
balancing transparency and collaboration in organizational relationships; and balancing 
risk and reward in High North development. 
Balancing Past, Present, & Future 
Browning and Morris (2012) describe circumspection as “reflecting upon what 
happened in the past, altering understandings about the circumstances of action, and 
prudently anticipating future events” (p. 15). The stories in Chapter Three communicate 
that from the beginning, the government has been circumspect in creating and adapting 
the Norway Model of natural resource management. In addition to historic continuity, 
within the Norway Model, prudent natural resource management is also based on the 
political structures of a social democratic government system. In “The Ten Oil 
Commandments,” structures takes shape in the form of government agencies, legislative 
policies, and integrative management plans. Thus, the circumspection narratives in 
Chapter Three communicate these structures are based on a cultural and historical 
tradition of political transparency and consensus grounded in a social democratic system.  
Accordingly, Sandvold argues that Norwegian success story is a narrative about 
balancing “capitalistic forces and regulations and government interventions.” In 
comparing our two countries, he explains that in Norway, “we have a stronger 
government and they create a stronger regulatory system than you see in the United 
States, which has to do with the system...in a social democratic system, you have this 
dual balance.” Essentially, this balance deals with managing interests from the oil 
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industry—which is constantly pushing for more development on a faster timetable—and 
prudently reflecting on multifaceted implications of moving too quickly.  
Looking back, the stories from Chapter Three suggest that legislative and 
regulatory policies for creating and adapting the organizational structures in the Norway 
Model have consistently supported social democratic ideals and will continue to do so in 
the future. “The Ten Oil Commandments” narrative communicates collective values such 
as managerial transparency, intergenerational justice, and prudence. For example, the 
state has protected Norway’s oil wealth for future generations. After establishing the 
Ethical Guidelines in 2004, the Petroleum Fund was renamed “The Government Pension 
Fund” to address concerns with the rising social security costs of an aging Norwegian 
population and growing number of pensions (Nilsen, 2010). At that time, the Fund was 
only projected to cover one-third of such future costs, so the state recognized that re-
emphasizing intergenerational justice by managing the petroleum wealth wisely and 
supporting a vibrant economy was vital to the long-term wellbeing of Norwegian citizens 
(Englund, 2008; MoF, 2011).  
However, as Chapter Four illustrates, not all voices in the Norway Model system 
agree that High North petroleum development is reflecting the socio-political context 
communicated in “The Ten Oil Commandments.” Recall that Nore and Sandvold argue 
the Norway Model was born out of reflexive experience; social democratic values have 
shaped how the system responds to emergent concerns adapts over time. Chapter Three 
paints the current era of High North petroleum activity as the logical next step in the 
Norwegian success story. Much of this logic is connected to faith that although the 
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national industrial culture of Norway has changed, important traditions are still being 
revered. As Weick et al. (2005) explain, the sensemaking process relies on faith, action, 
evidence, and guesses, but the central cog in this mechanism of understanding is 
communication—events, organizations, and environments—can actually be “talked into 
existence” by the stories people tell about them (p. 409). Weick (2009) offers a 
“synopsis” of this sensemaking experience:  
“Faith” in organizations takes the form of a future perfect presumption that 
“actions” will have made sense. “Evidence” in organizations typically consists of 
traces, clues, and fragments that are made sensible by actions that combine cues 
and “guesses” into meaningful patterns.  These are the basic tools we have to 
construct transient meaning in an unknowable world (p. 27). 
A clear example of the sensemaking connection between faith, action, and 
communication is evident in government stories about coexistence between the petroleum 
sector, the fishing industry, and the natural environment. In particular, stories about ripple 
effects illustrate how new oil and gas developments in the North can enact cultural 
values. Sandvold believes that “if you ask sort of the average mayor along the coast, he 
says, ‘Gosh, I'm one lucky guy, because now I have two legs to stand on, both fish and 
oil and gas…I don't have all my eggs in one basket.”  Furthermore, Sanvold reflects there 
are some “very strong forces within the fishing industry” that have come to “welcome, or 
at least they tolerate, the oil and gas activities…after 35 years. The responsible bodies 
within the fisheries communities and organizations see that actually oil and gas and 
fisheries can coexist on the shelf.  It can be done and experience has shown it.”  
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In addition to greater faith in coexistence, Sandvold believes local people and 
local fisheries in the North are concerned with population decline and brain drain. On a 
more personal level, these people are saying, “I have my fishing vessel. I'm not sure if my 
son will be a fisherman. I can live with oil and gas activities, but that may give my son 
future employment, and he can still stay in his community…Norwegians are not very 
migrant.” Overall, these comments indicate a balance between traditional cultural values 
and contemporary social and economic concerns. Yet the individual stories in “A New 
Chapter for the North” do not necessarily communicate that cultural values are shaping 
the trajectory of High North development. While Commandment Four espouses 
coexistence, the organizational leaders in Chapter Four believe oil and gas in LoVe 
would disrupt—even endanger—traditional ways of life.  
According to McAdams (2006), “to say that an event marks a ‘turning point’ in 
one’s life is to suggest that one’s life is like a story whose plot changes direction as a 
result of a particular scene” (p. 75). In both Chapters Three and Four, the High North 
represents a turning point. Whichever way the story goes, the Arctic will have 
transformational cultural, economic, and political consequences in Norwegian history. In 
this way, a new chapter for the North is really a new chapter for Norway.  
Balancing Transparency & Collaboration in Organizational Relationships  
Chapter Four locates the Norway Model in a temporal context for managing 
complexity by picking up where Chapter Three ends. This context is laden with tensions 
between cultural history and a new globalized era for Norway. In this story, LoVe is a 
symbol for Norwegian values— egalitarianism, consensus, and managerial 
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transparency—that are being diluted as the Norway Model adapts to High North 
development. Specifically, the stories in this chapter assert the relationships between 
government and industry are leading to the detriment of the greater Norwegian people. 
Browning and Morris (2012) argue that relationships based on egalitarianism and 
consensus still experience the turbulence of complexity and control. Since these systems 
are supposedly designed to promote equity among varying interests, uncertainty abounds 
as to whether or not “the distribution of resources, whether material or symbolic, are truly 
democratic” (p. 136). Thus, equity in egalitarian systems is “incredibly fragile and open 
to change” since “the conditions that established fairness and equity yesterday may not 
hold true today or tomorrow [and] decisions do not ‘stay’ made and must be continually 
reaccomplished to maintain their direction and bearing” (p. 136). This dynamism requires 
organizational structures in the Norway Model to be adaptive to emergent and non-linear 
relationships. As such, stories about government and oil industry collaborations are an 
example of adaptive relationships in a complex system. 
Specifically, the story about KonKraft and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
in “A New Chapter for the North” reflects how circumspection narratives can illustrate 
the plurivocal nature of complex relationships. In Chapter Four, we learned the MPE has 
been accused of collaborating with KonKraft to shape public opinion and legislation in 
favor of High North petroleum development. The closed-door nature of these meetings, 
limited mention of them in official government documents, and exclusion of local or 
environmental opponents to High North oil and gas seem contradictory to a plurivocal 
system espousing transparency and consensus based on social democratic structures of 
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organization and regulation. Yet despite these tensions in the KonKraft story, Ole Anders 
Linsdeth, a current director general at the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, says that his 
agency has an open-door pragmatic relationship with the oil industry, not a secret back-
door arrangement to close the system to opposing voices.  
Lindseth argues this relationship structure emerged with his predecessor, Tore 
Sandvold, who believes if the MPE wants “to take decisions on a basis where all relevant 
issues are taken into account, you cannot do that through a letter, for instance, from 
industry. You need to actually sit down with industry in order to learn how industry 
thinks and what makes industry tick.” This perspective reflects structural and dynamical 
complexity in recognizing the interdependent relationships between government 
regulators and private oil and gas companies in a nation whose economy is based on a 
state petroleum sector. According to Lindseth, these meetings are designed to be 
apolitical to encourage consensus with, not resistance from, from the industry. Thus, 
inviting organizations like WWFN to the table during these meetings could discourage oil 
and gas companies from being completely open about their goals. 
Furthermore, Lindseth believes that you cannot decide how to create value with 
political processes; value creation must involve investors, regulators, and commercial 
interests. In regulating and developing the national petroleum sector, the MPE must know 
how the oil industry thinks “geologically, technically, and commercially,” especially 
since “provide the activities that lead to value creation and income for the government.” 
For Lindseth, collaboration is the key; industry is a working partner, not the enemy of 
government: “If we—as they do in many countries—sit in splendid isolation here, I'm not 
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sure if we get all the relevant facts and all the relevant concerns on the table. That is why 
I am very occupied with speaking to industry, to have a very open-door policy.”  
The open-door policy has benefited Norway since they granted Phillips that initial 
exploration permit. Taxes from foreign oil companies have helped fund the Norwegian 
welfare state for generations to come, and those same companies built most of the initial 
infrastructure on the NCS, eventually allowing Norwegian petroleum and supplier 
companies to flourish. In turn, foreign oil companies have gained a lot from working with 
state agencies such as the MPE. The story behind the petroleum taxation system is one 
such incentive; oil and gas companies pay some of the highest tax rates in the world to do 
business on the Norwegian continental shelf, but they also are assured shared risks and 
rewards with the government. Moving forward, Lindseth believes government 
organizations must ask themselves, “How can you give industry the right incentives in 
order to contribute to making the cake bigger? We will never agree on how to share the 
cake, but there will be more to both parties if we make the cake bigger.”  
Balancing Risk & Reward in High North Development 
In addition to balancing state interests with those of oil and gas companies, 
balancing the risks and rewards of petroleum activity has been a central tenant of the 
Norway Model. More specifically, Chapters Three and Four illustrate awareness that the 
biggest dangers of petroleum activity are environmental, while the biggest payoffs are 
economic and social. Such awareness is not unique to developing the Norwegian 
continental shelf; all natural resource exploitation involves similar risks and rewards. 
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However, the way this balance has been enacted into policies and organizational 
structures over time is unique.  
From this perspective, Nore believes environmental issues “have been the starting 
point almost for everything in the High North or Norway.” In fact, the way that “Norway 
has handled how to analyze the environmental impact in the North,” with integrative 
management plans, “that kind of thing is a balancing act between commercial and 
environmental interests.” This balancing act involves deciding “do you want to maximize 
economic and variables, expecting that present value, or do you want to maximize the 
social impacts of oil and gas or the triple bottom line?” And moving forward, the tensions 
between risk and reward—essentially between predictability and uncertainty—only 
become more complex as petroleum activity expands into the Arctic. This creates perhaps 
the most complex balancing act for the future of the Norway Model.  
“The Ten Oil Commandments” communicates that the government has been open 
about its intentions for petroleum development in the High North, while still moving 
forward with prudence based on principles from the oil commandments such as 
coexistence. Reflecting on this decades-long history, Sandvold believes that most 
government administrations “have found quite a good balance between going slow in 
these new areas” by taking environmental and social concerns seriously and 
implementing “stricter and stronger regulations.” For example, the frameworks from The 
Petroleum Act of 1996 have been adapted for High North development with holistic 
management plans since the Bondevik placed a hold on LoVe petroleum activity in 2002.  
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Similarly, Nore explains “how you make a rational decision” in petroleum 
development decision-making is a complex process, beginning with looking at “the 
facts…at what’s the probability [of a petroleum-related disaster].” Next, you consider 
how to factor that probability “into your decision-making tools. Is that enough to stop a 
kind of development when, on the other hand, you have big incomes, you have local spin-
offs, and you have industrial development?” Overall, this process is a “balancing act 
between these two” and in the case of LoVe, “from a pure rational point of view, you 
should continue to go forward. But this is just one example…there are stacks and stacks 
of interesting stories to take here.” Thus, if the data say it is okay to drill in these areas, 
then the uncertain risk of disaster is outweighed by the predictable economic rewards.  
However, Sandvold recognizes that climate change has introduced a new element 
of uncertainty in High North decision-making in terms of balancing risks with rewards. 
He explains that “we are going to be living with this issue for a very, very, very long 
time, so we cannot…go and just develop, and develop, and develop…[and we] cannot go 
down the route of conserving and stopping. You have to find a sensible balance between 
the environmental and economic interests…this could well be the most global conflict 
issue in the next century…you have to find the balance.” The government must ensure 
the Norway Model is structurally, dynamically, and integratively complex enough to 
effectively adapt to such emergent uncertainties. The way to accomplish this complexity 
balance is through circumspection. 
Browning and Morris (2012) describe circumspection narratives as those in which 
actors “take into consideration both what happened and what would have happened had 
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circumstances been slightly different” (p. 147). In this description, we see another angle 
of circumspection in the Chapter Four stories. Two narratives in particular—the story of 
the Full City oil spill from Nina Jensen and Kristin Halvorsen’s recounting of a recent 
visit to New Orleans—are applied to explain how planning cannot mitigate the 
consequences to environmental and human safety should a Barents Sea disaster occur. 
Jensen and Halvorsen’s stories predict that if Norway, and the world for that 
matter, continues down the petroleum road despite a ticking climate change clock, it will 
soon be too late. To be circumspect is to be watchfully cautious and circumspection 
narratives are “about saving for a rainy day… learning from experience, taking timely 
action, not jumping the gun,” and other forms of cautious, well-planned, well-considered 
action (Browning & Morris, 2012, p. 15). Instead of planning for imminent peak oil by 
restructuring the Norway Model and building new national industries, the narratives in 
Chapter Four communicate the government is no longer circumspect about its future 
energy reality.  
Furthermore, the stories in Chapter Four question the narrative rationality of 
decision-making strategies such as integrated management plans for balancing risk and 
reward in the High North. Fisher (1989) outlines two components of narrative 
rationality—fidelity and coherence—to evaluate the trustworthiness and reliability of 
story’s message by finding the links between reason, value, and action. In terms of 
narrative fidelity, the stories in “A New Chapter for the North” communicate that, as 
Gaute Wahl says, “we need more knowledge.” His organization believes that integrative 
management is just a larger strategy to expand the petroleum sector.  
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This conclusion is based on scientific findings from environmental NGOs such as 
World Wildlife Federation Norway and Bellona Foundation. Nina Jensen affirms that 
these findings contradict what the government presents as scientific knowledge; she 
believes the “science is crystal clear: these areas should be protected.” In these stories, 
the success story metanarrative is called into question by presenting alternative 
interpretations of reason, value, and action in High North decision-making. 
In terms of narrative coherence, if this success story is to have a happy ending, “A 
New Chapter for the North” communicates there must be something more left to 
accomplish for the plot to make sense. As Jensen explains, “everyone can agree that oil 
has been good for Norway.” But just because oil was good for Norway in the past does 
not mean it will be in the future. Everyone loves a success story with a worthy 
protagonist; we cheer for the underdogs who overcome adversity and go from rags to 
riches without sacrificing their core values. Those like the Norwegian folk hero Ash Lad, 
who use innovative thinking and hard work to get ahead, who never forget where they 
came from and what matters most, no matter how far they have come. Therefore, to 
reason what is good for the oil industry is good for Norway does not necessarily mean 
that more money for the oil industry will build a qualitatively better Norwegian society. 
So what then, if not just money, is there left to accomplish?   
Limitations & Future Research 
Overall, this research presents many theoretical contributions for organizational 
narratology. In terms of coherence and fidelity, viewing these narratives together presents 
contradictions in reconciling past and the present traditions with future decisions about 
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Arctic petroleum development. The narrative mode thought and sensemaking metaphors 
draws attention to the temporal processes of creating and enacting meaning; past and 
events are woven into stories about where the Norway Model stands today and where it 
will go tomorrow. Using the Tamara metaphor as a lens of plurivocal interpretation, the 
juxtaposition of stories in “The Ten Oil Commandments” and “A New Chapter for the 
North” highlights the temporal balancing acts of collective and individual sensemaking 
processes involved with High North decision-making. Furthermore, viewing these stories 
as circumspection narratives in an open architecture of organizational narratology 
illustrates interpretive capacity of narratives for complex understanding.  
In addition to these contributions, several limitations of this research must also be 
considered. As with all interpretive, narratological, and case study research, the purpose 
of this study was not to test existing theory or produce generalizable results. Therefore, it 
is important to acknowledge this project could not be replicated in a different cultural or 
temporal context and produce the same findings. More specifically, three limitations to 
the findings of this study must be acknowledged. 
First, Norway is a relatively small country of five million people with a relatively 
homogenous population. Thus, to conclude the Norway Model is an ideal organizational 
system that would generalize to other countries would be an overstatement. However, 
certain plotlines of the Norwegian success story—creating one of the first and largest 
sovereign wealth funds of its kind, establishing a reputation for environmentally and 
socially responsible resource management, and maintaining status as a global leader in 
the fight against climate change—illustrate the heuristic value of these narratives. Other 
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nations have certainly expressed interested in understanding and adapting various 
structures of the Norway Model to their own cultures and governments. Therefore, this 
research offers important lessons about balancing tensions of complexity and control in 
global energy systems.  
Second, all interview data was collected after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon 
disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, which certainly affected participant responses. 
Furthermore, the government is scheduled to announce final plans for LoVe development 
after national elections in September 2013. Accordingly, the metanarrative in Chapter 
Three and localized stories of Chapter Four could be different if data collection occurred 
after such a punctuated event in the success story plotline. However, subsequent 
fieldwork trips and additional data sources enhanced the longitudinal perspective of my 
interpretations. Triangulating multiple data sources such as the interview data, archival 
data, and observational field notes I used in this project allows researchers to enhance the 
validity of theoretical categories (Creswell & Miller, 2000; Lindlof & Taylor, 2010; 
Maxwell, 2004; Yin, 1999).  
Third, I was the primary instrument of interpretation in analyzing and 
reconstructing these narratives, which naturally raises issues of reliability and validity 
with their theoretical implications. To maximize these components, I also relied on 
theoretical triangulation as consistent with the degrees of freedom approach to case study 
methods (Campbell, 1975). When interpreting theory in projects such as this dissertation, 
comparing emergent concepts with a broad range of conflicting and similar literature is 
essential for building internal validity, sharpening generalizability, and improving 
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concept definition (Eisenhardt, 1989). Theoretical triangulation also allows researchers to 
remain open to new directions for theoretical development (Creswell & Miller, 2000; 
Maxwell, 2004). Finally, I utilized thick description (Geertz, 1973) throughout this 
dissertation to increase the transferability (Guba & Lincoln, 1989) of its theoretical 
contributions to other research contexts. 
In terms of transferability, future research should consider the many ways in 
which narrative can be applied to understanding and describing this complex 
organizational system. This project focused on articulating tensions of complexity and 
control in circumspection narratives, but those are certainly not the only stories that could 
be interpreted from this data. For example, celebration narratives could be used to make 
sense of culture and identity as illustrated by the David and Goliath metaphor referenced 
in Chapter Two. And in keeping with the open architecture metaphor, a unique type of 
narrative might well be interpreted from this data. Although I primarily describe the 
Norway Model as a success story, other researchers—using a different theoretical 
orientation or methodological approach—could offer a more dire and different 
description of the political, social, environmental, and organizational implications of this 
metanarrative. 
In addition to examining the relevance of narrative communication to the Norway 
Model, future research should consider how organizational narratology could be applied 
to studying other complex systems of globalized organization. Just as practitioners must 
complicate their management approaches enough to match the complexity of the systems 
they manage, researchers must complicate their methods and theories to match the 
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complexity of the systems they study. While logico-scientific modes of understanding are 
important for establishing causal relationships and predicting outcomes, narrative modes 
of understanding can capture more nuanced meanings in complex systems of 
organization. In this way, organizational communication researchers using a narrative 
approach have a unique opportunity.  
When it comes to understanding some of the most socially relevant and complex 
issues of our time—climate change, globalization, and energy management—many 
disciplines have fallen short; prediction and causality are nearly impossible to establish in 
these dynamic and emergent issues. As such, studying large, complex systems of 
communication such as the Norway Model can be overwhelming. In taking on such a 
task, the organizational narratologist should not concern themselves with limitations. To 
make innovative and insightful interpretations regarding organizational narratives, 
researchers must be deliberate and confident. In utilizing the simplicity of narrative 
structure to understand complex organization, communication scholars can make both 
significant interdisciplinary theoretical contributions and applied contributions for 





“We are the first generation with scientific understanding of the new global risks 
facing humanity…Like no other generation before, we can choose the type of 
future that we will leave to the next generation. A transition to a safe and 
prosperous future is possible, but will require the full use of humanity’s 
extraordinary capacity for innovation and creativity.” 
Gro Harlem Bruntland, former prime minister of Norway & member of the U.N. 
secretary general’s High-level Panel on Global Sustainability 
The Norwegian success story is a unique oil and gas narrative; although this is 
certainly a tale of great wealth, power, and transformation, there is no villain. True, 
examples such as secret KonKraft meetings, fisherman protesting oil platforms in Røst, 
and the Full City disaster remind us that not all policies are created in the same spirit of 
transparency, democracy, or coexistence. Yet even among those organizational actors 
who decry the future of hydrocarbon energy, there is remarkable agreement that oil and 
gas has been good for Norway. Indeed, this success promotes an even greater sense of 
responsibility from organizations and actors involved in Norwegian natural resource 
policy-making, a responsibility to teach the rest of the world about environmentally and 
socially conscious energy production.  
Furthermore, the narratives of Chapters Three and Four imply a latent tension 
between Norwegian cultural identity and the direction the petroleum sector is headed. 
These narrators are proud of what they have accomplished in such a short time and 
believe others can learn from their story. They are determined to prove wrong anyone 
that says that an oil-producing nation cannot be environmentally responsible. They pride 
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themselves on promoting moral development practices both in Norway and abroad. They 
don’t want to just share their knowledge with foreign oil companies; they want to 
promote a Norway Model of clean energy management all over the world. 
From this perspective, the Norway Model does not necessarily make sense in 
terms of narrative coherence and fidelity. Yes, burning fossil fuels is warming the planet, 
but Norway is a world leader in in progressive climate change policies. Yes, renewable 
energy technology is important for the future, but most of the state’s investments should 
continue going towards the petroleum sector. Yes, High North petroleum activity could 
damage rich ecosystems, but comprehensive management plans will mitigate those risks 
and ensure disaster preparedness. Yes, some people in the North do not want petroleum 
activity in their backyards, but they also need jobs and tax income from the oil industry to 
keep their communities thriving. 
This is the central issue in current Norwegian resource management debates—and 
global energy debates in general—about shifting course for the future; industrialized 
society embraces petroleum for the possibilities it has created, but rejects our dependence 
on a finite resource that may very well be destroying our planet. In this dissertation, we 
see such tension through stories about High North development. Without taking the risks 
of expanding oil and gas activity into the Arctic, the national petroleum sector, the 
foundation of modern Norwegian society and its marker of global distinction, could 
become as depleted as the current fossil fuel resources on the continental shelf. But by 
using the same expertise and regulatory savvy that made this country a global model for 
responsible resource management, Norway will overcome new challenges and learn for 
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the future. Calling something a fairytale means there is a happy ending; the key to this 
story’s happy ending is staying the course of fossil fuel development.  
Thus, the next chapter of the Norwegian success story remains to be written and 
this dissertation has argued that narratives about the past, present, and future of the 
Norway Model will shape the course of natural resource management policies worldwide.  
Energy management is perhaps the most complex policy issue of our time, and existing 
models of scientific discovery are being outpaced by the rapid changes to our physical 
and political global environment. For example, although we know the planet is warming 
at increasing rates each year, we still cannot accurately predict what those changes mean 
for the future. The Arctic is symbolic to this shift; without global warming and melting 
ice, this new frontier for oil and gas discovery would not be possible.  
When dealing with such overwhelming uncertainty, especially in decision-making 
about natural resource production, narratives can be applied toward understanding the 
nuanced meaning behind organizational systems like the Norway Model. Taken together, 
“The Ten Oil Commandments” and “A New Chapter for the North” are both synchronic 
in their storying of one society’s success over the last century, but also diachronic in 
tracing the historical transformation of a culture that has lessons for a changing world. At 
one time, the Arctic was the last place many people wanted to go. Norway was once 
positioned at the edge of the world, but now it’s an epicenter of global interest. People 
want to know how they built their fortune, how they created such a healthy and happy 
society, and how they haven’t failed like so many other resource-dependent economies. 
As perhaps the most successful system of its kind in the world, scholars and policy 
180 
makers alike have much to learn from studying these narratives. Overall, conceptualizing 
this Model’s evolution as a narrative offers tangible entry points for understanding how 








What does High North mean? 
How do you define the term High North? 
Why is the High North important to Norway and other countries? 
 
General perceptions of High North oil and gas development 
What are the potential benefits of oil and gas development (OGD)? Who benefits from 
OGD in the High North? 
What are the potential risks of OGD – local, regional, national, international? 
What are the short and long term effects of OGD?  Please give me examples. 
 
Perceptions of power and representation in decision-making 
Who are the different actors (national, local, regional, etc.) in political OGD decision-
making?  Of these actors, does any have a louder voice than others? 
Who should be involved in OGD policy decision-making that is not currently?  Who is 
involved that should not be? 
What role do Norwegian voters play in OGD policy decision-making?  Give me an 
example. 
 
Perceptions of government 
What are the government’s responsibilities to Norwegian citizens, international citizens, 
and future generations of both populations in OGD decision-making? 
Who is the government most accountable to in OGD policy decisions (i.e. constituents, 
Norwegian citizens, humankind)?  How is that accountability manifested?  Who is 
rewarded and punished for their OGD decisions? 
How is the government addressing differing views towards OGD? How should the 
government address differing views towards OGD? 
 
Issue Framing 
How does your organization frame its views towards Norwegian OGD? 
How do opposing organizations frame their views of OGD? 
What arguments do you make against these opponents’ views? 
 
Media coverage 
How do the media portray OGD in Norway?   
How do the media represent your party’s views on High North OGD?  Is this portrayal 
accurate?  What is the most inaccurate portrayal you can recall? The instance where 
someone got it especially right? 




What is Norway’s role in the worldwide stage and how does OGD affect that role?  
What are Norway’s responsibilities to the international community? 
Where do opportunities and challenges exist in working with other countries in OGD? 
 
National values and identity 
What are the core national values of Norwegian people? 
What does OGD mean for the future national values of Norway? 
 
Perceptions of the BP oil spill 
What do you think about the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico? 
Who should be held accountable for the spill and its long-term consequences? 
Do you think this incident has implications for Norwegian resource policies? 
 
Closing  
Now that we have covered these issues and you can see what I am about, what else 
should I be asking?   





Interview Participants & Organizational Affiliations 
Name Title Affiliation  
Ivar Kristiansen Member of Parliament Conservative Party  
Siri Meling Member of Parliament Conservative Party  
Janne Sjelmo 
Nordaas 
Member of Parliament Centre Party  
Lars-Andreas Lunde Parliamentary Advisor Conservative Party 
Line Aune Kristin Senior Adviser Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Vegard Kaale Senior Adviser Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Jostein Mykletun Ambassador/Special Adviser  
& High North Project Manager 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Helge Eriksen Mayor of Harstad Conservative Party  
Ole Anders Lindseth Director General Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
Peter Nore Director, Energy Department NORAD 
Frederic Hauge President Bellona Foundation 
Timothy Moore Manager U.S. Embassy  
Eivind Sommerseth Special Adviser Research Council of Norway 
Tom Cato Karlson City Council Member Progress Party  
Kenneth Svedsen Member of Parliament Progress Party  
Anna Junggeren Member of Parliament Labour Party  
Gaute Wahl President People's Action  
Turrid Thomassen National Party Leader Red Party 
Kristian Halvorsen National Party Leader 
Minister of Knowledge 
Former Minister of Finance 
Socialist Left Party (SV) 
Ministry of Knowledge 
Ministry of Finance 
Siv Jensen National Party Leader Progress Party  
Nina Jensen Conservation Policy Director World Wildlife Fund Norway 




Organizations & Descriptions 
Organization Description 
Bellona Foundation International environmental NGO and think-
tank headquartered in Oslo with offices in 
Brussels, Murmansk, and St. Petersburg 
Centre Party (CP) Centrist political party with fourth-largest 
parliamentary representation (11 seats); part 
of Red/Green coalition 
Conservative Party (H) Centrist/conservative-leaning political party 
with third-largest parliamentary representation 
(30 seats)  
Ethical Council Government-mandated council for monitoring 
and enforcing Ethical Guidelines for the 
Pension Fund investments 
KonKraft Oil and gas industry company coalition 
promoting High North development and 
cooperation initiatives for government policy 
Labour Party (A) Centrist political party with largest 
representation in parliament (64 seats); prime 
minister and leader of Red/Green coalition 
Ministry of Environment (MoE) Norwegian ministry for coordinating 
government environmental policy initiatives 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) Norwegian ministry for regulating national 
taxation system, managing government assets, 
and preparing fiscal budgets 
Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs 
(MoFCA) 
Norwegian ministry for regulating fisheries, 
aquaculture industries, seafood safety and fish 
safety, harbors, sea transport infrastructure, 
and pollution emergency preparedness 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Norwegian ministry for creating and 
implementing foreign policy initiatives 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
(MPE) 
Norwegian ministry for managing all NCS 
petroleum operations and regulatory 
compliance monitoring and enforcement 
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Norwegian Aid Development (NORAD) Government organization for coordinating 
international energy aid and technology 
transfer initiatives to developing countries 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
(NPD) 
Supports the MPE with regulatory compliance 
monitoring and enforcement; enhances 
exploration and production efficiency and 
infrastructure coordination 
People’s Action Oil-Free Lofoten, 
Vesteralen, & Senja (PA) 
Grassroots organization to protest LoVe 
petroleum activity 
Petoro Government corporation for managing state 
activity and interests on the NCS since 2001 
Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) Independent government organization for 
establishing and monitoring safety regulations 
for NCS activity 
Phillips Group  Norwegian off-shoot of Oklahoma-based 
Phillips Petroleum Co. 
Progress Party (FrP) Far right-leaning political party with second-
largest parliamentary representation (41 seats) 
Red Party (R) Far left-leaning political party (not currently 
represented in Storting) 
Red/Green Coalition Ruling parliamentary coalition between 
Labour, Socialist Left, and Centre parties 
Research Council of Norway (RCN) National funding organization for government 
policy research initiatives 
Socialist Left Party (SV) Left-leaning political party with fourth-largest 
parliamentary representation (11 seats); part 
of Red/Green coalition 
Statoil Formerly state-owned, now private 
international oil and gas company; 
government owns 67% of shares 
World Wildlife Federation Norway 
(WWFN) 
Norwegian branch of international 
environmental NGO and conservation think-
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Chronological Listing of State Petroleum Policies 
Date Policy 
1814 Norway declared itself independent from Denmark and ratified a 
national constitution 
1905 Sweden approves Storting-approved separation with Norway and 
independent constitutional monarchy established 
1906 Storting approves Original Concession Act (i.e., “Panic Act”)  
1917 Storting approves Concession Act and Water Regulations Act  
1925 Storting approves Act of 17 July 1925 No. 11 (i.e., “The Svalbard 
Act”) to enforce Norwegian law and sovereignty over Svalbard 
May 1963 Royal Decree Relating to the Sovereignty of Norway Over the 
Seabed and Subsoil Outside the Norwegian Coast (i.e., “Only the 
King” decree) 
June 1963 Storting approves Act of 21 June 1963 No. 12, Relating to 
Exploration for and Exploitation of Submarine Natural Resources 
(i.e., “Submarine Resources Act”) 
March 1965 Maritime border agreements reached with Denmark and Great Britain 
April 1965 Ministry of Industry advertises first round of NCS licensing 
applications  
August 1965 Ministry of Industry announces NCS licensing concessions 
June 1966 Storting approves Act of 17 June 1966 No. 12, Relating to National 
Insurance (“The National Insurance Act”) 
June 1970 Storting publishes report estimating Ekofisk tax income value at 100-
500 NOK (16-85 USD) in tax income per year for the next 20-30 
years 
June 1971 Follow-up Storting report estimating Ekofisk tax income value at 2.5-
3.5 billion NOK (45-65 million USD) per year for the next 20-30 
years 
June 1971 Storting approves White Paper No. 76 (1970-1971), Exploration for 
and exploitation of subsea natural resources on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf, etc. (i.e., “The Ten Oil Commandments”) 
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June 1972 Storting establishes Norwegian State Oil Company (i.e., Statoil) and 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate by unanimous vote 
December 1972 Follow-up Royal Decree of December 8, 1972, Relating to 
Exploration for and Exploitation of Petroleum in the Seabed and 
Substrata of the Norwegian Continental Shelf (i.e., “Only the King” 
decree) 
June 1973 Storting approves White Paper No. 25 (1973-1974), Petroleum 
activity and its position to society as a follow-up to the Ten Oil 
Commandments 
June 1975 Act of 13 June 1975 No. 35, Relating to the Taxation of Subsea 
Petroleum Deposits (i.e., “The Petroleum Taxation Act”) 
1978 Storting creates Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
1979 Storting transfers environmental and worker safety regulation 
responsibilities to Ministry of Local Government and Labour 
1979 MPE enacts agreements between Statoil and foreign NCS operators 
to encourage technology transfer during fourth licensing round 
March 1985  Storting approves Act of March 1985 No. 11, Relating to Petroleum 
Activities to replace Submarine Resources Act 
June 1985 Storting approves White Paper No. 33 (1984-1985) Concerning the 
effect of the reorganisation of the State’s participation in the 
petroleum industry and splits state NCS activity investments between 
Statoil and the newly created State’s Direct Financial Interest 
June 1990 Storting approves Act of 22 June 1990 No. 36, Relating to the 
Government Petroleum Fund (i.e., The Government Petroleum Fund 
Act”) and establishes the State Petroleum Fund (i.e., “The Fund”) 
December 1990 Storting approves Act of 21 December 1990 No. 72, Relating to Tax 
Discharge of CO2 in the Petroleum Activities on the Continental 
Shelf and establishes a carbon tax on oil and gas activity 
November 1996 Storting approves Act of 29 November 1996 No. 35, Relating to 
Petroleum Activities (i.e., “The Petroleum Act”) to replace 1985 
update of Submarine Resources Act 
January 2001  Bondevik government places moratorium on Barents Sea exploration 
March 2001 Storting approves White Paper No. 29 (2000-2001), Guidelines for 
the economic policy and establishes handlingsregelen (i.e., “the four-
percent rule”) for managing The Fund 
June 2001 Storting approves privatization of Statoil and establishes Petoro 
195 
 
June 2001 Storting approves Act of 15 June 2001 No. 79, Relating to the 
Protection of the Environment in Svalbard 
March 2002 Storting approves White Paper No. 12 (2001-2002), Protecting the 
riches of the sea to formalize integrated management plan strategy 
June 2003 Storting approves White Paper No. 17 (2002-2003), Relating to State 
Supervision and establishes Petroleum Safety Authority 
January 2004 WWFN publishes report on environmental sensitivity of LoVe and 
Barents Sea ecosystems, condemning petroleum development 
November 2004 Royal Decree of 19 November 2004 establishes Ethical Guidelines 
for the Petroleum Fund international investment strategy 
October 2005 Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development 
commissions Barlindhaug Report on High North ripple effects 
October 2005 Stoltenberg government announces Soria Moria Declaration for High 
North strategy 
November 2005 Ministry of Environment publishes Barents Sea Management Plan 
May 2006 ECON consulting publishes 2025 Rings in the Water, projecting that 
the High North petroleum development would create 10,000 new jobs 
in Norway by 2025 
June 2007 Storting approves White Paper No. 34 (2006-2007), Norwegian 
climate policy and sets goal of exceeding Kyoto Protocol by 10%  
February 2011 Storting approves Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the 
Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and 
Cooperation  
June 2011 MPE presents An industry for the future: Norway’s petroleum 
activities to Storting  







Sample Theoretical Memo 
What is unique about the Norwegian approach to foreign policy and resource 
extraction?  
● The brand of policy-making where EVERYBODY WINS makes it more attractive to 
industry (for future and sustained investment, despite high regulation and taxation) 
and foreign governments (to emulate and work with in decision-making).   
● Consensus and dialogue as rational, pragmatic forms of negotiation in decision-
making in political/policy-making organizations.   
● Open, transparent, invitational dialogue is motivated by self-interest (as put by JM) 
and has allowed them to have a leading seat at the table in this discussion from the 
beginning.  By offering a predictable and credible approach, they are also now being 
modeled by other countries such as China, therefore influencing the direction of the 
issue and policy for the long term with potential conflicts.   
● JM stressed that Norwegian foreign policy was based on HIGH NORTH LOW 
TENSION.  This means anticipating an avoiding conflict with Russia. 
● They have also accomplished social success in terms of equality between the sexes, 
"eradicating poverty" (JM), relatively low crime, etc. while still maintaining 
significant wealth, which other mid-size/small nations rich in natural resources have 
not accomplished, giving support towards adopting/adapting their communication 
strategy/management practice in other countries building a reliable framework. 
  
What are the specific components of this policy-model? 
● Consistency: practice at home what you preach abroad 
● Consensus: a cultural value based on Norwegian history 
● Neutrality: separating energy and politics on the international stage (e.g., reliable 
source of energy for Europe and companies, international peace-brokering) 
● Innovation: best technology, research, trying to build up Northern education  
● Rational: most informed policy because based on facts, not ideology, and also invites 
everyone to have a seat at the table 
● Networks: relationships with industry, NGOs, local communities, and other actors 
● Resources: they have the money to back it up, thus have proven that this strategy 
works in shaping oil and gas development  
● Clarity: clearly articulated goals, outcomes, and evaluations 
● Foresight: designed for long-term engagement 
● Culturally valuable: democracy, humanitarianism, environmentalism 
 
 What do I need to do to build this model? 
● Locate the beginning, current, and future of Norwegian model's history 
● Locate potential critiques of its application to other country's government systems 
● Build rationale for why it benefits industry, government, and people in general  
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